


Hegel and Mind

Rethinking Philosophical Psychology



Richard Dien Winfield



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
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In memory of my mother, Lillian Yudien Winfield (1921–2008)

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Introduction

Thinking about mind has long proven treacherous despite perennial claims that nothing could be more knowable. Concepts adequate for capturing mental life have been just as elusive as their all too familiar prey. The subjective, self-active character pervading every aspect of mind continues to challenge conceptualization, especially when objectivity gets construed in ways leaving no foothold for subjectivity in the world. Theories limiting themselves to efficient causality and mechanistic explanation can no more grasp mental subjectivity than can theories appealing to the external teleology of artifacts or the internal teleology of life. When nature is construed in solely mechanistic terms, objects are determined from without with indifference to what they are, precluding any self-related activity. Artifacts, by contrast, may fulfill some end by being made to embody a form fitted to function, but artifacts cannot impose form upon themselves and exhibit the active self-informing process by which mind can subjectively determine itself. Although life does comprise a self-sustaining process, by itself the interdependence of **organic unity still lacks the subjective centrality** by which mind is in virtue of how it apprehends itself to be. Something more must be **provided to conceive mental subjectivity and how mental process can have a worldly realization.**

If **conceiving mind were not forbidding enough**, modern investigators have impeded their quests by treating mind as an epistemological foundation, determining the object of knowledge. Conflating logic and philosophical psychology, this move renders knowledge relative to privileged mental conditions. How these can be immediately transparent remains just as inexplicable as how they can be not just enabling conditions of all beliefs, but determining grounds distinguishing the true from false. If what is knowable is relative to some psychological foundation, that foundation either is accessible directly or is itself a conditioned construct. Any direct accessibility of the psychological foundation, however, contradicts the very view that what is knowable is derivatively constructed from some structure of mind. Conversely, relegating the psychological foundation to a conditioned construct contradicts its privileged role as the alleged foundation of knowledge.

The dilemma of confusing epistemology with the theory of mind has been compounded by the equating of mind and consciousness.

This identification traps all knowing in the opposition of consciousness, where cognition confronts its object as an independent given providing the standard of truth for knowledge. Correspondence can then never be confirmed since consciousness must always access its objects through its own "representations", instead of directly as they are in themselves. Owing to consciousness' own constitutive opposition, whenever consciousness attempts to certify whether its knowledge conforms to its object, consciousness discovers that the "object" with which it compares its belief is the object as consciousness *represents* it to itself. Consciousness' putative knowledge is thus left without certification. Consequently, if the standpoint of consciousness is taken to be insurmountable, neither that very assertion nor any other can be successfully validated.

Beyond conflating mind and consciousness, many contemporary thinkers have further gone astray by considering all consciousness to be conceptually discursive, precluding any pre-linguistic conscious awareness. Following Kant, they have treated consciousness as inherently discursive, as if awareness of objectivity depended upon conceptual regularities rooted in linguistic intelligence. This makes unfathomable how language and thought can be acquired. If individuals could not even be conscious or self-consciousness without already enjoying discursive rationality, they would be unable to distinguish themselves from other minds and other things and learn how the expressions of themselves and others can communicate anything about the world they observe in common.

However prevalent all these quandaries, they become surmountable with the help of thinking through the neglected arguments of the great philosophical maverick who refuses to give philosophical psychology epistemological significance, to banish subjectivity from objectivity, to conflate mind and consciousness, to treat all consciousness as discursive, and to ignore accounting for the psychological conditions of philosophical reason. That maverick is Hegel and his pioneering contributions to the philosophy of mind are ready to be mined once attention turns to the analyses where he systematically conceives the different spheres of mental life. These analyses are preeminently located in Hegel's investigation of "Subjective Spirit" in his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, an investigation ignored almost as much in the vast literature on Hegel as in contemporary philosophy of mind. Attention has instead focused upon Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel does not give a positive account of mind, but instead provides an internal, immanent critique of the misguided approach of modern epistemology, which takes the opposition of consciousness as definitive of knowing. The outcome of

that investigation is wholly negative, revealing how the standpoint presuming that knowing always addresses something given cannot sustain its own defining assumption that cognition always has presuppositions or foundations. By ignoring both this outcome and the positive theory of mind developed by Hegel in his *Encyclopedia* Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, thinkers have tended to embrace the conflation of mind and consciousness, losing sight of the radical solutions Hegel provides for the dilemmas plaguing modern philosophy of mind.

The following work attempts to plumb the riches to be found in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and rethink some of the most fundamental problems of philosophical psychology.

Chapter 1 introduces Hegel's thoroughgoing challenge to the philosophy of mind, investigating how Hegel's basic division of mind into spheres of a preconscious psyche, a pre-linguistic consciousness, and intelligence provide a framework for resolving the most daunting problems of philosophical psychology.

Chapter 2 thereupon examines how Hegel's conception of mind overcomes both mind-body dualisms and the dilemmas of the problematic remedies proposed by Spinoza, materialist reductionists, Aristotle, and Searle.

Chapter 3 attempts to clarify the distinctive character of mental reality by drawing upon Hegel's logical analyses of mechanism, chemism, life, and teleology in conjunction with his analyses of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence. Arguments contained in these discussions are enlisted to illuminate why mind cannot be reduced to any mechanism and why machines can never feel, be conscious, or think.

Chapter 4 then proceeds to draw upon Hegel's analysis of recognition to show how self-consciousness depends upon not only consciousness of spatial objects and the self's body, but desire and intersubjective relationships. These interactions comprise a pre-linguistic recognition process constituting a nondiscursive self-consciousness without which linguistic intelligence is impossible.

Chapter 5 leaves the psyche and consciousness behind to focus on intelligence so as to uncover the psychological realization of reason. Thinking through Hegel's account of how representation paves the way for thought, this investigation clarifies why thinking involves intelligence rather than just consciousness, why conceptualization involves a universality beyond the bounds of representation, and how semiotic imagination enables intelligence to enter the realm of thought, liberated from the opposition of consciousness. The philosophy of mind thereby accounts for the psychological conditions of its own theorizing.

Chapter 6 turns from theoretical to practical intelligence to explore the psychology of will. The examination of Hegel's treatment uncovers why will involves intelligence rather than merely psyche and consciousness. It further explores how the successive stages in the will's psychological development provide the conditions making possible normative conduct. In this way, the conception of practical intelligence brings the philosophy of mind to closure by arriving at the threshold of ethics.

Chapter 7 makes explicit the epistemological ramifications of the preceding investigations of the different spheres of mind. Contrasting Davidson with Hegel, the discussion examines why neither consciousness nor the intersubjectivity of linguistic intelligence can serve as epistemological foundations. Although the different spheres of mind may comprise enabling conditions of knowledge, they cannot serve as determining conditions distinguishing the true and false beliefs they equally make possible. As Hegel shows, the intersubjectivity of linguistic intelligence does not render reason socially relative. The truth of discourse instead rests upon the intrinsic connection between the autonomy of conceptual determination and the independence of objectivity.

1

Hegel's Challenge to the Philosophy of Mind

The modern controversy in the philosophy of mind

Much debate in modern philosophy of mind has revolved around whether awareness of self, awareness of objects, and awareness of others are intrinsically connected. Controversy has raged ever since Descartes examined what could be doubted, found certainty only of "I" as a thinking thing, and then presumed that self-consciousness could be had without consciousness of anything else. Kant contested this solipsism by showing that self-consciousness could not be apart from consciousness of objects in space. Insofar as intuition of time requires awareness of a persisting backdrop that only spatial objectivity provides, the temporality of self-awareness is inseparable from consciousness of nature in space. Kant's transcendental idealism, however, leaves objectivity merely an appearance, relative to consciousness. As a law-governed realm appearing to consciousness in general, phenomena do retain a comparatively nonsubjective character consisting in an intersubjective commonality extending to all conscious selves. Yet this law-governed character of appearance excludes any experience of spontaneity. Given that spontaneity is basic to selfhood, this exclusion renders problematic consciousness of other selves, just as much as self-consciousness. Hence, on his own terms, Kant cannot make any legitimate theoretical claims about intersubjectivity. Moreover, since no distinction can be drawn between what is general and individual if no plurality is knowable, Kant can hardly claim any knowledge about consciousness in general.

These difficulties might seem to be resolved by the reconception of mind following in the wake of Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson. On this view, self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of others are inseparably connected. What makes their connection

inextricable is the relation between knowledge and concepts on the one hand, and concepts and language on the other. By invoking justification and the appeal to reasons, knowledge involves propositions and the concepts they contain. This is true of self-knowledge as much as of knowledge of other objects, including other selves. Concepts and the propositions they inhabit pre-suppose language. Because language is not private, the acquisition of the concepts making knowledge possible is bound up with the intersubjective process of learning and using a language. To the extent that words are learned by observing how others employ them in reference to commonly perceived objects, there can be no knowledge that does not rest upon the conjuncture of self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of other speakers. Accordingly, one cannot coherently entertain Cartesian doubt and be certain of one's own existence while being uncertain of everything else, nor can one be self-conscious and conscious of objects in space without knowing other interlocutors.

By itself, the connection between knowledge, propositions, and language need not bear upon the validity of the knowledge claims made possible by linguistic interaction. The connection can simply mean that any certainty of self cannot be coherently detached from certainty of some objects other than the self, and from certainty of other selves. The followers of Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson, however, accord epistemological significance to the inseparability of self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of others. So treating linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of truth presents problems. Because communication is contingent upon what interlocutors happen to recognize in common as the objective reference of commonly employed expressions, making this interaction determinative of not just what terms mean, but whether they provide knowledge, renders knowledge relative to contingent linguistic interaction. Given how meanings are interconnected in the ever-changing web of language, what results is a relativist holism, wherein no concepts or principles have any necessity and where knowledge claims are justified with conventional standards as contingent and variable as the rules of any game.

Paradoxically, if this were true, the theory affirming the interconnection of knowledge, concepts, and language, would be relative to linguistic convention, leaving it and every other knowledge claim suspect and corrigible. The holistic interconnection of meanings cannot redeem their truth by some principle of charity, for that idea is equally contingent upon shared practices neither infallible nor unwavering. This difficulty reflects the dilemma of seeking to know before knowing,

that is, of specifying determining conditions of cognition as if such conditions could be identified without falling into the circularity of already employing cognition.

Compounding this problem is the accompanying presumption that discursive knowledge and consciousness are inseparable. Their connection is implied by the assumption that consciousness is a *knowledge* of objects and that therefore subjects cannot be conscious without disposing of concepts and propositions and the linguistic engagement that these involve. This view is anticipated by Kant, who makes the objectivity of experience depend upon conceptual determination of intuitions through necessary judgments. Allegedly, because the given content and association of representations may just be subjective, they cannot convey anything objective unless intuitions are necessarily conceptually ordered. Although Kant does not take account of the intersubjective implications of the discursive character of conceptual determination and objective awareness, he hereby paves the way for the linguistic turn.

Needless to say, if consciousness of objects depends upon concepts and propositions and linguistic interaction, the same will be true of self-consciousness. Then neither dumb animals nor children who have yet to acquire language can be either conscious or self-conscious.

These exclusions might seem benign. If, however, one considers the scenario where individuals acquire knowledge of self, objects, and other selves by becoming conscious, self-conscious, and discursive at one blow, one must wonder how selves lacking consciousness, let alone self-consciousness, can first perform the triangulation establishing meanings. How can individuals discriminate themselves from commonly given objects, let alone, discriminate their responses from those of others, unless some form of consciousness and self-consciousness is already available?

The unheralded challenge of Hegel's theory of mind

Hegel's theory of mind is crucial for resolving these difficulties. This has been largely unrecognized due to two circumstances. On the one hand, Hegel's theory has been co-opted by Wilfrid Sellars and such epigones as Robert Brandom, who have presumed that it anticipates the linguistic holism they advance.¹ On the other hand, the details of Hegel's systematic treatment of mind have been among the least discussed portions of his philosophy. A voluminous secondary literature continues to focus upon the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as if truths about mind could be legitimately

culled from its propaedeutic observation of the self-elimination of the standpoint of consciousness. Meanwhile, the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the *Encyclopedia*, where Hegel offers his proper philosophy of mind, has hardly been investigated. Symptomatic of this neglect is Charles Taylor's mammoth tome, *Hegel*, which allocates not a single page to the doctrine of subjective spirit.² If one bothers to examine Hegel's analysis of subjective spirit, it is hard to miss the fundamental departure from the problematics that have plagued modern philosophy of mind from Descartes through Davidson.

To begin with, Hegel does not treat mind as an epistemological foundation, which determines the truth of knowledge and thereby must be known before anything else. Instead, Hegel predicates the systematic theory of mind upon the successive investigations of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic*, and the *Philosophy of Nature*. Before mind can be addressed, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* must provide access to systematic philosophy by eliminating as principle of knowing the opposition of consciousness and its appeal to the given. The *Science of Logic* must then furnish a presuppositionless self-development of categories, establishing the determinacies that any account of reality incorporates and further qualifies. Finally, the *Philosophy of Nature* must unfold the idea of physical reality, which any other realities contain.

That the investigation of mind presupposes all these inquiries has decisive ramifications. First, although the account of mind must end up conceiving how real minds can think the truth, in doing so, that account will not fall into the foundationalist trap of treating mind as a juridical epistemological principle, mandating what knowledge is valid. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* has unmasked the internal untenability of the whole enterprise of treating knowing as having foundations, as having something given as its standard of truth. For its part, the *Science of Logic* has effected the positive deed of showing how categories are determinable without appeal to any givens. If these efforts be taken seriously, it is too late for philosophical psychology to retain any epistemological ambitions. Instead, the conception of mind will explain how real individuals can think, leaving undetermined which thoughts are true among those that are thinkable. The philosophy of mind can then escape invoking epistemological foundations and having to know before knowing, which would be unavoidable if true knowledge could only be ascertained by first knowing mind and its foundational role.

Second, by presupposing systematic logic's self-development of categories, the philosophy of mind can escape the self-refuting pragmatic holism that results when all thought is left conditioned by contingent

linguistic practice. Instead of making conceptual determination hostage to arbitrary language games, undercutting all universal claims about thought and language, the philosophy of mind can take advantage of an independent determination of categories whose freedom from foundations signifies a liberation from corrigible convention.

Third, by following upon the systematic determination of nature, from the pure mechanics of matter in motion, through physical and chemical reactions, to the life process involving all dimensions of nature, the philosophy of mind can escape the mind/body dualism making so inscrutable self-consciousness, consciousness of others, and action. Instead of setting nature and mind apart as self-contained substances whose relationship becomes inexplicable, Hegel's placement of mind as the outcome of nature leaves mind inherently connected to a physical world in which there is life. Moreover, because results of immanent development contain what they presuppose, Hegel here presents mind not just as a result of the animal organism, but as incorporating that organism as a constitutive element of mental life. On this basis, mind is necessarily a living entity, not merely in the world, but metabolically interacting with it. Whatever theoretical challenges this point of departure may involve, it precludes the dualist problems of connecting a disembodied mind with nature or bridging an opposition of freedom and determinism. By being in part an animal in the world, mind never faces the dilemma of dealing with an ontologically incommensurate domain. In acting, for example, mind never wields an immaterial agency exerting external causation upon the body. Instead, action is the self-activity of a being that always involves animal physiology.³

These implications of the place of the concept of mind within systematic philosophy set the stage for the more thoroughgoing challenge residing in Hegel's actual delineation of mind. Whereas most modern treatments tend to identify mind with consciousness, Hegel conceives mental reality involving three successively determined processes: the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence, all of which involve life, but are not reducible to it. These mental realms do not comprise three parts or powers of mind, given independently of one another. If that were the case, mind would be rendered a thing, whose unity would be problematic. Instead, psyche, consciousness, and intelligence are successive stages in the self-constitution of the totality of mind. Given this order of development, intelligence involves consciousness and psyche, consciousness involves psyche, and psyche comprises the minimal mental process without which no others can function.

Accordingly, it is possible for an animal organism to have a psyche without possessing consciousness or intelligence. This may be because (1) the organism by nature never develops these further mental processes, (2) the organism is still immature and will later acquire consciousness and/or intelligence, or (3) the individual has lost consciousness and/or intelligence through injury or disease. Similarly, an individual with a psyche may also possess consciousness without having intelligence. Once more, this can be due to congenital limitations related to species being or impaired prenatal development, immaturity, or loss of intelligence due to some harm. These options in the possible configuration of mind raise important issues regarding the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence.

First, if the psyche can be had without consciousness and intelligence, but not conversely, it must be possible to identify a mental process that is not conscious or intelligent, yet provides some mental activity that consciousness as well as intelligence cannot do without. Further, to the degree that the psyche supervenes upon the most developed form of life, animal existence, there must be some way of distinguishing between the pre-conscious activity of the psyche, and the sensibility and irritability differentiating animals from plants. Unlike Aristotle, for whom the psyche is the principle of life, possessed by plants as well as animals in its minimal form of nutritive process, Hegel here presents the psyche as something that only certain animals will possess, without necessarily having consciousness.

Two important consequences follow from the psyche subsuming animal life and making possible consciousness and intelligence: machines are precluded from being conscious or genuinely intelligent and any mind, finite or infinite, involving no animal body is rendered suspect. Consequences no less crucial, especially for the connection of consciousness, self-consciousness, and language, follow from Hegel's determination of consciousness prior to intelligence.

To begin with, the very distinction between these two spheres permits what any conflation of mind with consciousness prohibits: that intelligence can transcend the opposition of consciousness, whose constitutive reference to the given fatally compromises any attempt to transform certainty into knowledge. In this respect, Hegel's differentiation of consciousness and intelligence provides the psychological *enabling* conditions for systematic philosophy, which, as foundation-free, has no juridical *determining* conditions.

Further, to the extent that intelligence is developed as the mental domain in which signs become produced and thinking occurs, the

consciousness presupposed by intelligence will be both pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual, even if intelligent individuals will be conscious of words and thoughts. This allows consciousness and self-consciousness to be possessed by both dumb animals and children who have yet to speak and think. It also makes it possible for individuals to be conscious of one another and of common objects without yet entering into linguistic interaction, something which may be a precondition of the triangulation in which meaning and thought become baptized. To the extent that knowledge is both conceptual and propositional, the pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual character of consciousness suggests that conscious awareness may not involve knowledge proper, but only certainty.

If the order of development is taken seriously, every shape of consciousness determined prior to the emergence of intelligence must be understood to function without discourse. This poses significant challenges. Although sense-certainty may readily be impervious to propositional knowledge, the two further stages of consciousness delineated by Hegel—perception and understanding—might seem to involve awareness of concepts and principles, both to perceive things and their properties and to understand the forces and laws in the dynamic relations of objects. This problem appears just as acute in self-consciousness, where, strictly speaking, not only desire but also recognition should not yet involve discourse. If these forms of self-consciousness can be pre-linguistic, they too can be accessible to certain dumb animals and immature children. The same applicability applies to the reason of universal self-consciousness. If its consciousness of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity need not involve language and thinking, then conscious reason is of broader scope than commonly supposed. Yet can consciousness lay claim to any reason, not to mention understanding, without already containing an awareness of concepts and the words that allow them to be expressed?

This question can be broadened if one takes seriously Hegel's development of intelligence. Although intelligence is that mental process within which words and thoughts arise, Hegel characterizes it more generally as an awareness of reason, where mind relates itself to its own cognizance of what is equally subjective and objective.⁴ On Hegel's account, before intelligence relates to reason in terms of language and thinking, the intellect involves intuition and then representation and imagination. This allows for intelligence to have its own pre-linguistic region, which means that those individuals who participate in the engendering of language can already have some intelligence as well as consciousness.

However crucial this may be to the production of signs and engagement in real speech and thinking, it presents a formidable challenge to the conception of consciousness. To take seriously Hegel's development of stages of intelligence, one must consider how consciousness can sense, perceive, and understand without already engaging in intuition and representation.

A further quandary concerns the role of intersubjectivity. Although the naturally determined life of the psyche bears the imprint of sexuality and the interrelations it implies, the absence of subject-object distinctions precludes intersubjectivity proper from otherwise figuring in the psychic field of feeling. Hegel brings intersubjectivity into consciousness in the recognition process constitutive of the type of self-consciousness from which universal self-consciousness arises. Nevertheless when Hegel develops intelligence, he refrains from explicitly involving intersubjectivity. This is most strikingly the case in his development of intelligence's sign-making activity and verbal memory. These moves, so crucial for the emergence of thinking, are presented without reference to any intersubjectivity, let alone the triangulation in which individuals fix the meaning of signs through their commonly observed reactions to commonly perceived objects. Has Hegel succumbed to a private language conception, compromising his psychology by ignoring the constitutive intersubjectivity of discourse and thinking?

All these questions call for resolution, not just to test the coherence of Hegel's account of mind, but to sort out how mind achieves identity in difference, integrating psyche, consciousness, and intelligence.

The psyche as the presupposition of consciousness

The first issue in Hegel's account that must be addressed is how the psyche can involve more than animal physiology, yet be a pre-conscious mental process on which consciousness and intelligence depend. What can it be that the psyche adds to the animal organism that does not already include the subject-object distinction constitutive of consciousness? For Hegel, this question is equivalent to asking for the minimal determinacy of mind and the answer is starkly simple. Mind without further qualification immediately supervenes upon nature in its most complete development as the animal organism and, as such, mind is the encompassing unity that contains that reality as its constituent. This means that mind minimally has a nature of its own that is not the product of any mental process and that mind relates to it without any intermediary, incorporating it without yet modifying its content.

Already, animal physiology involves its own self-monitoring organ in the form of the nervous system, regulating both sensibility and irritability. Supervening upon this naturally given self-registering unity, mind as psyche adds a new level of self-relation. Unlike consciousness, however, the psyche does not relate to its content as something from which it is disengaged and confronts as an other, an objectivity with a unity of its own. Nor is the psyche self-conscious, relating to itself as self-opposing an objectivity from which it is extricated. Instead, the psyche registers the neurophysiological totality of the animal organism as its own given being, doing so immediately. The psyche's self-relation immediately registers the animal organism it encompasses since any mediated registration would presuppose an immediate relation to the mediating factor, reinstalling an immediate self-relation as the minimal form of the life of the psyche. As immediate, the psyche's registrations are singular and contingent, devoid of the further interceding organization that could impart universality and necessity. Although what is registered reflects the organic unity of animal physiology in its interaction with the surrounding biosphere, the immediacy of mind's relation to its natural constituent takes all this in without any discrimination. The psyche simply feels and what it feels is itself as immediately given. For this reason, Hegel observes, the psyche is subject to an *anthropological* treatment, where the psyche draws its content from natural processes that are not yet products of its own mental activity.⁵ Instead of determining itself *ex nihilo*, the psyche simply feels what it is by nature, belonging as it does to an animal organism inhabiting a preexisting biosphere.

In so doing, the psyche does not sense something it confronts from a disengaged standpoint, straddling a subject-object divide. The psyche relates to its own nature in feeling. In contrast to the "I" of consciousness, which senses an object with an independent unity, the self of the psyche is what it feels and feels what it is. In feeling, the psyche is related to itself without relating to anything other and, for just this reason, the psyche is self-feeling without being conscious or self-conscious.

Accordingly, the psyche can undergo naturally alternating phases of sleep and awakening, without waking necessarily being accompanied by consciousness, self-consciousness, or intelligence. Although the awake psyche distinguishes itself from being asleep, what are opposed are two naturally occurring phases of itself, not subject versus object. Thus, before developing subject-object awareness, infants and young children can be awake and self-feeling, just as animals to which consciousness need never be ascribed.

These distinctions indicate how the psyche can be a mental domain independent of consciousness and intelligence, but more is needed to establish the dependence of conscious awareness upon the psyche. Hegel's account of the psyche's development from self-feeling through habit to emotive expression offers a neglected key.

In order for mind to be conscious, two requirements must be met. Mind must relate to its own determinations as being both for it and as determinations of an object. If mind's own determinations are not for it, mind lacks the self-relation on which depends the givenness to consciousness of any object. Unless mind's determinations fall within its own field of awareness, mind can hardly have any object before it. On the other hand, mind must treat its own determinations as being of something other to it, possessing an independent unity from which mind has extricated itself. Otherwise, mind only communes with itself and there is no subject-object relation.

For mind to be conscious without the need of any pre-conscious mental life, these two requirements would have to be immediately satisfied, as the minimal shape of mind. Yet how can what is immediately given to mind have an independent unity without some mediation of its manifold content? And how can mind extricate itself from this manifold without first being in immediate relation to it and then separating itself from it? These questions go together, for the extrication of mind from its own mental determinacy is only possible if that determinacy can acquire an independent unity, leaving mind an abstracted subject, disengaged from the given material of its feelings.

The psyche, immediately registering the given neurophysiology of its animal organism, need not presuppose any other mentality since self-feeling is an unmediated communing with an immediately given manifold yet unmodified by any further mental activity. The problem that must be resolved to account for consciousness is how the psyche can develop out of its passive receptivity, separate its self-related unity from its own mental content, and enable that content to stand for it as an independently unified opposing objectivity. Since this must be achieved by the psyche without appeal to other mental processes that take it for granted, the genesis of consciousness can no more involve discursive aspects of intelligence than involve sensation, perception, understanding, desire, recognition, or any other form of subject-object relations.

Hegel's account of habit provides the first crucial step in solving the problem. In feeling, the psyche has a formal unity in that the centrality of the feeling self connects all its feelings without otherwise determining

their content. What is felt is immediately given and that it be felt by the self-same psyche does not add anything to the felt content beyond what the neuro-physiology of the animal organism already provides, given its individual realization of its species being and its unique trajectory through its biosphere. Admittedly, by feeling, the psyche does mediate its mental content in that its feelings exist only insofar as the psyche feels them. Mere feeling, however, does not of itself affect the content felt or the psyche's relation to it. The mediation of feeling by the feeling psyche is as yet wholly formal.

How can the psyche overcome its own passivity and modify the content of feeling and the way it feels? Because the psyche lacks any activity other than feeling, it has no resources for modifying itself through its own activity. All it does is feel and every feeling is equally indiscriminating, immediately registering a manifold whose further organization cannot be taken in without more developed mental operations. Consequently, if any modification is to occur, it must both be a result of nothing but given feeling and happen by nature, that is, without any further contribution by mind, which, as a merely feeling psyche, has none to offer.

Habit, as Hegel here delineates it, comprises just such a development, where, by nature, the occurrence of feeling alters the character of further feeling. The alteration in question cannot consist in any qualitative difference in the content of feelings, for each feeling is just as singular and contingent as any other. Nor is there any manner in which the content of one feeling can exhibit the prior occurrence of another feeling. Because feeling as such is immediate, one cannot feel relations between feelings nor the mediation of feeling by anything else. Consequently, the only way feeling can be altered by antecedently given feeling is in respect to not content, but form.

Yet because feeling is immediate in form as much as in content, how mind feels can be qualitatively discriminated no more than what mind feels. All the psyche can do in relation to its feeling without qualitative discrimination is to become indifferent to its content in virtue of past feeling. Becoming indifferent, that is to say, becoming habituated, involves a detachment from the content without producing a specific content alteration. Such content alteration would require a qualitative differentiation demanding more mediation than the psyche has at its disposal. By contrast, acclimatization to a feeling simply leaves its given content be. What enables the detachment to result from a prior feeling rather than be a random numbing is some family resemblance between them. That resemblance is provided by regularities in the neurophysiology of the

animal organism and its interaction with the encompassing biosphere. This, rather than any activity of the psyche, allows for repetition of similar feelings, whose tie is not so much felt as reflected in the diminishing of feeling automatically occasioned by it.

Although each feeling remains as singular and contingent as ever, the psyche's involuntarily acquired detachment is mediated by the psyche's own history of feeling. This gives mind an abiding pattern of response distinct from what it feels at any moment, while rendering feeling subject to acclimatization. Generally, such habituation allows mind to withdraw from the immediacy of its feelings, making possible attending to other matters, as any further mental activities require. More directly, the automatic inurement to repeated feelings gives the psyche its first disengagement from its immediate content, rendering the psyche something with an integral character that can begin to be distinguished from the feelings it has.

Such habituation to feeling does not make mind conscious, for the habituated psyche relates to contents that still only count as elements of its field of feeling. The psyche may have gained a relative detachment from some of these, but it is not yet a fully disengaged ego, confronting determinations that not only fit within its awareness, but have an **independent unity**. Hegel acknowledges this limitation by passing to **one further development of the psyche, which is presented as the final bridge to the emergence of consciousness**. This comprises the so-called **actual psyche, which embodies actuality, an existence exhibiting its own essence, by having the psyche express itself in some manifestation of its neurophysiological life**.

Since the psyche has no content besides feeling, its actuality here comprises an expression of feeling. Moreover, given the absence of subject-object awareness, the psyche has no desire for objects, let alone any intentions. Consequently, its expression of its own feeling cannot be intentional, but can only comprise an involuntary, purely emotive gesture. In order for such a gesture to occur, the psyche must, of course, have a feeling to express. That feeling, like any other, involves its own neurophysiological reality, to which it is immediately conjoined. What gesture adds is a further neurophysiological realization, which, instead of being immediately one with feeling, is now posited by a feeling, as its manifestation. The psyche, which detached itself from given feeling through habit, now disengages itself from its given immersion in its natural physical reality. To gesture, the psyche must figure as the underlying ground of its expression, which manifests a centrality of feeling of which it is the product. In so doing, the psyche does not become a ghost in

a machine, for what gesture expresses has its own neurophysiological existence. Nevertheless, by positing a bodily expression, the gesturing psyche produces a realization distinguished from its feeling, which is comparatively inward insofar as it retains a separate existence. The gesture thus comprises a phenomenon that has a unity of its own in contrast to the self-feeling of the psyche that it expresses. All this still proceeds within the orbit of the neurophysiological life of the psyche, which relates itself to dimensions of its own existence without yet transcending its self-communing field of feeling.

The stage is set, however, for the mind to undergo one more transformation that will make it conscious. Through habit, the psyche is already able to detach itself from its feelings, in function of their universal connection with one another, a universal connection consisting in the family resemblance that allows for repetition of similar feelings. That connection is not felt as such by the psyche, which only registers their repetition by becoming detached from them. To become conscious, mind must not just extricate itself from universally connected feelings, but externalize them, so that they confront mind as an independent domain. By expressing its feeling in involuntary gesture, the psyche does externalize itself, making its feeling manifest in a distinct neurophysiological actuality. All that mind must do to be conscious is combine these developments—withdraw from its feelings and externalize them as a connected realm confronting mind as its other. In habit, mind does withdraw from its feelings, but without externalizing them as an independent domain. In emotive gesture, mind does externalize its feeling, but without connecting its externalized feelings into a united whole. Once both capabilities are mobilized in conjunction with one another, mind is in a position to treat its feelings as the determinations of an otherness with a unity of its own, and in so doing, relate to itself as a centrality of feeling that is equally extricated from all these determinations. In this way, mind is an abstracted subject relating to itself as such by externalizing its own determination as psyche, which confront it as an opposing whole. With this, the opposition of consciousness is at hand. Because it contains the determinations of the psyche, consciousness cannot be without their preconscious mental life.

Consciousness without intelligence

Hegel underscores the dependence of consciousness on psyche by pointing out that the minimal shape of consciousness, presupposed by all others, consists in nothing but mind relating to the determinations of

the psyche as both its own and as other to it. Consciousness is minimally sense-certainty in that mind takes the determinations of feeling provided by the psyche, abstracts itself from them as a disengaged ego, confronting them as an independent whole comprising an object given to it as subject. Although the psyche has already generated universal connections in feeling and the subject of feeling through self-feeling and habit, neither concepts nor judgments play any role in enabling mind to bifurcate itself into subject and object.

Consciousness as sense-certainty relates to a manifold consisting in the psyche's self-feeling, whose singularity and contingency is just as immediately given as the relation in which mind engages in confronting this content as something other. Transformed from self-feeling into sensation, mind's mental determinations are still opaque to thought and language, even though they provide mind with a minimal consciousness of what is given to it. As sensed, the manifold does reflect all the organization of the living individual's sense organ apparatus, as well as the configuration of the sensed biosphere. Nevertheless the immediacy of sensation precludes consciousness from yet discriminating any of these relationships. Lacking any resource for registering the conceptual character of tangible reality, sense-certainty comprises a wholly non-discursive subject-object awareness. It does distinguish what it senses from its sensing, so as not to revert to self-feeling, but in so doing, sense-certainty knows nothing determinate about what it senses. Properly speaking, its certainty contains no determinate knowledge claims. This is why, when Hegel observes sense-certainty phenomenologically, he points out that we, the phenomenological observer, must speak for consciousness in delineating what occurs in this its minimal shape.⁶

Both perception and understanding, however, seem to involve knowledge both determinate and propositional. When perception relates to its mental content as a determination of a thing and its properties, consciousness appears to be making a judgment connecting a subject with its predicates. Similarly, when understanding reorders the content of perception through dynamic relations of force and law, consciousness seems to comprehend supersensible concepts and principles, which require language and thought to be accessed.

Admittedly, in his *Science of Logic*, Hegel conceives judgment to involve concept determinations, namely, universality, particularity, and individuality. Hegel, however, is careful to distinguish quality and qualitative relations from universality and judgment. Quality involves otherness and differentiation, but not the further relationship that particulars have in participating in the same universal. Moreover, Hegel conceives both

the thing and its properties and force and law as categories of the logic of essence. As such, they all lack the self-determined character of the concept and its constitutive elements: the universal, the particular, and the individual. Instead, the thing and its properties, like force and law, involve the two-tiered determinations of essence, where what posits and what is posited remain distinguished. Hence, the thing and its properties do not involve the relation of individual and universal anymore than force and law involve judgment. Law may involve regularity in appearance, just as force may manifest itself in appearance, but neither law's relation to what it regulates nor force's relation to its expression involves the relations of universal, particular, and individual that bring the concept into play. A thing and its properties do not present a universal and its particularization insofar as properties contain nothing that manifests the unity of the thing. The thing does not inhere in its properties, which is why they revert to independent matters. Force, for its part, may express itself in its manifestation, but not in a way that allows that manifestation to express itself. By contrast, the universal is self-identical in the particular, which becomes universal once the universal, the particular, and the individual, all exhibit particularity as differentiations of the universal. Finally, what is regulated by law is not a particularization of law because all that distinguishes it is an unregulated residual content, whose connection to law can only be an other, inverted lawfulness.

These logical distinctions imply that perception and understanding bring mediations into conscious awareness that may well transcend the immediacy of sense-certainty, but involve neither concepts or judgments, nor the discursive intelligence required for the latter's mental representation. Mind can perceive and understand the existence of objects without having to conceive or judge. Accordingly, there is no need to deny pre-linguistic children and dumb animals the ability to perceive things and their properties and to understand dynamic relations and regularities among them.

Conversely, there is no need to deny that things have universality and relationships characterized by concepts, even if perceiving and understanding them need not take these concepts in as such. What is conceptually determinate about objects can still require discursive intelligence to be accessed.

By the same token, even though self-consciousness may embody determinations of the concept, as Hegel himself points out in the introduction to the *Logic of the Concept*, consciousness of self need not involve awareness of concepts or their verbal expression. This becomes

evident on examination of the forms of self-consciousness proceeding from the most rudimentary form: self-consciousness as desire.

To confront itself as an object, consciousness must relate to its mental content as having an independent unity that equally manifests the unity of consciousness. This is most minimally achieved in purely negative fashion by consciousness of desire, where the subject, through its own mental content, confronts what is given as something to be made assimilated to the subject, to which it can offer no intractable resistance. Anyone familiar with Hegel's polemics against Kant needs no reminding of how often Hegel points to the satisfaction of animal desire as a refutation of any transcendence of the thing-in-itself. What matters here is that Hegel acknowledges the possession of desire by animals devoid of discursive intelligence. Although this would ordinarily raise few feathers, it becomes more provocative once the connection between desire and self-consciousness is recognized. If dumb animals, not to mention pre-linguistic children, can have and fulfill desire, then they can be not only conscious, but self-conscious. Desire, after all, involves not just awareness of an object confronting the subject, but the certainty that that object can be subsumed to the subject, without any unyielding remain. This would be impossible if consciousness did not contain the psyche and the animal organism it involves. Without that, the subject could not consume any object, let alone perceive it and its relation to its own body.

If desire involves consciousness of self, but not thought, then recognition is open to non-discursive interaction between subjects. The consciousness of self provided by desire and its satisfaction is, of course, ephemeral. The correspondence of subject and object achieved by desire satisfaction is purely negative, since the object of desire gets consumed, leaving behind no tangible objectification of its unification with the subject. To obtain an abiding, positive objectification, the subject must confront an other self that the subject refrains from obliterating, yet manages to have reflect its own subjectivity. Can one subject confront another and thereby be reflected back into itself without thinking or engaging in linguistic interaction?

Significantly, Hegel's celebrated account of recognitive self-consciousness makes no direct mention of either thinking concepts or expressing them in language. One self seeks to eliminate the independent otherness of its counterpart, but satisfying this desire initially consists in threatening the life of the other, something hardly requiring conceptualization or language. Given the empty result success would achieve, self-consciousness is better served if the other can be subordinated to

fulfilling the desire of the subject in an ongoing manner. Does such subordination, however, require either party to think or communicate in words? Must the dominating individual verbally express his or her desire, let alone formulate it conceptually? And must the subordinated individual show subservience through some verbal acknowledgment, eliciting a conceptual recognition from the master?

If, as Hegel shows, subservience to the desire of another consists in acting to satisfy that desire, thought and words need not be called upon. The prospective master must indicate what is desired to the individual who will serve that desire. Yet so long as the object of desire is individual and satisfaction requires an individual act, neither concepts nor their verbal expression are needed. Further, so long as the necessary work is undertaken and the beneficiary observes the other satisfying the former's desire, no inner or outer discourse is required.

Accordingly, recognition need not involve individuals with linguistic intelligence. It can proceed among pre-linguistic children, between them and intelligent adults, and conceivably between dumb animals, and between them and their intelligent masters. For this reason, the self-consciousness achieved in such recognition must not be confused with the respect and self-respect of individuals as bearers of right that accompanies participation in the institutions of freedom. Such recognition involves thinking, linguistic competence, and willing, none of which need be at play in the coordinated desire satisfaction of recognitive self-consciousness.

Even when self-consciousness becomes universal by relating reciprocally to another self-consciousness, no concepts need be thought or communicated. All that is necessary is that two conscious individuals mutually exhibit the desire to satisfy the desire of one another. The psyche's expressive abilities conjoined with consciousness' awareness and desire of objects suffice to enable one self-consciousness to be aware of itself confronting another self-consciousness engaging in the same relationship.

The same absence of thought and language applies to consciousness as reason, which is immediately certain of the identity of consciousness and self-consciousness, thanks to universal self-consciousness being conscious of an object equivalent to its own self-consciousness. Although reason proper, that is, reason as intelligence, may need the concept and the idea to *think* this identity in its truth, reason as consciousness can still be *certain* of that identity without employing concepts and language. Hegel makes this manifest in distinguishing consciousness as reason from the intelligence it structurally precedes. As a form of consciousness, reason is aware of the identity of subject and object

without removing their opposition. Consciousness as reason is simply certain that its own mental determinations are also determinations of objects as they are independently given. The ego and the non-ego are opposed, but correspond, and this correspondence is what is taken as object by reason as consciousness. Having certainty of this does not involve referral to concepts or propositions as a securing bridge. It is a non-propositional attitude in which the subject relates to its mental content as both independently given and as matching the subject. The fit is not one between concept and object, but merely between the non-discursive content of the subject and what confronts it.

Experience with children and animals may not indubitably confirm how self-consciousness and consciousness as reason can be pre-conceptual and pre-verbal. What help secure this possibility are two things that come into focus as Hegel moves from consciousness to intelligence. The first is how certainty and knowledge get distinguished, not as elements within conscious awareness, but as signposts for differentiating consciousness from intelligence. The second matter is the account of the development in intelligence enabling mind to make and use signs. Whereas the distinction between certainty and knowledge allows for consciousness to operate without thinking concepts and using words, the latter development indicates how mind arrives at the point of thinking and speaking thanks to pre-linguistic consciousness as well as pre-verbal and pre-conceptual aspects of intelligence.

Knowledge and intelligence

What distinguishes the certainty of consciousness from the knowledge of intelligence are limitations underscored by Hegel in characterizing the reason arising from the unity of subjectivity and objectivity achieved in the reciprocity of universal self-consciousness. This reason as consciousness signifies only, Hegel emphasizes, the abstract, formal unity of self-consciousness with its object.⁷ The unity is formal in that it in no way determines the content of what is both subjective and objective. Instead of signifying truth, this unity provides merely correctness, a correspondence in which the terms that fit are simply given, without any justification. Consequently, awareness of the correctness of any mental content is no more than certainty, a subjective assurance that mind's disengaged filling corresponds to something given, whose own truth remains undetermined. Correctness mobilizes no reasons to support correspondence, nor does it require conceiving anything universal and propositional.

By contrast, reason as intelligence comprehends the conceptual, that is, universal determination of what is both subjective and objective, which involves both thinking and linguistic competence. The truth of this knowledge will therefore have the conceptual character allowing for propositional relations. Correspondence will now be between concept and objectivity, so that truth will be idea, the unity of concept and objectivity. Unlike the givens that figure in correctness, concept and objectivity both involve self-grounded determinacies that are, as such, intrinsically connected. This enables knowledge of truth to pertain to what is determined in and through itself, rather than to something posited by something else to which it is relative. It is also why Hegel can claim that only when true content becomes an object for mind can intelligence become reason in its concrete significance.⁸

Admittedly, intelligent reason takes different forms in which knowledge captures the unity of concept and objectivity with varying degrees of adequacy. In each case, however, reason concretely *theorizes*, that is, *conceives* objectivity, producing mental determinations that are just as conceptual as the object to which they correspond. To do so, mind must employ language and hence, the truth that theoretical knowledge grasps is necessarily discursive. Consciousness, by contrast, can be aware of the correctness of its mental determinations without theorizing, without working them up into a universal, conceptual content and finding that same content in its object. Accordingly, reason as consciousness can be aware of the formal correspondence between what is given in its disengaged mind and what it confronts in the world, without having anything to think or say.

Drawing this hard line between the certainty of consciousness and the knowledge of intelligence does not, however, diminish the role of pre-linguistic, preconceptual consciousness and intelligence in the constitution of discursive rationality.

The production of signs and the rise of thought

Hegel's account of how mind produces and uses signs provides important insights for comprehending why thought and language depend upon processes of consciousness and intelligence involving neither concept nor word.

To begin with, mind is in no position to utilize signs unless it has intelligence, a mental activity in which the disengagement of subject and object has been bridged, without reverting to the self-communing of the psyche. Intelligence is needed because signs require mind to attend

to mental contents that, on the one hand, are externalized, and, on the other hand, signify by being both subjective and objective. Signs are externalized in that mind signifies only by making something mental its object. Signs involve the identity of subjectivity and objectivity in that they are at once inward and external, having meaning and reference (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*).

The bridging broadly enabling this is accomplished via universal self-consciousness. In its reciprocal recognition, the object is another self-consciousness equivalent to the subject. This equivalency renders the object universal, possessing a character encompassing the subject opposing it, while giving the subject a form which encompasses its object.⁹ The relation of subject and object is not thereby eliminated. Rather, the opposing sides each overlap their counterpart, each being aware of its unity with the other. Hegel characterizes intelligence (*Geist*) as the resultant truth that is aware of what it is.¹⁰ It is truth insofar as it is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and it is aware of what it is, because mind here is aware of itself in its unity with what opposes it as object.

This awareness is at work in all three successive stages of theoretical intelligence: intuition, representation, and thought. Feelings, which consciousness rendered sensations by treating them as determinations of objectivity confronting the ego, become intuitions when mind attends to sensations as both determinations of objects and mental contents. Intuitions become representations when mind recollects them, rendering them mediated by mind, while still retaining the dual character of being objective and subjective.¹¹ The image, the form intuition takes upon becoming produced and reproduced by mind, is known by intelligence to be both of something and a fixture in the mind. Concepts and language need not be involved in having and forming images. Unlike habituated feelings, which reflect the psyche, images have intentionality, presenting anew what was immediately at hand in intuition. Moreover, mind can imagine images that represent what is commonly contained in other images without attending to anything transcending the immediacy of images.¹² Representations do possess generality by abstractly subsuming intentional contents as possessions of intelligence, which relates images to one another in associative imagination.¹³ But, as Hegel emphasizes, this generality falls short of thought by retaining a pictorial matter,¹⁴ derived from intuition.¹⁵ In order for mind to conceive, to be aware of concepts as such, to think the universal, mind must liberate itself from the singular content of images, and do so without having already to think and converse.

By now, Hegel's account has provided the resources for determining the production of signs and the move from image to thought. The psyche with the body it always encompasses allows for minds to have an intuitable reality for themselves and their productions. Consciousness enables selves to be aware of one another as subjects and objects. Lastly, the pre-linguistic intelligence at work in intuition and representation enables mind to produce images, as well as to relate them to intuitions and other images. Through these relations, the pre-verbal imagination of intelligence generates general representations,¹⁶ lying in the common content re-identified in recollection.¹⁷ These generalized representations and their relations to other mental contents would be purely subjective *if* mind were unable to give them an intuitable reality. Conversely, nothing worldly could be or be known to be an expression of mind unless contents can be apprehended to be both subjective and objective. To make a sign and be aware of it as such, mind must be able to generate an intuitable content, recognize it as its own product, relate it to a generalized representation that is both something mental and about something else, and recollect that relation as something mind has itself produced. The representation must be generalized, for if it remained merely singular, the intuitable content would just express an incommunicable intuition. The same is true of the relation of the sign to its representation. For communication to be possible, this semiotic relation must become generalized as a repeatable, re-identifiable link of sense and meaning.

As Hegel shows, these requirements of sign production get fulfilled through a complex mental activity in which intelligence operates in conjunction with the psyche and consciousness. Mind via the psyche produces some intuitable appearance. Via consciousness and self-consciousness, mind is aware of this production being its own. Through intelligence, mind recollects a representation, which thereby has a generalized content, common to each re-identifiable apprehension.¹⁸ Mind relates this general representation to the former intuitable appearance. In so doing, mind takes that appearance to refer to its representation, not by anything given in its content, but solely by mind setting them in relation. Finally, through verbal memory, mind makes that reference repeatable, generalizing the tie of sense and meaning, and rendering the sign itself something general, transforming it from an intuition into a representation that mind can inwardly retain and reproduce.¹⁹

These operations bring mind to the threshold of word and thought. The contrast between sign production and symbolization is indicative of the new frontier. Because the symbol's given content relates to something

in the representation to which it refers, symbolization leaves mind still beholden to imagination, not yet free of image. Intelligence can occupy itself with meanings liberated from the particularity of images only when mind knows its produced appearance to signify a general representation by mental fiat, without connection to the image of that appearance.²⁰ This knowledge is at hand in the production of the sign. Once verbal memory frees the sign from the immediacy of its own outer intuition by turning it into an inwardly repeatable general representation, mind can then know meaning entirely without intuition or image.²¹ Meaning may still be something different from mind's inward representation of it, but through mechanical memory, mind associates represented signs independently of any distinguishable meaning, setting the stage for thought that leaves behind the opposition of consciousness.²²

Hegel describes these developments arising through activities of intelligence which do not directly involve any relationship between intelligent selves.²³ Yet as Hegel introduces them, sign production and verbal memory are only achievable by a mind embedded in the world and capable of giving its meanings a worldly presence. Moreover, to the degree that intelligence depends upon universal self-consciousness, sign production presupposes recognition. Still, the act of sign production does not involve any triangulation whereby individuals recognize one another fixing meanings in reference to commonly observed objects and commonly observed usage.

Sign production would succumb to problems of private language if that production were identified with language formation. As Wittgenstein would argue, intelligence cannot guarantee the communicability of the meaning of its sign simply through its own singular act of connecting an intuitable produced content with one of its own representations, or through multiple private recollections of that connection. Although the produced content may be intuitable by others, they can no more determine that it signifies some representation, than know which representation it intends.

Hegel shows his awareness of this limitation by expressly noting that sign production is not equivalent to the formation of language.²⁴ Sign production is not itself an act of communication. Yet can communication and thought operate without a production of signs given independently of linguistic interaction?

The answer to this question has two sides. To begin with, the production of signs cannot be a prerequisite of language and thought unless that production can be achieved without employing words or concepts. Hegel's account of sign production shows how that is the case. All

that intelligence need do to produce and know the meaning of a sign is make an intuitable mental content and associate it with a general representation otherwise indifferent to that content. Although this sets intelligence free of imagined content, this freedom is still relative, since the representation signified by the sign does not yet have any positive conceptual filling.

Communicating the sign's meaning is another matter, requiring public recognition of not just the intuitable sign, but its connection to some general representation. Because representation is a work of intelligence, at once subjective and objective, these two dimensions must both take public form. This occurs when minds make manifest to one another that some object given to them all is *publicly* associated with some subjective manifestation that they publicly share. Here enters the triangulation in which individuals simultaneously experience the correlation of shared semiotic behavior with commonly observed objects of representation. This shared behavior cannot communicate meaning unless each participant is producing an intuitable expression that they independently mentally associate with their own mental representation of what they commonly confront. Otherwise, the correlation of observable behavior and observable object lacks the internal connection that allows that behavior to *signify* the general, repeatable *representation* of the object. Because this internal association is partly constitutive of communication, it does not already comprise language nor the thinking requiring language for its expression. Sign production can therefore occur apart from and prior to linguistic interaction, of which it is a necessary constituent.

In this connection, it is important to note that communication, which involves sign production and use, is not itself equivalent to language. Dumb animals may be imputed communication through signs, without yet exercising the syntactical employment of signs by which communication becomes linguistic.²⁵

Although Hegel does not address the formation of language, the anti-foundationalism of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* would be contradicted if the triangulation fixing meanings determined their truth. Communication may depend upon common observation of objects and common usage of correlated signs, but this does not decide whether what is communicated is true. Massive uncertainty about reference may be precluded by the conditions of communication, but shared certainty is not equivalent to shared knowledge.

To overcome the limitations of the standpoint of consciousness, mind must use its communicable signs to think without foundations.

In so doing, mind does not cease to feel, sense, or desire. Mind can and must exercise intelligence without jettisoning psyche and consciousness, both because psyche and consciousness are its enabling conditions and because both leave undetermined the truth of what intelligence thinks.

By outlining how this is so, Hegel's neglected account of the unity and difference of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence has paved the way for comprehending the mental reality of thought with neither self-defeating dualisms nor incoherent appeals to epistemological foundations. Recovering, confirming, and elaborating the details provides an abiding agenda for the philosophy of mind.

2

Hegel's Solution to the Mind–Body Problem

The traditional dilemma

The subjectivity of mind has always posed a challenge for theorists. At every level, what mind is reflects how it relates to itself, whether as a psyche that is what it feels itself to be, a conscious subject treating its own mental content as the appearance of a world it confronts, or an intelligence that intuits, represents, or thinks by relating to its determinations as both mental and objective. The reflexive self-activity pervading mental life has always eluded those who confine themselves to categories of being and of essence, where terms are determined, respectively, through negation by an other or by being posited by some determiner.¹ In each case, the autonomy of subjectivity remains inscrutable, for what is determined by contrast with an other or by being posited by something else cannot be determined by itself.

So long as objectivity is presumed to lack the self-determined character of subjectivity, mind seems condemned to be an ineffable entity standing apart from tangible reality. The material world, considered as conditioned by chains of external necessity, where each factor is determined by something else, offers little foothold for mind, whose subjectivity seems so incongruent with objectivity. Yet if mind cannot retain its subjectivity without opposing objectivity as an independently determined, incommensurate factor, we are left with an implacable divide between mind and body and mind and world whose resulting difficulties have made “Cartesian dualism” an untouchable option.

Beyond mind–body dualisms

The dilemmas of mind–body dualism are manifold.

To begin with, conceiving the mind as something separate from the body raises insurmountable epistemological problems. Solipsism becomes unavoidable, for if mind can be without anything nonmental, nothing in mind can secure a bridge to what lies beyond. Mind is left communing with itself, stuck in meditation, for no mental feature is inherently connected to something other and the incommensurability of the nonmental makes interaction an insoluble mystery.

Yet even solipsism's sole certainty of self-knowledge is doubtful, when the individuality of the self has no real foothold in the physical world. First, as Kant argues in his "Refutation of Idealism",² the very temporality of mental life becomes inexplicable if mental contents have no abiding background to manifest the temporal unity of their succession. If all mental contents are temporally successive, only the appearance of something *nonmental* can provide a persisting backdrop sufficient to connect past, present, and future in the flow of self-awareness. Consequently, self-awareness is impossible without awareness of enduring objects other than the self, objects that are spatially as well as temporally ordered.

Further, if mind stands in relation to nothing but its own mental content, there is no basis for individuating the self and uniting the **diversity of mental content into a mind**. As Strawson argues in *Individuals*, **mental contents cannot belong to an individual mind unless it can be tied to a nonmental factor exclusive to it**. Given that bodies in space-time constitute the **minimal materiality** irreducible to logical determinacy—the least that **material existence can be**—what provides an exclusive nonmental mooring individuating mind is none other than the unique spatiotemporal itinerary of a body inherently connected to mind and its mental activity. Even if, to paraphrase Kant, all mental content must be able to be accompanied by the representation "I think", that representation is purely abstract, lacking any individuating content that could tie mental content to one mind rather than to another.³ As Hegel has shown in his analysis of "Sense Certainty" in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "I" applies to any subject just as "here" and "now" refers to any time and place.⁴ Without a unique embodiment, mind has no individuating anchor with which to unite the temporal flow of mental contents into a single awareness.

That connection between mind and body must be evident to mind itself, but this is impossible within the framework of mind/body dualism, which leaves inexplicable any interaction between mind and its own or any other body. Only if mind is embodied in a body in which it experiences itself as uniquely active can mind relate to itself as an individual subject and, through this self-relation, be *a mind of its own*.

Although mental embodiment may not require linguistic intelligence, to have self-knowledge mind must make propositional claims to the extent that knowledge involves judgment. Judgments, like the concepts they contain, cannot be mentally realized apart from language, for judgments connect individuals and particulars to universals and only words can express the purely intelligible conceptuality of universality, which transcends the particularities to which images are confined. Language, however, cannot be private, since one cannot employ some intuition as a sign for a generalized representation with any assured communicability without recognizably participating in an ongoing practice in which others make the same connection. Accordingly, mind cannot have self-knowledge without access to the conditions of linguistic interaction, which, as Sellars argues,⁵ involve relations between individual minds who cannot appear to one another and make and comprehend communicable utterances unless they are embodied. Mental contents must be given some physical expression before they can be perceived by others and communicable signs cannot be formed unless interlocutors can indicate to one another materially what common expressions they are using and to what commonly observable objects they are referring. Only then can interlocutors move on to communicate purely universal meanings and converse philosophically. Thus, unless individuals possess bodies over which they have some control, they will have no way of coming to participate in discursive rationality.

All such interactions between mind and physical reality, and between mind and other minds, are precluded if mind and body are inherently separate. Sensation becomes doubly mysterious since a purely immaterial mind can have neither an intelligible connection to bodily sense organs through which physical objects make themselves manifest, nor any way of otherwise being affected by material things. Although causal relations between sense organs and physical objects cannot themselves enable sensations to refer to what produce them, unless there are physically induced modifications of sensibility to which mind can relate, mind has nothing with which to apprehend phenomena. Conversely, worldly action becomes unthinkable since the mind/body dualism leaves incomprehensible how a mind can affect a body of its own and thereby anything else. With no way of having a tangible, object-like presence distinguishable from other objects, nor any way of making its own activity appear to itself or to others, mind can hardly be self-aware, let alone aware of other things and other minds.

The failed remedies of Spinoza and materialist reductions

Insofar as mental reality cannot be retained by denying matter, the impasse of Cartesian dualism can hardly be resolved by following the immaterialist route pioneered by Berkeley, for whom existence consists in being perceived. Given the dilemma of the immaterialist option, a solution to the dualist impasse has instead been sought in two closely linked rescue strategies, one invoking a parallelism between mental and physical reality, and another eliminating the immateriality of mind by reducing mind to matter.

Spinoza pioneers the first remedy in his *Ethics*. In the *Ethics* he removes the dilemma of accounting for interaction between mind and body by depriving both of any independent substantiality and then recasting them as modes of the one substance that is both thought and extension and whose unity ensures their thoroughgoing correlation.⁶ The stumbling block of Spinoza's solution is the absence of any resources for individuating finite minds and for securing the correlation of any particular mental state with any particular object or any corporeal condition of an aware individual. Both problems are closely interrelated. By being reduced to different modes of the same substance, both mind and body are rendered phenomena that are externally determined in the endless causal chain of conditioned events.⁷ Deprived of the independence and autonomy of substance, whose self-sustaining "conatus" Spinoza otherwise acknowledges,⁸ mind and body are left exclusively determined by efficient causality. This precludes any final causality or self-activity on which Spinoza's own theory of emotion, virtue, and freedom depends.⁹ Whereas each mental state is caused by a preceding mental event, each physical condition is determined by antecedent physical events. Psychological necessity runs its own course alongside physical necessity, each involving occurrences that are indifferent to what kind and import, what type and end anything mental or corporeal might have.¹⁰ Each event, be it psychological or physical, is caught in a blind succession of external conditions where no factor has any intrinsic relation to any other. As a consequence, there is no more basis for grouping together certain mental states as those of a single mind, than for treating successive physical conditions as belonging to a particular finite body. Although Spinoza does subject bodies to laws governing the motion of matter,¹¹ these laws cannot individuate the bodies they rule in common. Whatever particular mass, density, or other features bodies possess must be given apart from laws that apply to all bodies equally, but no resource is available to account for these individuating

factors. This is all the more true in Spinoza's case, for whereas other early modern philosophers from Locke through Kant treat individual bodies as particular *substances*, Spinoza cannot avail himself of that category to give bodies a persisting identity.¹² With every mental and physical occurrence a mode with no abiding independent being of its own, neither minds nor bodies can be individuated.

This naturally prevents any mind from being aware of itself as an individual, let alone from having any individual body as its own, despite Spinoza's assurances to the contrary. Any connection between corporeal events and mental events is equally problematic, since no causal chain can cross over the parallel streams of necessity. That these streams are modes of the same substance may provide a global unification. Yet that unification provides no basis for connecting any specific physical event with any specific mental occurrence. Spinoza may suggest that particular physical and mental occurrences are different expressions in different attributes of the same event, but he has nothing to offer as their common bearer other than the one substance that underlies everything without exception. How then are coexisting corporeal events to be parceled out to one coexisting mental happening rather than another? Even if only one physical occurrence and one mental event were simultaneous, what could allow them to be ascribed to a single finite phenomenon somehow expressed in both the attributes of thought and extension? The one substance may encompass all mental and physical occurrences, but all that is left are the modes themselves in their parallel conditioned successions. Given these difficulties, there is no accounting for how one could sense objects impinging upon one's sense organs or be aware of acting in the corporeal world. Both require that mind somehow be able to relate to itself as embodied.

Those who seek to reduce mind to matter might seem to escape these dilemmas by supplanting dualism with a physical monism and dispensing with the halfway house of dual modalities of a single substance. The problem remains, however, of how to explain away mental life, which remains incongruent with the mechanism of material nature, even if it is reduced to an epiphenomenal show. With physical reality subject to the exclusive governance of efficient causality, there is no room left for either goal-directed behavior or the self-activity where something independently acts upon itself rather than being externally impelled to affect something else. Yet not only do ends figure prominently in desires, emotions, and intentional conduct, but mind pervasively appears to involve reflexivity, where the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence all owe their distinctive character to how mind acts upon its

own determinations. As Hegel details throughout his account of mind under the rubric of "Subjective Spirit", every form of mental awareness involves a self-relation determinative of mental content. The psyche is what it feels itself to be, registering feelings that cannot be without being felt. The psyche relates to its feelings as determinations of its own psychic field, not yet distinguishing them from itself as sensations of an objective world.¹³ By contrast, consciousness is aware of objects by taking what it feels to be not itself, but determinations of a unified domain from which it has extricated itself as a subject confronting objectivity.¹⁴ Intelligence, for its part, has intuitions, representations, and thoughts by relating to its various mental contents as both products of its own activity and as determinations of objects.¹⁵ In each case, mind acts upon itself, comprising a type of awareness whose characteristic mental content cannot be apart from that form of reflexivity. Whether these mental shapes be regarded as reality or as phenomenal illusion, how they can be reduced to blind material necessity is just as inscrutable as explaining the interaction of separate substances of mind and body.¹⁶

The problem does not reside in some fundamental incompatibility between physical and chemical processes and the goal-directed and self-active character endemic to much and/or all mental activity. As Hegel has shown in his analyses of mechanism, chemism, teleology, and life in the *Science of Logic*,¹⁷ the external determination of mechanical and chemical process is precisely what allows them to be enabling constituents of artifacts and living things, which have dimensions irreducible to physics or chemistry. Both mechanical and chemical relations depend upon some external condition to get underway, such as an impulse in mechanical motion or a catalyst to precipitate chemical reactions. As a consequence, they can be instigated by something else which may act mechanically or chemically upon objects, but do so as part of a process having a different type of initiation and result. An end, for example, is distinct from an efficient cause in that what it brings into being is not something different from itself and devoid of any intrinsic relation to it. Rather, an end gets realized, relinquishing the subjectivity of being merely a prospective goal and gaining fulfillment in an objectification with the same content. An end, however, as something yet to be realized, cannot immediately be its own fulfillment. If it were, the end would have no subjective character and there could not be any teleological process. Something must therefore mediate the end's realization, a means that works upon objectivity to make the end objective. That working upon objectivity is external to objectivity and therefore comprises a mechanical or chemical process. Nevertheless the

objective realization of the end achieves something unlike mechanism or chemism. Instead of resulting in a movement or chemical reaction different from the starting point, the fulfillment of the end arrives at the same content subjectively present in the unrealized end. So long as the fulfillment of the end depends upon a means separate from it, as well as an intervening process that imposes the end in an independently given object, teleology is external, generating a product like an artifact, which embodies the end by extinguishing the process by which it has been realized.

Teleology becomes internal, constituting the process of life, when physical and chemical processes are incorporated in a self-sustaining objectivity, which is an end in itself by continually reproducing the activity in which it consists, being both means and end at once. Mechanical motions and chemical reactions still come into play wherever factors get acted upon by something else, such as when one part of an organism affects another, or when an organism sustains itself by assimilating material from its external environment. These causal relations now unfold within an encompassing process of a radically different character. Here determiner and determined are not distinct since the self-sustaining life process acts upon itself. Action depends on nothing external since the organic process is self-renewing. Ends are **always** objective since the life process already realizes what it continually brings about and that objectivity is for its own sake, since it acts to reproduce itself. Moreover, since what life is thereby determines its own ongoing process, that process is intrinsic to its specific nature and not indifferent to it, as are the laws of matter that govern all things, whatever their type or import.

All these features appear much more amenable to mind and its subjective self-activity than the debilitating dualism of separate mental and physical substances, the parallelism of mental and physical modes, or a reduction to matter. Can the mind/body relation be resolved by conceiving mind in terms of life?

Dilemmas of the Aristotelian solution

Aristotle points toward such an escape from dualistic difficulties by conceiving mind as inherently embodied, identifying the psyche as the principle of life animating the living organism. As such, the psyche never confronts the problem of bridging any gap between itself and the world, or more specifically, between itself and the body with which it perceives and acts.

Aristotle's solution, however, suffers from two flaws.

First, when Aristotle conceives the self-activity of the organism, and by implication, the principle of the psyche animating the body, he falls back upon categories of technique that involve the very separation between active agency and passive recipient material that is ingredient in mind/body dualism.¹⁸ Likening the organism to a doctor who cures himself,¹⁹ Aristotle employs the external purposiveness of artisan activity to characterize the internal purposiveness of life's self-sustaining process. Artisan activity is externally purposive insofar as its end is pre-conceived by the artisan, who imposes it upon a given material, making a product that does not contain the activity producing it, but rather results from that activity's completion. By contrast, life sustains itself by containing the activity by which its unified organic process is maintained and reproduced. Because the living organism has within itself its end, the material in which that end is realized, and the process of that realization, life's telos, is internal. This internal teleology cannot be captured by Aristotle's example of a self-treating doctor. An ailing doctor may certainly impose the lost form of health upon himself by using his craft. Nevertheless the doctor's own medical intervention is not part of the ongoing self-activity of his healthy existence. That existence is self-sustaining without the purposive intervention of medical craft, which only enters when health is threatened. Consequently, when Aristotle uses the external teleology of craft to explain the internal teleology of life, he inserts mind (that of an artisan) into the organism in a way that is extraneous to its ongoing process.²⁰

This difficulty is complemented by a converse problem. By identifying the psyche with the principle of life, Aristotle reduces mind to organic unity, leading him to ascribe a psyche to all life forms, including plants. Although mind may well be something alive, that does not entail that all life possesses mind. Life minimally involves an entity differentiated into complementary organs that serve as means and ends of one another, reproducing the self-sustaining whole to which they belong. As such, the living organism cannot be constructed by mechanically assembling preexisting parts, contrary to the reveries of human or divine "intelligent design". Because the organs of the organism exist only within the complementary functioning of a self-sustaining whole, the living thing can never be produced as an artifact, issuing from an exercise of technique imposing form upon some preexisting material. Instead of being made, the living organism grows and reproduces, generating its form and matter internally. Yet in doing so, the living organism need have no indwelling focal point that could be distinguished from its physiological organs as a mind.

Plato reveals this in his preliminary analysis of the "City of Pigs" in the *Republic*.²¹ Whereas an economy can sustain itself through the complementary occupations of a division of labor, the unity of the whole is not the aim of any of the particular trades comprising its organs. In such a "City of Pigs", limited to organic interdependence, no ruling function is exercised, for no agency imposes the unity of the whole upon its constitutive elements. To paraphrase classical political economy, the economic law of market interdependence operates behind the backs of all without being enacted by anyone. Mind, however, adds to life a factor that relates itself to the entirety of the organism, be it through feeling, consciousness, or intelligence. Like the activity of rule, which is exercised by something within the body politic that nevertheless acts upon the whole, mind relates to the organism to which it brings feeling, awareness, and intentional control in a way very different from how merely physical organs complement one another. Plato distinguishes the unity of the body politic from that of an economic order by revealing how the body politic depends upon a ruling element that realizes the unity of the whole by virtue of knowing what that unity is and purposefully sustaining it. By analogy, the psyche relates to the body by being that element of the embodied self that determines its totality in function of being aware of who it is.²²

Hegel's conceptual breakthrough for comprehending the non-dualist relation of mind and body

In drawing his analogy between polis and soul, Plato points toward a logical difference that Hegel makes thematic for comprehending the non-dualist relation of mind and body. Mind and body are not related as one particular to another, be it as independent substances or as different organs of an organism. Rather, mind and body are related as the *universal* that relates to the *particular* by overarching and containing it.²³ The universal cannot be at one with itself without having the differentiation that particularity affords. Particularity, however, is not simply something different from universality. It is rather an otherness that is no less united with the universal that pervades it. Otherwise, the particular is not the instantiation of the universal, but just something that the universal is not. In that case, "third man" problems are inevitable, for some extraneous factor must be introduced to connect universal and particular, which, as itself an extraneous addition, calls for further mediation without end.

Moreover, particularity is not an appearance of the universal, nor is the universal the essence or ground of the particular. Plato makes the mistake of subsuming the particular and the universal under such categories of the logic of essence by treating particulars as phenomenal, deficient replicas of the universal idea, which figures as their true essence. Yet determinations that are posited by some prior determiner always lack the independent being belonging to what determines them. Particulars, however, are not mere posits. As differentiations immanent in the universal, they must share the same intrinsic being that allows them to be the universal's own determinacy. The universal *determines itself* in the particular, rather than positing something else with a derivative, conditioned existence. That is what allows the universal to have individuality, with an intrinsic differentiation that is determined in and through itself. It is also what allows particulars to be individuals, exhibiting the same independent being endemic to self-determination.

Mind, inherently embodied, will exhibit the true relation of the universal and the particular by being at one with itself in the body, provided the body, in its distinction from mind, is so determined that it comprises the necessary vehicle of mind's own actuality. Then, mind, while not being just another bodily organ, will still exist nowhere else **than in the body**. Even though a central nervous system will enable the **animal to both feel as a unitary self and move itself as a unitary subject of action**,²⁴ mind will thereby pervade the organism as a whole and therefore not be seated just in the brain or in any other particular location within the body. This omnipresent subjectivity is precisely what gives mind its inwardness and "ideality", leaving it situated within the body it inhabits, but infusing it in its totality. Similarly, the universal, by differentiating itself in particularity, relates to particularity as a specific differentiation falling under its own encompassing unity, which now has the universal and the particular as its differentia. So mind, relating to itself in the body, will equally relate to the body in a relationship contained within the whole that mind comprises.

That relation will not make bodily alterations *effects* caused in whole or part by the mind. Categories of essence cannot apply to the relation of mind and body. If they did, mind would have a prior immaterial existence of its own, of which the body is a mere semblance. Yet mind cannot have an individual unity, temporality, or any specifically mental content without embodiment. Hence, the physical realization of mind cannot be posited by mind, for mind cannot posit anything without already being embodied. For this reason, the mind's relation to the body never consists of mind being a cause of bodily events. That would

reinstate a mind/body duality, where mind acts upon not its embodied self, but a body different from itself. Mind must instead be thought of as being self-cause, *developing* as something encompassing the body and the bodily processes of the mind-endowed individual. Only as self-cause of an embodied unity, that is, as self-determined, can the mind be the cause of something else, namely effects generated by the influence of its corporeal actions upon other things, whether inorganic objects, plants, or animals with varying degrees of mental endowment.

Limits of Searle's parallel proposal

John Searle alludes to something seemingly similar, describing mind as both realized in the brain and having the brain as its enabling condition. The principal false assumption plaguing dualism and reductive materialism, namely, that the subjectivity of consciousness cannot belong to the physical world, is overcome, according to Searle, by recognizing that brain processes cause our conscious states and that consciousness is itself a biological phenomenon.²⁵ Subjective states of mind are no more than higher-level features of the brain just as digestion is a higher-level feature of the stomach. That consciousness has an irreducible first-person being is just a fact about nature rather than a metaphysical puzzle.²⁶

Searle's account asserts that life and mind go together, but how and why mind requires biological realization remains largely unexplained. Can one really equate how mind supervenes upon the brain with how digestion is a "higher-level" feature of the stomach? The stomach, like any organ, can hardly be detached from its function, since the different parts of an organism are means and end to one another by virtue of their complementary functionalities, and no organ can continue to be what it is apart from that organic unity. This certainly applies to the brain, as part of the nervous system, which sustains itself as an organ of the animal by facilitating the sensibility and irritability by which the animal interacts with its environment, thereby enabling nutrition and reproduction, and allowing the other organs to function and jointly uphold both the whole individual and the entire species to which they all belong. Although injury or disease can debilitate the nervous system and reduce the animal to a vegetative state, it would be a mistake to presume that the nervous system can be fully operative as a brain in a vat. In that example, the brain is ripped apart from a living organism and somehow connected to an electrochemical mechanism, which supposedly keeps it functioning as before. Yet that supporting electrochemical

mechanism is itself inanimate and therefore must be set in play and controlled by some agent who can hardly be just a brain in a vat. Even if such a brain were to embody a mind, that mind would not relate to that brain as digestion relates to the stomach. Mind may be embodied in an animal organism, but its relation to the organism is not identical to that of the function of a single organ to that organ. If it were, the mind/body relation would revert to the organic unity of the "City of Pigs", undercutting the subjective centrality of mind.

That subjectivity is further jeopardized by Searle's employment of efficient causality in characterizing how the brain makes mind possible, as well as how the mind affects the body. If the brain is the cause of the mind, the brain has no intrinsic connection to mind, for an effect may owe its existence to its cause, but otherwise cause and effect are indifferent to one another, so long as causality is solely efficient and not formal or final.²⁷ As effect of the brain, mind is something separate, and its difference from the brain leaves undetermined why mind has the psychological features that distinguish it from neurological activity. The same duality reenters when mind is considered the cause of effects in the body,²⁸ rather than as something always embodied that acts upon its own embodiment. It is thus no accident that Searle allows for the possibility of consciousness being caused and sustained by an artificial brain fashioned out of inanimate materials just as a heart can be replaced by an artificial machine that pumps blood.²⁹ Since function is kept separate from the material in which that function is carried out, it has the external teleology of an artifact, rather than the internal teleology of a self-realizing form that cannot be apart from the living material it encompasses.

Mind is not the property of the brain, or even of the entire nervous system. Still, mind cannot be had by plants because only animals have sensibility and irritability, together with the nervous system these functions involve. These physiological features endow the animal organism with a degree of self-related activity without which the subjective centrality of mind cannot introduce itself. Yet mind still relates to itself as embodied in the entire animal organism, rather than as belonging to a particular organ or physiological system among others. Particular features of the nervous system may be associated with specific activities of mind, so that, for example, damage to certain brain areas can be correlated with certain mental deficits. Nevertheless the mind feels, senses, thinks, and acts always in and through its own body as a whole.

For just this reason, the mind can never act upon its body as if the body were an object apart that could suffer the effects of mental

causality. Just as the body does not cause the mind, so the mind does not affect the body. Precisely because the mind is inherently alive and encompasses the animal organism in its entirety, categories of efficient causality cannot apply. Nor, however, is the relation of mind and body revealed by employing the categories of external teleology, appropriate to artifacts, to which Searle reverts in describing the "higher level" of mind as something imparted by an external function, which artificial "brains" could fulfill.

The self-development of embodied mind

The solution to the mind/body problem hinges upon recognizing that mind does not act upon the body as cause of effects, but rather acts upon itself as an embodied living subjectivity. As such, mind develops itself, progressively attaining more and more of a self-determined character. This progressive self-formation is endemic to mind. Hegel logically captures this process in further characterizing mind in terms of the Idea, whose process unites concept and objectivity in and through themselves, bringing into being the inherent correspondence in which truth resides. This characterization allows Hegel to speak of the embodied mind as coming to exhibit the truth of the Idea, where body and mind unite objectivity and subjectivity, leaving the dead body something "untrue", lacking that unifying process.³⁰

This process of self-formation has a definite beginning. Even though mind always engages in reflexive self-activity, at the outset mental process must have a natural character, that is, a given determinacy through which it relates to itself. This given determinacy comprises what Hegel aptly calls the anthropological dimension of mind,³¹ to the extent that mind is from the start encumbered with a natural species being involving a physiological body with its own specific metabolism, sensory apparatus, and way of sustaining itself within its encompassing biosphere. Although we may be born as *homo sapiens*, mind need not share in that species being, which, as contingently given, has features extraneous to mind per se. Mind, however, must have some given species being through which mental life can be self-active, necessitating that mind has a natural endowment upon which it can proceed to individuate itself through its own activity.

Mind's being encumbered with "natural", given determinacy is logically prefigured by how, as Hegel shows in his *Logic*, the self-determined determinacy of the concept arises from something else, namely the reciprocity into which the logic of essence reverts. Although the concept

emerges logically when the difference between determiner and determined is overcome, the self-determined determinacy that results has not given itself its own character. Rather, it arises from that antecedent process, leaving the concept with an initial form of self-determination that has not yet fully determined itself.³² Consequently, the concept must come to mediate its own determination, which it can only do through further development that progressively renders every determination of the concept something determined by conceptual factors. This occurs first in judgment, where the factors of the concept (universality, particularity, and individuality) are *immediately* determined by one another through the copula "is" (for example, the particular or individual *is* the universal).³³ The syllogism then overcomes judgment's immediate determination by providing a mediating term, enabling the determination of one concept term by another to be mediated by a third (for example, the individual is the universal by virtue of its particularity).³⁴ Objectivity removes the abiding difference between the mediating term and the two terms it connects, allowing individuals to be so completely self-mediated that their external relations are completely indifferent to their individuality.³⁵

Hegel delineates the mental analogue to this progressive self-determination in conceiving the successive ways in which the **always embodied mind cultivates itself to become more and more thoroughly what it has determined itself to be**. The succession of these mental way stations has a dual significance. On the one hand, it comprises an ordering of structural constitution, where preceding shapes are prerequisites for those that follow, either as temporally prior developments or as component constituents. On the other hand, because the latter stages presuppose the earlier ones, mental processes can appear independently in a temporal development. In other words, if, following Hegel, mind involves successive mental processes of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence, then the psyche can emerge without consciousness or intelligence, consciousness must involve the psyche but can exist without intelligence, and intelligence can emerge after the development of psyche and consciousness, but not without either. These possible independent temporal realizations can involve distinct species arising in evolutionary succession and/or existing simultaneously with different mental endowments, distinguished by their greater or lesser inclusion of the various shapes that must always incorporate those that structurally precede them. The succession can also take the form of the mental maturation of an individual, whose mind undergoes a temporal development of its own. In every case, at every stage the self-formation

applies to a mentality that has its own physiological dimension. Each stage in the self-cultivation of mind therefore comprises a specific mind/body unity.

Mind, as initially self-active with a given animal species being, minimally does nothing more than immediately register the determinations of its nature, feeling them as a psyche consisting in merely the feeling of its own natural determinacy.³⁶ That natural, "anthropological" endowment involves both its own internal physiological process and its interaction with the surrounding biosphere. Mind as psyche has nothing with which to determine further its own feeling other than the immediate feeling activity in which it solely consists. In the absence of any other mental resources, this added determining can itself only occur immediately, as the "natural" automatic result of prior engagements in feeling. Given the immediacy of these prior engagements, they can only impact upon current acts of feeling by rendering them immediately distinct from other acts that have no relation to those prior acts. That immediate distinction cannot involve positing new felt qualities, for their introduction would require some mediating discrimination to qualitatively differentiate them. Since immediate feeling has no power of comparison to discriminate between felt contents, any distinctiveness acquired by such contents must reside simply in a nonbeing or suspension of the feeling concerned, which adds no new determinations to it, but only involves mind's relative withdrawal from it. This can occur when feelings that resemble some antecedents thereby get psychologically sequestered from those that do not have any relation to prior acts of mind. Such is the course of habituation, where mind becomes inured to feelings that resemble others that precede their registration. Since feelings are bound up with bodily activities, habituation allows mind to detach itself from both certain repeated feelings and repeated corporeal behavior by not attending to them in its current psychic field. These repeated feelings and behavior can now proceed without mind having to be immediately immersed in their process. In this way, mind and body become simultaneously transformed through the functioning of the psyche, which has now begun to refashion itself. What occurs is not an act of mind upon the body, as if categories of essence such as cause and effect applied. Since mind is always embodied, the transformation is not an effect upon something else, but rather a self-development or cultivation, where the psyche gives its specific mind/body unity a character determined by its own self-activity, encompassing physical, chemical, and biological processes.

That concrete self-determining continues apace with the emergence of consciousness. As Hegel argues, once the psyche has succeeded in detaching itself as a disengaged standpoint from its feeling and its embodiment, it can confront some of its feelings as sensations of an independently given objectivity and give expression to others in corporeal behavior that mind can recognize as both occurring in the world and being its own activity.³⁷ This allows mind to individuate itself as an embodied subject in the world of which it is conscious. Thanks to this embodiment, mind can confront its own awareness as something objective. Doing so, however, depends upon a cultivation of mind's own embodiment, so that it recognizably exhibits the subjectivity of the consciousness to which it is uniquely connected. This cultivation is not entirely an affair of the individual consciousness, in isolation from others. An animal may confront its own subjectivity in a purely negative fashion by consuming an object of desire, thereby revealing itself in the negation of an independent object. Yet to have a positive objectivity that reveals the self, consciousness must confront consciousness itself as an independently given other. This other reflects consciousness itself by being another consciousness, rendering both minds particular exemplars of consciousness in general, which recognize each other's distinct **individuality**. Hegel characterizes this relation as one whose participants **show their desire for the desire of one another**.³⁸ This manifestation **must involve corporeal activity both expressive of desire and related to the desire of the other**, for otherwise it remains purely internal and private. Recognition always involves embodied selves, conscious of other living minds and self-conscious as a living mind both sharing in what is universal to consciousness and individuating itself from others. Since recognition applies to subjects manifest to one another in and through their bodies, the universality of consciousness equally involves a commonality in physical behavior, which need not as yet take the form of linguistic interaction.

The emergence of linguistic intelligence depends neither on any causal movement upon the individual mind nor on mind acting upon the body. Rather, it arises through a self-development that embodied mind undergoes in conjunction with others. The psychological precondition of theoretical intelligence, whether intuiting, representing, or thinking, is the achievement by consciousness of the universal self-awareness that recognizes itself in objectivity and treats its mental determinations as equally objective.³⁹ This requires a physical interaction with others, with mind encompassing bodies trained so as to give recognizable expression to the consciousness of one another. Linguistic

interaction cannot occur until individuals are in a position to fashion and use perceivable signs so as to participate in a shared practice of communication. At one and the same time, this physical/mental linguistic habituation allows mind to access the intersubjectivity of rational discourse and to behave physiologically as an embodied rational individual.

Accordingly, action never involves the mystery of mind acting upon the body, where categories of essence, such as cause and effect, enter in to raise the specter of a disembodied soul. Intelligence becomes practical by instead acting upon its ever-embodied self. Articulating purposes and intentions that may involve pictorial representations and/or words, as well as the physiological dimension they involve, the individual agent realizes them through behavior that may cause other things to occur, but which itself comprises a self-determination of the individual agent. Reasons do not “cause” the action that ensues. Rather, the action *qua* action already has intentions ingredient in it. If instead, the individual just moved its body without intrinsic purpose, the movement would be an intentional act only relative to external observers who imparted their aims to what occurs.

The self-determination of action is, however, only formal at the outset. In exercising choice, the agent employs a “natural” form of willing that is not determined by its act, but rather comprises the given capacity to choose providing the enabling condition of each and every choice. That capacity involves the ability to represent ends and focus on one rather than another, as well as the physical skill to achieve whatever ends are chosen. Although these arise from the physiological as well as psychological maturation and cultivation of the individual, they are still preconditions of choice rather than products of the volition with which they are connected. Similarly, the ends inherent in action are first given by desire and contingent circumstances rather than being determined by willing. The will only opts for one or another of these given aims, exercising a volition whose form and content are equally externally determined rather than self-determined. Even when practical intelligence reflects upon its aims and seeks their universal fulfillment in the pursuit of happiness, that encompassing goal remains bound to whatever desires the individual happens to have.

Only when individuals interact so as to exercise rights, can will then obtain both a form and content determined by willing. Hegel shows this in its most minimal form in explicating the recognition process of property ownership, with which the *Philosophy of Right* systematically begins. Individuals will into being their own form of agency as owners by

first making known to one another that their wills exclusively inform their own bodies. This requires coordinated action accompanied by coordinated recognition of the significance that each of the parties to the interaction ascribes to their conduct. Once more, only embodied selves who have achieved the universal self-transformations of intelligence can give themselves the form of agency of owners and will a content, property, that is determined by will, rather than externally given. On that basis, persons can use that recognized embodied agency to lay claim recognizably to external factors that have yet to be informed by anyone's will, establishing alienable property that can then figure in contractual relations.

These developments push beyond the domain of philosophical psychology to that of ethics, where philosophy addresses the reality of self-determined agency. By resolving the mind/body problem, Hegel has provided not only a viable framework for the philosophy of mind, but also the enabling conditions of ethical theory.⁴⁰

3

Hegel, Mind, and Mechanism: Why Machines Have No Psyche, Consciousness, or Intelligence

The rise of computers and robots, heralded in science fiction and pervading ever more daily experience, has fostered a rampant temptation to model mind as a mechanism and to expect machines to one day simulate all mental reality. This temptation reflects more than technological developments, however. It arises from the perennial dilemma of two complementary approaches to mind that proceed from the assumption of a mind/body duality: one conceiving mind to be wholly immaterial and the other reducing mind to inanimate matter. Exploring the difficulties of these views puts us in a position to evaluate the relation of mind and machine, helped along the way by key insights from Hegel.

Why mind cannot be immaterial

The notion that mind cannot be material seems confirmed in every moment of self-consciousness, whose purely temporal flow of mental content testifies to the apparent nonspatial existence of mind. Yet so long as mind is construed as immaterial, it lacks the resources to have any temporal ordering, possess any unity, or retain any specifically mental character. Deprived of materiality, mental life is hardly distinguishable from a succession of logical categories that exhibit determinacy in general, rather than anything particular to mind. The possibilities of any nonlogical content are excluded. Lacking any embodiment, mind has nothing with which to passively receive content in the manner of sensibility, nor to retrieve and re-fashion any such sensible content in images. Mind could perhaps generate conceptual content, but this would be indistinguishable from the thoughts that logic produces in its thinking of thinking. Yet even for logic to appear as an actual

philosophical undertaking, mind must be embodied for philosophers to express their thoughts in a tangible way recognizable by others, as well as to acquire linguistic competence and conceptual thought in the first place. Any practical interaction with nonmental reality or other minds would, however, be precluded for an immaterial mind.

Yet the solitary solipsism that seems to await mind, even one lacking language and thought, is itself doubtful given the problem of retaining any individual unity without matter. So long as mind is only a temporal succession of mental contents without any spatial differentiation, there is no way for different mental contents to align themselves as parallel streams of coexisting immaterial minds. Nothing can tie any of the simultaneous contents to certain predecessors and successors rather than others, anchoring them to distinguishable subjects. Similarity of content is no guarantee of exclusive mental unity without assuming that overlapping mental material cannot belong to different minds. The temporal order of mental contents can no more insure how they are to be distributed among coexisting minds than that they all belong to one and the same mind. Hence, without some unique spatiotemporal location to root mind in some actual body, there cannot even be a single mental subject.

Moreover, the temporal flux of mental content, which might seem to provide at least something irreducible to logical determinacy, is just as **problematic for mind without matter**. As Kant argues in his "Refutation of Idealism",¹ the succession of mental flux has nothing abiding to sustain the continuity of each fleeting representation, unless mind has something enduring in space to provide a persisting material backdrop. To apprehend this abiding spatial world in any determinate fashion, mind must view that objectivity from a spatially determined vantage point. Not only are near and far, up or down, left or right, and in front or behind what they are only in relation to a specific location, but no points in space are distinguishable unless something material occupies them. Without a material embodiment to which mind finds itself inextricably tied, mind will lack spatial as well as temporal ordering and mental contents will revert to logical terms.

Mind, matter, and mechanism

Yet if mind cannot be without matter, how is mind to be embodied? Successfully answering this question has been stymied by a widely resurfacing approach that aims to escape mind-body dualism by reducing mind to purely physical, inanimate matter. Pre-Socratics, the ancient Indian Carvaka school of philosophy, the French Enlightenment

materialists, and recent quantum mechanics theorists² have all joined in this enterprise. The modern disenchantment of nature provides a general cultural preparation for embracing their material reduction of mind, by removing the traditional view that invested inanimate nature with spirit and paid homage to the mind in matter through prayer and offerings. With matter now losing its soul, the door is open for materialists to reduce the mental to a merely physical process. To secure the undertaking objectivity in general must further be considered reducible to mechanical and chemical process.

That presumption is commonly associated with the thesis that physical reality is determined exclusively by efficient causality, something propounded by Newtonian mechanics and early modern philosophy whether empiricist or rationalist. Efficient causality is the principle by which one factor determines some change in another. With formal and final causality excluded, no change can involve alteration in either form or purpose. In an objectivity exclusively governed by efficient causality, nothing that occurs can bear upon any ends or upon the nature of any factor. Determined with utter indifference to purpose and form, the world of efficient causality orders things equally, irrespective of what they are and what import they may have. Objects are therefore exclusively ruled by laws pertaining to their matter. It is assumed that a nature whose objects are externally determined with indifference to end and kind will comprise a mechanistic universe.

A universe governed by laws of matter, however, cannot be solely determined by efficient causality. Just because efficient causality is indifferent to what it orders, its causes and effects must be individuated by something else. Laws of matter can hardly account themselves for the specific plurality, masses, or locations of the bodies to which they apply. As Hegel demonstrates in the *Logic of Essence*,³ cause and effect cannot even uphold their own difference since a cause must posit its effect to be a cause, rendering that effect the cause of its cause's causality. With cause thereby becoming the effect of its own effect, cause and effect exchange roles and revert to reciprocity where the distinction between cause and effect is removed, overcoming the difference between determiner and determined. This overcoming ushers in self-determination, where what is determined is what does the determining and what does the determining determines itself. Self-determination, as immediately arising from reciprocity, first comprises the determination of universality, which involves a self-differentiation into particularity in which universality remains at one with itself by being individual, that is, determined in and through itself.

Insofar as the interaction of mechanism does not provide for the identity of its interacting factors, these must have individuality in and through themselves. This is why Hegel conceives mechanism within the Logic of the Concept under the heading of Objectivity. Unlike the mutual dependence of existence, in whose relativity phenomena are completely determined by one another, objectivity embodies the self-determined character of conceptual determination, providing the categorial resources for determining entities that can have an identity of their own completely unaffected by their relationships to one another.

Significantly, when Hegel, for purposes of illustration, looks for a philosophical system that makes mechanism its fundamental principle, he turns to Leibniz' monadology. Each monad is both externally related to others and determined exclusively in and through itself. Although the resulting mechanism might seem ready for application to matter in motion, Leibniz construes monads in mental terms, as beings that represent a world of their own. This allows each monad to retain a simple dynamic unity escaping the divisibility of matter that renders any material principle a composite manifestation of something more fundamental. Notably, the external relationship of mechanism does not intrude *within* the representing of any monad, but rather applies solely to the indifference they have to one another. Hence, the mental process of monad representation does not render mind something mechanical. At most it allows for minds to stand in a mechanical relation to one another, where the inability of any external influence to effect mental activity entails that whatever individuals do to one another parallels what each monad is in and through itself.

Hegel's account of the transition from the Logic of Essence to the Logic of the Concept provides the conceptual resources for making sense of how objectivity, reduced to a realm of efficient causality, can only be a free-standing mechanism if mechanism consists of objects individuated in and through themselves, apart from the causal interaction to which they are externally subject. Because efficient causal determination of objects neither constitutes nor impinges upon their individuality, mechanism applies solely to objects independent of and unperturbed by mechanical influence. Without this self-subsistent individuality, for whose conception the Logic of the Concept is a prerequisite, there can be no distinguishable objects interrelating solely through the mechanical, wholly external laws of efficient causality.⁴

This is why conceiving what an object is provides no knowledge of any efficacy it has in mechanical process, which is what allows Hume to deny that cause (that is, efficient cause) can be known by reason.

It also entails something crucial for the materiality of mind: that whereas mechanism may impact upon the spatiotemporal (material) ordering of objects, it leaves everything else about them otherwise undetermined. Because mechanism involves individual objects, but leaves their individuation determined independently, material things can and must have other dimensions specified apart from mechanistic motion.

As Hegel's own account of Objectivity reveals, this irreducible supervenience occurs most minimally in chemical process, or chemism.⁵ Like mechanism, chemical process determines objects externally without purpose or form. Just as motion gets mechanically communicated to one object by another, objects must be brought together by some external catalyst to react chemically. Chemical relations are distinguished from mechanical interaction in that objects are chemically affected by one another not as mere bodies governed by the same laws of motion, but as distinct chemicals that are poised to break down or coalesce in function of their complementary difference. The mechanical relations of objects as movable matter can neither be violated nor impeded by chemical process precisely because chemism pertains to the relational difference of objects, to which mechanism is indifferent. Whereas objects react chemically without relinquishing their governance by laws of motion applying to matter *qua* matter, their chemical reaction involves something undetermined by and irreducible to mechanism.

Two correlative aspects enable mechanical and chemical processes to both be incorporated within additional processes that can remain irreducible to them. These are the external determination to which they subject objects and the independent individuality their objects possess. Because mechanical and chemical processes are not inherent in their objects, these cannot be mechanically or chemically altered without some external condition. Instead of being self-renewing, mechanical and chemical interactions depend on something else. Due to this very externality, what an object is and what purposes if any it may serve are not decided by its spatiotemporal and chemical specifications. Just as objects of the same kind may have different chemical compositions, so things of different natures may have identical chemistry. Because mechanical and chemical processes leave ends and forms undetermined, they can be subsidiary parts of irreducibly encompassing processes for which they may be enabling conditions.

This is indicative of how mechanism and chemism have a logical character, whose determination can be exhibited in different spheres of reality. This logical character has been obscured by the early modern assumption that material reality is exclusively determined mechanistically,

an assumption that has encouraged the conflation of mechanism *per se* with the mechanics of physical nature. As Hegel points out, however, mechanism can be embodied just as much in mental relationships as in the physical interaction of bodies.⁶ Memory, for example, can be mechanical in form, rote recalling words without any attention to their meaning or syntax. Similarly, the emotional attachments of individuals can exhibit chemical relations of elective affinity, where the complementary “chemistry” of personalities draws them together.⁷

These examples may give encouragement to mechanistic reductions of mind. Nevertheless the mere exemplification of mechanism in different domains does not entail that they are wholly reducible to mechanical relations. The possibility of nonmechanistic processes must be precluded from these spheres to warrant the reductionisms of those who conflate mind with matter that is exclusively mechanistically determined.

The problem confronting the materialist reduction of mind is twofold: whereas the external determination of mechanism and chemism allows mind to be embodied without becoming just mechanical/chemical process, constitutive aspects of mind transcend that externality. Because every mechanical and chemical interaction determines objects with indifference to form and function, any mechanical or chemical reduction precludes any purposive activity or any self-activity, where something acts upon itself in virtue of its nature. Yet as Hegel’s account of Subjective Spirit makes abundantly clear, self-activity is an ingredient in every level of mind, just as purposiveness is intrinsic to conscious and intelligent action, as well as implicit in the life of feeling of the psyche.

Unlike inanimate matter, mind is a function of how it relates to itself, be it as pre-conscious psyche, pre-linguistic consciousness, or intelligence. The psyche is a pre-conscious subject of feeling insofar as it fails to differentiate its mental modifications from itself.⁸ Registering its own psychophysical changes, the psyche simply is what it feels itself to be. Instead of sensing an objectivity confronting it, the psyche communes with itself, a self comprising the psychic field of sensibility exhausting its mental life.

As Hegel points out, consciousness involves the same mental content, but mind as conscious relates to it as the unitary domain of an independent world that it confronts as a disengaged subject.⁹ This is true even in self-consciousness, where mind is self-conscious rather than just self-feeling by relating to its mental content as independently confronting it as another self-consciousness. Lastly, mind renders itself intelligence by intuiting, representing, and thinking, variously treating its mental contents both as determinations of an objective world

and as products of its own activity.¹⁰ Although mind always remains embodied, situated in a world in which it is caught up in mechanical and chemical processes, mind retains its constitutive forms of mental reflexivity thanks to how it acts upon its own specifications.

By the same token, whenever mind treats matters as having significance for it, feeling emotion and acting intentionally, goal-directedness enters in, rendering what Hegel calls "practical intelligence"¹¹ something beyond the bounds of blind mechanism.

In face of these considerations, the opposing approaches to mind/body dualism arrive at an impasse. On the one hand, mind cannot be immaterial without eliminating its own unity, temporality, and specifically mental character. On the other hand, mind cannot be reduced to natural inanimate matter without forsaking the purpose and self-activity so manifest across the spectrum of mental life.

Given the persisting assumptions of modern philosophy, this outcome has precipitated a turn to artificial intelligence, treating mind as a machine. This is because artifacts possess material embodiment as well as purpose, and machines are artifacts that carry out functions rather than remaining inactive. In these respects, artifact mechanisms seem to offer features necessary for mental activity. If these features are not just necessary but sufficient for mental life, artifacts could have minds and minds could be understood as machines, even if belonging to natural individuals.

Can machines possess mind and are minds reducible to machines?

The rise of computers has filled the sails of these options, leading investigators increasingly to construe mind in computational terms, while others set off on designing "thinking machines" to artificially simulate every mental activity.

All these undertakings, however, seem to ignore a fundamental anomaly: artifacts have purpose only insofar as they have been produced by an artificer who gives them their function by imposing design on materials of which they are composed. The purpose of artifacts thus derives from makers who produce with a nonderivative aim. Artificial intelligence therefore depends upon a natural intelligence capable of giving itself ends in a way that cannot be modeled on an artifact's derivative functionality. Although computing machines might display the purposiveness of mental calculation, this conferred goal-directedness can never exhibit the autonomous setting of goals rendering natural minds irreducible to any artifact.

Neo-Darwinians such as Daniel Dennett purport to circumvent this difficulty by maintaining that natural selection has blindly designed organisms that have evolved to produce machines, removing the dependency of artifacts' derivative functionality upon some original goal-setting mind.¹² Yet even if this were so, how can artifacts themselves feel, have conscious experience, or theorize and act with linguistic intelligence? Artifacts in general, and machines in particular, may be material and functional, but they are still mechanisms, whose susceptibility to external mechanical and chemical influence is what makes their design and manufacture possible. Because the design of an artifact is imparted by an independent agency, an artifact cannot activate itself, but operates mechanically, moved by other things with indifference to its nature just as it moves other objects in like fashion.

Unlike organs of a living being, which function in an intrinsic complementary interrelation, artifacts' action upon things depends upon the contingent presence of both what gets acted upon and some activating agency. Extrinsic to what it operates upon, such mechanical functioning is emblematic of calculation, which manipulates inputs following laws that apply equally with indifference to what those inputs are. **What makes calculation mechanical is precisely that it orders its terms in ways extraneous to their character, which is why calculation can only involve information whose content is without intrinsic connection to its ordering.** This is the case with quantitative reckonings that are indifferent to the quality of what is quantified, as well as with formal logical deductions that involve logical variables, whose extrinsic ordering allows for substitution that leaves their formal logical relations unaltered.

Not surprisingly, computing machines have been the most popular candidates for modeling mind, with great expectations abounding of an imminent fulfillment of Turing's test, whereby a computer would seal the identity of mind and machine by making calculations indistinguishable from the responses of a "natural" person. Here the talk is always of designing "thinking" rather than "feeling" or "conscious" machines because what "thinking" is understood to be is nothing but calculation. "Natural" minds may certainly engage at times in the mechanical operations of formal logical deduction or reckoning. Yet "thinking" machines can hardly compute like a natural mind due to the disanalogy between the "external" teleology of artifacts and the "internal" teleology of living things, a disanalogy that applies even when mind acts in its most mechanical ways.

Although a machine may be manufactured with the help of other machines, it cannot grow or assemble itself, but must be built from given parts by an agent who gives the machine its functionality by ordering the parts according to an antecedently given design. Further, machines do not activate themselves, but must be put into operation, functioning upon things as externally given as the parts from which the machines are made.¹³ Moreover, no machine determines the ends it serves. Rather, as Charles Taylor notes, what function a machine performs is not intrinsic, but relative to an external observer.¹⁴ An operating computer, for example, produces heat, diverse noises, various light effects, electricity expenses, and outputs interpretable as different sorts of information processing. Yet that the function of the computer consists in processing data, rather than heating its space, making sounds, giving a light show, or raising power costs cannot be decided by the computer, but only by an observer with its own ends.¹⁵

For this reason, neither “desires” nor “impulses” can be intrinsic to a machine. That a machine be poised to fulfill some function is relative to how its possible motions fit what its users or designers intend it to do. Their aims are not relative to any external agency, but set by themselves, determining what matters for them in the function of how they understand themselves.¹⁶ Machine functionality is observer relative because machine movements are mechanistically caused by prior conditions irrespective of any ends. Although this external determination leaves machines always available to serve extraneous ends, those ends are independent of machines’ movements. In contrast to machine motion, action undertaken by a natural agent is intrinsically purposive, with the acting individual taking account of the import that circumstances have for him or her.¹⁷ This applies to the most mechanical activities, such as when an individual performs calculations, logical deductions, or rote memorizations. A machine may follow similar *motions* of calculation, but individuals carry them out as *actions*, intrinsically informed by their own aims. Whereas a computer blindly executes its artificial “thinking” according to the instructions built into its hardware and software, individuals reckon, deduce, or recite by rote with some end in mind, whether to achieve something fulfilling an interest, improve their mechanical abilities, or simply to while away the moment. On occasion, individuals may behave in a blindly mechanical, calculating way, as when driving a complicated route while distracted by conversation or when performing under hypnotic suggestion. The very exceptional character of these examples only highlights the glaring discrepancy between the mechanical movements of “artificial intelligence” and the

purposive activity with which individuals calculate, deduce, or recite by rote.

The pitfalls of reducing mind to machine and the limits of "artificial intelligence" become most glaring when one turns from how a natural mind calculates to how it performs activities entirely beyond mechanistic manipulation.

Although such activities are to be found in the psyche and consciousness, as well as in intelligence, they most obviously figure in the "higher" mental functions that computers remain hopelessly unable to simulate. Completely elusive to cybernetic reduction is conceptual determination, the very acme of linguistic intelligence and the indispensable prerequisite for theorizing about mind or any other topic. Conceptualization is opaque to machine modeling because it centers upon the ties of universality, particularity, and individuality, which, as Hegel's *Logic of the Concept* so pointedly demonstrates, cannot be reduced to any reckoning. This is because universality always pervades the nature of its particulars, whereas mechanistic "thinking" processes terms indifferent to the ordering to which they are subjected. Particulars, to sustain their plurality, must have individual features indifferent to what they share, but their unity in the universal is intrinsic to them. An individual cannot be particular unless it possesses that which unites it with others as instances of the universal. For its part, the universal cannot have its own constitutive encompassing unity unless particulars comprise its inherent differentiation, rather than being given independently of it. The indifferent externality of mechanism is superseded on both accounts.¹⁸ Indeed, this supercession is itself presupposed by mechanism, whose interaction depends upon the independent individuality of the factors that it indifferently relates, since their mechanical relationship requires their plurality, yet does not individuate them. As Hegel has shown, to be individual involves particularity and universality. What is unique cannot be determined by something else, both because what owes its character to its contrast with an other (the determination by negation of the *Logic of Being*) is just as much an other as the something to which it stands contrasted, and because what a determiner determines (the positing of the *Logic of Essence*) can just as well be another derivative term. To be individual, something's unity must pervade its differentiation, just as the universal pervades the particular. Then it is determined in and through itself, exhibiting the self-determination enabling the universal to have particularity as its own differentiation.¹⁹ This is, once more, why Hegel is correct to conceive mechanism as a category of the *Logic*

of the Concept, constitutively presupposing the self-determination of conceptual determinacy.

It is also why thinking machines, limited to calculation, remain unable to theorize, that is, to comprehend the universal in the individual and conceive its particularization. Dreyfus has observed that no one has the slightest idea how to make computers or any other machine generalize and thereby simulate this most fundamental activity of human intelligence.²⁰ Dreyfus lays blame upon the inability of computers to react to the features relevant to humans that supposedly make possible identifying what should be sorted together and what rules ought apply.²¹ Yet as Hegel's analysis of the concept reveals, the difficulty is not limited to circumstances governed by pragmatic concerns.²² The mechanical motions of computation operate upon inputs that must be susceptible to connections that are entirely extrinsic to their character. They therefore must be atomistic in character, lacking all inherent relationships.²³ Consequently, they lack all basis for being subsumed under one rather than another universal.²⁴ It follows that they can only be ordered by law, whose equal treatment sets generic differences aside. However prodigiously computers may calculate, whenever the intrinsic categorizations of theorizing are at issue, reckoning proves futile.

The annals of philosophy are replete with recognition of this futility. Early on, Plato exposed the limitations of computation in his Divided Line, showing how calculating understanding gets transcended by the true thinking that liberates itself of premises and given algorithms by conceiving what lies beyond assumption, intuiting ideas that develop immanently (dialectically) from one another.²⁵ Plato showed that the calculation of "artificial intelligence" can never provide unconditioned knowledge. Because computation proceeds with premises and given procedures, any attempt to reduce mind to machine, that is, to universalize calculation and reduce reason to understanding, is self-defeating, condemning its own claims to dependence upon unexamined premises.

Similarly Kant unmasked the impossibility of satisfying the Turing test by noting how judgment, subsuming particulars under universals, cannot be rule governed. This is because any rule for applying concepts would itself need to be applied, leaving an ultimate subsuming beyond any law.²⁶ The same point gets later raised by Wittgenstein, arguing that rules cannot govern all practice, since rules for applying rules must themselves be applied, inviting an infinite regress that can only be overcome by simply applying rules without the guidance of any rule.²⁷ Significantly, Kant considers such ability to judge without rules

to distinguish intelligence from stupidity. Anything but mechanical, this ability can no more be imparted according to rules than operate as a law-governed activity.²⁸ If such liberation from given rules could appear to leave mind clever, but arbitrary and subjective, Kant's recognition of synthetic a priori judgments endows mind with a reason able to produce new content remaining necessarily entailed in the universality of thought. This essentially philosophical thinking, which gains knowledge by reason alone, letting the universal particularize itself, lies beyond any computation that orders inputs irrespective of their nature. No machine can simulate synthetic a priori judgment, for doing so requires determining what is inherent in thought.²⁹

Hegel points out a fundamental symptom of this inability: mechanical "thinking" always manipulates terms with a content given and fixed.³⁰ What machine intelligence orders with indifference to its content is something thereby both undisturbed by those operations and at hand independently of them. If thought determinations were condemned to have the atomistic, passive, and rigid character of such inputs, concepts could never relate to what they are not, nor develop themselves into new conceptual content. This would leave thought wholly analytic, unable to generate any determinacies of its own, and reduced to an impoverished instrument for sorting what lies within **given terms, supplied by something beyond thought**. To paraphrase Kant, thought would be empty and knowledge would be limited to empirical observation of objects and the usage of language. Yet, even to know that this predicament holds universally and necessarily would transcend the limits of experience and a reason left impotent by being assimilated to mechanical thinking.

The conceptual theorizing of philosophy, however, depends upon what no mechanical "thinking" can simulate: an autonomous reasoning whose thinking orders itself, thanks to concepts that relate themselves to what they are not, transforming themselves in the conceptual self-activity whereby the universal (the concept as such) determines itself, giving reason knowledge of its own. Because artificial intelligence instead externally orders inputs that are fixed and independently given, thinking machines can never exhibit the freedom of thought to philosophize.

As Hegel shows in his parallel introductions to the *Science of Logic*,³¹ this gaping incongruence between true and artificial intelligence is most radically presented in the constitutive quandary of philosophical inquiry. All other disciplines are irredeemably conditioned by investigating a subject matter they take for granted and using a method their

investigation must no less presuppose precisely because it is not itself the topic under examination. By contrast, philosophy can tolerate no given "inputs" or given "instructions" if it is to escape the relativity resulting from dogmatically accepting privileged contents and procedures from the outset. Hence, philosophy must call into question how it should proceed as well as what it should investigate. Such questions are beyond machine intelligence, which can only raise problems for which it has been programed and can only address isolated, fixed contents fed to it from without in accord with its design. That design may mandate continual modifications of operations in virtue of parallel processing, but whatever "learning" results is still governed by the provision of given inputs and the algorithms that govern the "learning process". The critical freedom of rational autonomy remains precluded because thinking machines, whether parallel or serial in architecture, are beholden to externalities that condition all their outputs.³²

Yet just as the determined determinacy of the Logic of Essence gives rise to the self-determination of the Logic of the Concept, so every thinking machine points beyond its own limitations. The rule-governed operations of computers depend upon hardware engineers to design programmable circuitry as well as programmers to provide software instructions. On both accounts, activities must be performed that cannot be contained within the rule-governed functionality with which they endow artificial intelligence.³³ To begin with, hardware engineers and programmers cannot just follow given algorithms in implementing their designs. To come up with their program and circuitry designs in the first place they must be very unmechanical and creative. Furthermore, for any input to be entered, meaningful propositions must be translated by programmers into the "meaningless discrete bits" with which computers operate,³⁴ just as no meaningful output results until users interpret what has been mechanistically produced, imparting a significance arising from an independent understanding of relevant contexts and interests.

What all these anomalies point to is a feature of mind that no artifact nor any machine can duplicate: the self-related activity pervading the feeling of the psyche, the intentionality of consciousness, and every engagement of intelligence. Simply because mechanism is externally rather than self-moved, no machine can act upon itself. Yet self-activity is constitutive of every dimension of mind. The psyche cannot have any feelings without feeling them, just as consciousness cannot experience objects without treating its own mental content as the determination of a unitary domain from which it has extricated itself and to which it

stands opposed. By the same token, mind cannot move beyond feeling and being conscious to intuiting, representing, and thinking unless it relates to its mental contents as determinations of something objective as well as its own subjective modification. How mind acts upon itself is in each case constitutive of what mind is.³⁵

Insofar as computers lack all self-activity, they cannot relate their operations to anything they may be about and achieve reference. Although computation may produce outputs from inputs according to embedded rules, this movement cannot therefore claim knowledge and differentiate reality from appearance. No matter how often inputs caused by external situations get similarly processed, that recurring causal relation does not secure reference any more than a sneeze resulting from the sight of cows thereby becomes not just a sneeze, but the sign of a cow.³⁶ The lack of intrinsic reference plagues every machine computation. Computer calculations may analogously duplicate the quantitative relations of objects being reckoned, but machine movements do not themselves determine that they are representative of anything objective.³⁷ Operators must always intervene to encode input and decode output, performing an intentional activity beyond computation, yet intrinsic to natural minds that reckon about their world.

Since how mechanical functions relate to something beyond themselves can only be determined by an external observer, machines can only refer by deriving intentionality from agents who relate the causal movements of these machines to what they thereby come to be about. Insofar as "thinking machines" can only compute about something by deriving intentionality from minds with intrinsic intentionality, it is absurd to reduce mind to artificial intelligence.³⁸

Indicative of this absurdity is the inability of a machine to make mistakes.³⁹ Lacking the self-activity to tie its operations to something else and relate to that connection, a machine may malfunction, but it cannot err, misjudging the due relation of its output to external objects. Computations might be correct, but they can never alone leap across the boundary between causal connection and intentional reference.

It might be countered that machine feedback simulates at least some of mind's pervasive self-activity. Certainly a thermometer may transmute heat changes into indicator movements, just as a thermostat may convert temperature fluctuations into indicator motions that engage heating cycles. Yet never do these movements act upon themselves, rather than some other part of the mechanism.⁴⁰ This is true even when a feedback mechanism's regulation is necessary for continued operations. A steam engine, for example, may blow itself up unless pressure

regulators continually cause proper adjustments to be effected. Yet these adjustments are still always different from the antecedent movements whose pressures are monitored. Not only does self-activity never occur, but mechanical feedback never *refers* to the functions it monitors. Feedback may affect further functioning, but it never is *about* what causes those changes. It simply comprises a causal loop. To paraphrase Kenneth Westphal,⁴¹ feedback is all syntax with no semantics. For these reasons, a thermometer no more feels heat, than a thermostat renders a heating system conscious of its own operations.

The same deficit in self-activity is present when a computer monitors its own calculations. The decisive point is that, as Charles Taylor observes, the monitoring and the operations monitored are independent of one another.⁴² This remains true even when the monitoring sets in motion other functions that affect those being monitored. The abiding difference between monitoring and monitored is inescapable in thinking *machines*. As a mechanism, every computer operation has no intrinsic connection to what it acts upon. Since this applies to the relation between monitoring and object of monitoring, these must remain distinct, such that the monitoring operation can always monitor something else, just as what is monitored can always be what it is apart from being monitored.⁴³

Unlike artificial intelligence, true mind cannot separate its self-activity from its object.⁴⁴ This holds true for the brute simplicities of the psyche to the complexities of practical intelligence. Pain cannot be distinguished from the perception of pain⁴⁵ just because pain has no existence apart from the psyche's feeling of it. Similarly, since how we comprehend our goals and situation determines our emotions, they cannot be felt independently of how we describe ourselves.⁴⁶ This is why clarifying an emotion alters it,⁴⁷ a point Spinoza understood to be essential for taking control of our emotions,⁴⁸ and which modern therapists use to reduce emotional distress by helping patients explicitly understand their feelings.

Artificial intelligence can never involve the revelations where new self-understandings modify feelings. Because the inputs of computation are independently determined factors acted upon externally,⁴⁹ how they get processed cannot alter their identity. Data processing may result in different outputs depending on what information is fed in and what rules are followed, but varying outcomes do not change what the inputs are in their own right.

This does not preclude machines from just having emotions. What makes emotions incongruent with machine intelligence pertains to

every type of awareness.⁵⁰ Hegel's treatment of subjective spirit brings this home time and again. Feelings are what they are according to how the psyche feels them. Once repeated registrations habituate the psyche to similar feelings, the latter relinquish their immediate hold on the mind. Now mediated by past feeling activity, these sensations become sequestered contents from which the psyche can turn away its focus.⁵¹ Similarly, when mind can fully disengage itself from its mental contents and treat them as determinations of an independent objectivity, that objectivity is determined by how the emergent consciousness acts upon its mental determination. When consciousness relates immediately to its content, it senses something that simply is, with no further discrimination.⁵² If consciousness instead relates aspects of its sensible manifold to some underlying substrate, it no longer senses what is, but perceives a thing with properties.⁵³ And if these properties are treated not just as given possessions of things, but as dynamically posited by their substrates, consciousness understands objectivity to comprise a law-governed nature.⁵⁴ As Hegel's analysis of the different shapes of consciousness underscores, each type of mental content is intrinsically connected to a different mode of mental activity.⁵⁵

This intrinsic connection is precisely what eludes the mechanical processing of inputs by thinking machines. In every computation, what gets processed is always a fixed factor independent of the calculation performed upon it, just as every operation proceeds apart from those that it follows upon. As a consequence, none of the reflexivity constitutive of mind can possibly be attributed to machines. For this reason, no machine will ever feel, be conscious, or have desires and emotions. To the degree that all these self-active functions of mind are necessary ingredients for agency, neither computers nor robots will qualify as persons, entitled to rights.

Whether cyborgs, entities that combine machines with a living organism, can qualify as persons is another matter, which can only be settled by exploring the connection of mind and life. That connection is a key problem for the philosophy of mind, long recognized as such by thinkers from Aristotle to Hegel to Searle. How life and mind are related can only be duly confronted, however, once the limits of artificial intelligence have been exposed and the temptation to reduce mind to machine has been repudiated.

4

Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity

The apparent primacy of self-consciousness

Nothing appears less problematic than self-consciousness. Without it, no inquiry seems possible, for how can one seek knowledge unless one is aware of undertaking that quest? Moreover, consciousness of anything other than the self is always plagued with knowing something whose existence cannot lie in the consciousness of it. As Descartes observed, whenever one represents an object different from one's consciousness, it is always doubtful whether that object exists or corresponds with its representation.¹ By contrast, insofar as consciousness of one's self-consciousness is the very being of self-consciousness, the gap between object and representation here seems uniquely absent. Not only is my representation of myself as self-conscious constitutive of my being self-conscious, but nothing prevents that representation from corresponding to what it is about.

This privileged certainty, however, generates skepticism regarding knowledge of anything other than one's own consciousness, including other minds. If knowledge of self-conscious is secured by its identity of subject and object, of knowing and what knowing is knowing of, wherever that identity is lacking cognition confronts the dilemma of bridging a gap that is insurmountable if knowing has no access to its object other than by representing it.

The yawning solipsism that attends the privileged self-certainty of self-consciousness is not mitigated by the oft-alleged dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness. To paraphrase Kant, consciousness of any object is only possible if consciousness relates itself to its own representation of the object. Otherwise, the putative knowledge belongs to no one and there is no consciousness of the represented

object. If this relation of consciousness to its own representation is self-consciousness, then there can be no consciousness of an object without a simultaneous self-consciousness.² The problem with securing this dependency is that the privileged certainty of self-consciousness renders suspect whether consciousness can ever relate to anything but itself. So long as self-consciousness is construed to be primary, it remains doubtful whether there can be any consciousness of a non-self to accompany self-consciousness.

The solitary primacy of self-consciousness, however, is just as questionable as is *how* consciousness can be aware of itself.

The dependency of self-consciousness on consciousness

To begin with, self-consciousness must presuppose consciousness if to be self-conscious is to be conscious of one's consciousness. In that case, consciousness must be present, relating to an object it distinguishes from itself. Consciousness may always involve self-relation in that consciousness only relates to an object by relating to its own mental content. Nonetheless, in order for this self-relation to involve intentionality, to be about something objective rather than subjective, consciousness must treat its own mental content as the determination of something independently given from which it is disengaged. Without disengaging itself from the same content to which it stands in self-relation, consciousness reverts to a preconscious psyche that feels nothing but its own feeling self, never attaining an opposition of subject and object. For this reason, the relation of consciousness to its own mental content is not equivalent to consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness' relation to its own representation is only part of consciousness, a part that must be accompanied by a relation to that content as something *other to* consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness does not collapse into self-consciousness.

Because mind is enabled to be conscious of something other than itself only by detaching itself from its own mental content, neither self-consciousness nor consciousness can be primary. Just as consciousness depends upon the disengagement by which self-feeling becomes sensation of something objective, so self-consciousness depends upon consciousness as the object of its own disengaged awareness.

This double dependency undercuts Cartesian solipsism since if self-consciousness presupposes consciousness, not to mention the preconscious psyche, then self-certainty cannot be had apart from certainty of something not the self, namely, an object. Consciousness of a non-self,

however, involves more than just what is logically other to the subject. The dependence of self-consciousness upon consciousness has a further specificity argued for in parallel ways by Kant and Strawson.

Self-consciousness and objects in space

In his famous "Refutation of Idealism" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,³ Kant upholds the dependence of self-consciousness on consciousness by arguing that the temporal succession of any conscious awareness cannot just consist in consciousness of one representation after another. For any plurality of representations to be perceived in temporal succession, something must be given as a persisting backdrop, enabling the continuity of time to be apprehended. Mere repetition of the same content in different representations cannot suffice since no matter how instantaneously they vanish or how much recurring detail they contain, none represents their temporal connection to one another in the stream of consciousness. Nothing *in* any perception can bridge the ceasing to be of one and the coming to be of another. What is needed is something that persists independently of the flow of representations, something reidentifiable from one moment to the next, even if only through the representations comprising the mental content of consciousness. To apprehend the temporal sequence of its own representations, consciousness must perceive representations that count as determinations of something persisting in space, that one abiding framework given independently of mental succession. Without consciousness of an object in space, consciousness has no enduring resource external to the succession of representations with which to connect one perceived moment to the next. Insofar as self-consciousness involves awareness of manifold mental contents whose temporal succession falls within one consciousness, there can be no consciousness of self without awareness of spatial objectivity. Self-consciousness therefore always involves consciousness of not just a non-self, but also a spatial object.

Strawson comes to an analogous conclusion by focusing not on the preconditions of temporal awareness, but by providing an indirect proof, showing how a "no-space world" cannot suffice for attributing representations to one consciousness or for identifying objective particulars.⁴ Presuming that a consciousness solely aware of sounds has no perception of spatial relations, Strawson examines this case to see whether any mind unaware of space can still use its space-deprived representations to identify objects and retain the unity of its awareness. Vital for identifying objects is the ability to distinguish objects from the representations

of them, a distinction requiring some way of apprehending objects to exist even when they are not being represented. This goes together with being able to reidentify an object through representations separated by an interval in time. No matter how sounds be sequenced and no matter how a continuous "reference tone" may modulate in conjunction with accompanying sounds that do and do not resemble one another, consciousness can never thereby obtain awareness of anything that can be certifiably distinguished from the sounds it hears. That a sound like one heard before some interval is accompanied by a certain modulation in the continuous background tone hardly guarantees that something exists during that interval, or that reoccurring sounds signify the same persisting object. Temporal relations are simply insufficient to give representations any identifiable objectivity. To the extent that consciousness of self depends upon consciousness of an object, temporal relations will equally fail to provide the unity of consciousness allowing all representations to be attributed to the same awareness. No concatenation of sounds can independently secure that those sounds are all perceived by one consciousness, rather than being differently distributed among the auditory perceptions of many others.

This suggests something at the core of Kant's transcendental deduction: **that the conditions for any object being given to consciousness are equally the conditions for the unity of representations in one consciousness, without which self-consciousness is impossible.** The transcendental deduction imputes those conditions to the necessary connection of representations under concepts in judgment, thereby linking consciousness of objects with the unity of apperception. Significantly, the parallel arguments of the "Refutation of Idealism" and the "no-space world", do not appeal to concepts and judgment, which would then invoke linguistic intelligence. Instead, they offer something else: the spatiotemporality of objectivity. Only insofar as consciousness is aware of an objectivity determined in space and time can its successive mental contents be united in one consciousness.

This linkage between awareness of spatial objects and the unity of consciousness may secure the dependence of self-consciousness on consciousness, but it does not establish how self-consciousness is possible. To be conscious of itself, consciousness must be conscious of an object and have that consciousness as its object. This involves distinguishing between object and subject, while still somehow having the subject of consciousness be manifest to itself as an object. That consciousness must always involve consciousness of objects in space may provide a further necessary condition for self-consciousness, but it is hardly sufficient.

Self-consciousness and the self's body

Nevertheless the irreducibility of consciousness of spatial objectivity might suggest that self-consciousness is achievable, at least in part, through consciousness of a particular body to which the subject of awareness is specially connected. If such privileged connection can be accounted for and if that connection can be manifest to consciousness, then self-consciousness might be explained through these relationships. Moreover, if such connections between consciousness and a body both exist and become objective for consciousness, then knowledge of and interaction with other minds becomes less inexplicable.

Such a connection between awareness of one's body and self-consciousness would still allow for consciousness of spatial objectivity to be unaccompanied by self-consciousness. Namely, it might be possible to be conscious of objects in space without perceiving one's body or to be conscious of one's body without recognizing it to be in any special relationship with one's awareness. These possibilities would be removed if a yet stronger connection held, namely that consciousness necessarily involves not only awareness of spatial objectivity, but awareness of the subject's own body in its unique spatiotemporal location within that objectivity and in its unique relation to the subject's consciousness. If this were true, not only would consciousness and self-consciousness go inextricably together, but the self of consciousness would necessarily have an individuated tangible reality observable by itself and potentially by others. To the extent that the body is among other objects in space and time, self-consciousness via awareness of one's own body would include consciousness of its contrast to other physical objects. Consciousness of oneself as embodied would thereby be accompanied by consciousness of a physical non-self.

Although introspection might offer empirical confirmation of such connections, no observation can supply sufficient evidence for their necessity. One might always find one's own consciousness accompanied by awareness of one's body and encounter reports by others confirming the same unfailing linkage in their own experience, but neither testimony can guarantee the like for all past or future occurrence. By the same token, no introspection or survey of others can determine what enables any consciousness to recognize its body as its own. Whatever may apply in some observed cases need not have any universal applicability.

A more plausible strategy for establishing the necessity of consciousness of one's body lies in showing that without that awareness what is otherwise ingredient in consciousness is impossible.

Partly supporting this avenue is the idea that any receptivity of consciousness depends upon having a body through whose sensory apparatus sensations of objects can be given. Then, all perception will reflect the spatiotemporal orientation of the body's sense organs, not to mention their physiological constitution. As such, consciousness will not only relate to its own awareness in being aware of its representations, but it will encounter the mark of its own body in the view it has of the world.

This physiological embeddedness of perception need not be challenged by the absence of any systematic reference to particular senses and their organs in a work such as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. That absence may instead reflect how *what* sensory apparatus underlies the receptivity of consciousness is contingent upon the individual's species being and personal physiological history. Whether or not Aristotle is correct in asserting that no other sense organs can function without the sense of touch,⁵ the contingency of sensory configuration does not remove the requirement that consciousness have *some* sense organ, whose situation conditions *whatever* experience can be had.

Hints of such a proviso are manifest in Kant's account of the "Analogies of Experience", which focus on how certain temporal relations of perceptions are necessary to any experience of objects. Although Kant fails to explicitly address the role of consciousness of one's body, aspects of his argument here reflect it. This is evident in the analyses of the second and third analogies,⁶ which consider the conditions for experiencing the succession and simultaneity of objects and events. Kant points out that the order of perceptions in experiencing successive events cannot be a matter of indifference, since then nothing could distinguish a subjective series of imagined representations from an objective succession of observed occurrences. If, for example, a boat is traveling downstream, observation of it upstream must precede observation of it downstream. By contrast, when objects coexist, the order in which they are perceived is arbitrary. It matters not whether one first observes the front or back of a room, for example, so long as what is front and back coexist. This order indifference of perceptions of coexisting objects, depends, however, on consciousness having a unique vantage point that can be altered at will.⁷ Otherwise, the possibility of alternate orders is inexplicable. Moreover, which perceptions can indifferently precede or follow one another will depend upon what

spatial orientation the observer takes, with each change in orientation connected to its predecessor by movements, observation of which is not order indifferent. Successive observations of any event will equally depend upon consciousness retaining locations from which objective alterations are perceivable. Any change in view will itself comprise an event in time, involving the movements determining the variation in orientation. That this is so can only be available to consciousness if it can be aware of its own situation in time and space, a situation presumably dependent upon having a unique body.

All these involvements of the body in observation take for granted that consciousness is able to recognize its body and how it positions perception. Yet how is this possible? Is the ever-present fact that perception occurs through the body something built into consciousness by how the orientation of perception is always perceivably connected to how the body is uniquely positioned?

If this is so, then consciousness may be always potentially or actually conscious of how perception is relative to one perceived object, on whose orientation and condition the field of perception depends. Does this suffice, however, for consciousness to connect all perceptions as its own or to take that privileged object as its own embodiment? These considerations go together, for if consciousness cannot be certain of that object as its own unique body, it may not be able to claim as uniquely its own the perceptions which are all relative to the situation of that body.

As Strawson has observed, no reflection on the connection of perceptions to a perceived body is sufficient to unite them in one consciousness. Even if what is perceived is perceived to be relative to the location and condition of one object in the field of perception, the various perceptions might still belong to different awarenesses which alternately receive successive situated perceptions.⁸ Then multiple minds might share the same body without that connection individuating them.

The same difficulty stymies any attempt to ground the unity of self-consciousness on awareness of a connection between the field of perception and not just a situated body but further connection between intentions and perceived behavior of that body. Consciousness that a body is one's own may well require some perceived correlation between observed movements of the body and mental contents such as impulse, desire, purpose, and intention. Nonetheless, self-consciousness will depend upon possession of those internal and external observations by the same awareness both at one and successive moments. That unification, however, is presupposed rather than instituted by consciousness of any

relation between inner intentions and outer behavior of a body. To connect intention and action, consciousness must already recognize as its own that intention as well as the awareness in which intention and observed action both fall.

How is this possible? Consciousness may always involve awareness of physical objects and be potentially aware of one body to which the field of awareness is uniquely connected, but what enables consciousness to be aware of its exclusive possession of these mental contents? This very question suggests the answer, for self-ascription of one's mental contents to a body can no longer be problematic if the unity of awareness depends upon consciousness of a body of which consciousness must know itself to have exclusive possession.

Such a dependence has been advanced in parallel by Merleau-Ponty and Strawson.⁹ Both point to two central requirements: (1) that the unity of awareness depends upon the individuation of consciousness enabling it both to be distinguished and to distinguish itself from any other, and (2) that consciousness cannot be individuated without standing in exclusive relation to a unique body. In order for mental contents to be connected to one awareness, that awareness must have an identity of its own. If it cannot be individuated, any content ascribed to it can just as well be ascribed to some other standpoint. In other words, to be a unity, consciousness must be not just a consciousness in general, that is, an undifferentiated particular, but an individual consciousness. Without that individuality, consciousness can no more be identified by itself than by others. No assortment or succession of mental contents can provide that individuality, since whether they all belong to the same awareness is precisely what is in question. Simply pointing to them does not secure their unification in one consciousness.

Both Merleau-Ponty and Strawson take the individuating embodiment of consciousness as basic, since without it no unity of awareness is possible. Consequently, any "pure" consciousness, such as Descartes, as well as Kant, would entertain is a derivative abstraction, presupposing the concrete person. Accordingly, when Kant speaks of the "I" that accompanies all representations as a condition of their unification in one consciousness, it is not surprising that he offers it as an abstract "thought", devoid of any individuating content.¹⁰ That abstraction is unavoidable since without any connection to a body, the "I" is just an apperception in general, no different from any other.¹¹ For just this reason, the possible accompaniment of each representation with that thought does not suffice to unite them in one, identifiable awareness, as the transcendental deduction of the categories supposes. By the same

token, when Descartes reflects on the “thinking thing”, it appears in complete isolation from any other self in contrast to which it would have to be somehow individuated, ceasing to be merely a “thinking thing”.

Given that a body has an individuated being in space-time, excluding everything else from its unique situation and life history, consciousness is individuated by its exclusive embodiment. Indeed, if the unity of consciousness depends upon having a unique identity and no consciousness is possible without that unity, then consciousness is *per se* an embodied mind with a unique itinerary in the world.

Although, as Strawson observes, individuation presumes the possibility of a plurality of particulars without which nothing universal can be ascribed to a subject,¹² that possibility does not dictate that consciousness requires any relation to others. Consciousness can have its unique embodiment whether or not it actually coexists with other minds, let alone has any awareness of them. Indeed, consciousness hardly forfeits its concrete identity if it were to be the last mind standing.

Can, however, consciousness be aware of its unique identity without either being in relation to others or more specifically, being or having been conscious of other selves? The answer to this question raises a problem that the primacy of embodied consciousness does not immediately resolve: *how* is consciousness self-aware, given its concrete being in the world? That consciousness cannot be without being embodied may be true, but that truth does not tell us in what way consciousness recognizes itself as an object.

Self-consciousness and linguistic intelligence

In the wake of Wilfrid Sellars and more recently, Donald Davidson, a view has gained increasing currency that self-consciousness necessarily operates in conjunction with consciousness of objects and consciousness of other selves. What allegedly connects these three forms of consciousness is the supposed bond between knowledge and linguistic intelligence. On this view, knowledge involves truth claims, which take the form of propositions involving the determination of individuals through concepts. Because propositions and the concepts they contain involve language, and because language cannot be private, knowledge rests upon linguistic intelligence and the interaction among interlocutors on which language and thought depend. Moreover, because language fixes meanings by a triangulation in which individuals simultaneously observe one another using common expressions to refer to commonly

observable objects, no knowledge can be had apart from awareness of objects, of others, and of oneself participating in linguistic convention. If one grants that consciousness always involves knowledge claims, then self-consciousness will necessarily be discursive, involving propositional knowledge that cannot be had apart from knowledge of objects and knowledge of other interlocutors. Not only is solipsism precluded, but so is any skepticism of other minds.

The proponents of this view have generally attached to it an epistemological foundationalism by treating the linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of truth. Because these conditions involve interwoven conventions that are contingent, treating them as epistemological foundations leads to a pragmatic holism, where all terms and standards of justification are regarded as just as corrigible and contingent as the conventions they rest upon. This view is self-defeating, for it deprives its own account about language formation and the forms of consciousness of any abiding authority. In so doing, it presents one more example of the insupportable dilemma philosophy falls into whenever it seeks transcendental conditions for knowledge. Whether these be formulated in terms of consciousness or linguistic practice, the same difficulty arises: by seeking to identify anything as the privileged structure or process **determining knowledge**, one is compelled to make knowledge claims **about that privileged foundation**, claims that cannot have any legitimacy given how valid knowledge is supposed to be only determinable by **appeal to that foundation**. One can forego such seeking to know before knowing by simply refraining from treating the linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of knowledge. Then, the impossibility of massive uncertainty about what terms mean need not signify that it is impossible for there to be massive ignorance of which meanings are true. Triangulation may be basic to the fixing of meanings, but that does not prevent it from leaving undetermined which of those thoughts that are thinkable and expressible in language are valid.

If one pares away the bogus epistemological foundationalism from the linkage of self-consciousness, consciousness of objects, and consciousness of others, one is still left with a refutation of solipsism and skepticism of other minds. Although knowledge may not be guaranteed, it will hold that one cannot be *certain* of oneself without being *certain* of objects and of other selves. Within this nexus, self-consciousness will necessarily be accompanied by consciousness of objects in space and of one's own body. Without both of these, as well as the tangible embodiments to which they refer, linguistic interaction can hardly operate. Interlocutors, after all, must be able to have a tangible presence for one

another, as well as be aware of other tangible things about which they can communicate and think.

These requirements, however, do not dictate that individuals are self-conscious only while being conscious of other interlocutors or communicating with them. One could still be incommunicatively alone, either temporarily or for good, yet still retain self-consciousness so long as one had once engaged in the intersubjective conventions enabling one to first learn language, and with it, the practice of thinking.

These considerations all follow upon the presumption that self-consciousness and linguistic intelligence necessarily go together. Certainly they may accompany one another and, in so doing, carry with them all the above implications. Yet it is hard not to wonder how self-consciousness could inherently involve linguistic competence. If self-consciousness were wedded to linguistic intelligence, then the triangulation by which meaning is fixed and language acquired would have to generate simultaneously awareness of self, of objects, and of others. Yet how could individuals recognize their common responses to commonly observed objects, thereby gaining access to concepts, language, and knowledge, if they did not already possess a pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual consciousness of self, of objects, and of others? Without such nondiscursive awareness, the participants in the establishment of linguistic interaction would have no way to discriminate their responses from one another, nor from objects they observe in common.

If this is the case, then self-consciousness as such need not be discursive, nor involve discursive knowledge. Although it may come to involve thought and speech thanks to the further mental achievement of intelligence, self-consciousness must involve an awareness that can distinguish subject and object without thinking concepts and making judgments.

Neither tangible objects, including the body and other selves, nor mental relationships need thereby be deprived of conceptual determinations. Universal features, as well as connections between individuals, their particularities, and different types of universals can all pervade the fabric of nature, human physiology, and psychological process. None of that is obliterated by consciousness or self-consciousness failing to grasp these conceptual terms as such by perceiving without theorizing, that is, without apprehending in thought what is conceptually determinate in objectivity. Theorizing does require linguistic intelligence and therefore presupposes the interaction that engenders language and thinking. For just this reason, the nondiscursive self-consciousness which linguistic intelligence presupposes must be certain of itself in distinction from other objects without theorizing, without having to think or say anything.

How can this be, and what does it tell us about the way in which consciousness is aware of itself?

Desire and nondiscursive self-consciousness

Important clues toward a solution are provided by Hegel's analyses of desire and recognitive self-consciousness in his systematic account of mind, the so-called *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

There Hegel identifies desire as the minimal form of self-consciousness, one that need not involve thought, speech or any other intersubjectivity.¹³ In so doing, Hegel sheds light on how self-consciousness can be nondiscursive, as well as non-cognitive.

Although desire's connection to self-consciousness may not seem evident, its connection to consciousness is obvious. Desire is intentional insofar as the subject of desire thereby relates to the object desired. Yet if desire were just a cognitive relation, wherein consciousness perceives a thing and its properties or understands the dynamical interaction of things through force and law, all that would be present would be an awareness of objects through mental determinations from which consciousness has extricated itself. The consciousness of these **objective relations** would not itself be objective to consciousness, not even if the objects in question included the body to which consciousness stands uniquely related. In perceiving one's body, one does not perceive one's perceiving, any more than in perceiving other putative persons one perceives their perceiving.¹⁴ In both cases, consciousness relates to its mental contents in order to be aware of an object, but in so doing it does not relate to its own consciousness of them. If that were all that desire involved, consciousness would be present, but not self-consciousness.

With desire, however, something more is added. As desired the object is not just perceived as something external to the perceiving self. It is further treated as something whose independence from the subject of awareness is to be annulled. The desired object is to be rendered a means of satisfaction, which minimally entails in some respect yielding its externality and being assimilated by the subject. Moreover, this projected nullity is not just theoretical; desire involves the impulse to achieve gratification by actually canceling the indifferent givenness of the object of desire and allowing the self to lay hold of it. To the extent that this occurs, desire satisfaction objectively exhibits a subjectification of what consciousness demarcates from itself as objectively external. This subjectification takes the form of a gratifying consumption of the

object of desire, in some way removing its external independence and absorbing it into the subject.

Desire does not thereby involve thought in the manner in which willing realizes a preconceived aim, acting both on purpose and with a motive that concerns the universal implications of the deed.¹⁵ Desire just seeks satisfaction, nullifying the independence of the object irrespective of any end or principle. Through this objective, negation of the objectivity of the object, consciousness relates solely to its own negative relating to the object. The elimination and absorption that this comprises both require the embodiment of consciousness. Only if consciousness is embodied can it effect any objective removal of the independence of the object and only if consciousness involves its own living organism can it assimilate the object. This is true whether the gratification of desire involves a literal devouring of the object or some lesser alteration, such as being made to appear to the subject's more theoretical senses, hearing or sight, that leaves the object otherwise intact. Moreover, for consciousness to be aware of this material or largely formal assimilation as a subjectivization of the object, it must recognize its body as its own instead of perceiving the desire satisfaction as a transaction between two objects from which it is equally extricated.

This recognition by consciousness of its own body might seem already to presuppose self-consciousness, subverting any place for desire in the constitution of consciousness of self. This would be the case if consciousness of the body as consciousness' own were given independently of desire satisfaction. Yet if the body manifests the consciousness to which it is exclusively related only in the process of desire, then the problem of circularity may be removed.

Nonetheless, the self-awareness ingredient in desire might still seem preempted by the connection of the unity of consciousness with the individuation provided by consciousness' embodiment. That connection might seem to imply that consciousness must always already be cognizant of itself as a concrete subject in the objective world. This is not the case, for consciousness' individuation as an embodied mind can be a precondition of the unity of consciousness without being something of which mind is conscious. For this reason, consciousness can always engage in the doubts Descartes avows in viewing his body and wondering if he is dreaming or in viewing a hatted figure on the street and wondering whether it is an automaton. That consciousness must have a unique body to engage in any doubts does not prevent any particular representations from being suspect. This is true even if consciousness doubts theoretically, using concepts and language that

render past interaction with others indubitable. Consequently, the individuating embodiment of consciousness does not render desire redundant. In desiring, consciousness enjoys a relation to itself as objective that it does not have simply by inhabiting a body through which its mental contents are united and individuated. Significantly, the desiring mind's consciousness of its negation of the object of its desire involves both consciousness of spatial objectivity as well as consciousness of its own body. Neither of these apprehensions entail thinking concepts and engaging in speech. For this reason, there is nothing incoherent about attributing desire to preverbal children, or, for that matter, dumb animals.

Whatever self-consciousness desire contains is, nonetheless, wholly negative in character. The two sides of desire, the canceling of the externality of the object and its absorption by the subject may comprise a single process in which consciousness and self-consciousness become identified in that what the self is conscious of as its object becomes reduced to the subject.¹⁶ Yet this identity attains no persisting being. The relation to itself that consciousness gains through desire is completely abstract¹⁷ since consciousness' self-identity here lies in the removal rather than the abiding reality of anything objective. The objectivity consciousness has for itself in desire consists entirely in its body's negation of the independent being of an object. The achievement of that negation equally eliminates itself. That is, the satisfaction of desire brings to an end the nullifying of some externality of the object of desire, which is what objectively manifests the self to itself. Desire therefore provides the most ephemeral and empty form that self-consciousness can take, a form burdened by consciousness, from whose independent, selfless object it is never liberated.¹⁸ Because satisfaction occurs in the one subject through a transient consumption of an external given, the self's objectification perennially relapses into subjectivity, leaving consciousness with the same confrontation with independent objectivity from which appetite proceeds.¹⁹

Recognition and nondiscursive self-consciousness

Recognitive self-consciousness presents a more abiding self-manifestation, which involves intersubjectivity without necessarily invoking thought or speech.

Generally, awareness of one self by another provides two features necessary for consciousness of consciousness that are unattainable so long as mind relates only to itself or to objects that are not subjects.

To be conscious of consciousness in any positive way, mind must relate to an object from which it is disengaged and that object must be consciousness.²⁰ No solitary self-relation can provide the disengagement allowing consciousness to be an object to mind. Introspection remains caught within the subject whereas any awareness of an object that is not a conscious self provides no abiding objectification of awareness. Hence, consciousness of consciousness is only concretely possible when consciousness has as its object *another* consciousness. This requires the embodiment of both the other self and the consciousness that is conscious of the other. Only then can either be individuated from one another and be manifest as a distinct object of awareness. Yet, however this be achieved, consciousness of *another* consciousness does not provide *self*-consciousness unless awareness of the other consciousness manifests to consciousness its *own* awareness of the other.

In that case, self-consciousness is no longer just consciousness of consciousness. Because consciousness is consciousness *of an object* and not consciousness *of consciousness*, the consciousness of consciousness does not have the same object as the consciousness that is *its* object. The awareness of consciousness may have a subject for its object, but that subject has a non-self for its object. For this reason, the consciousness of consciousness is not reflexively conscious of itself.²¹ To have itself as its object, this consciousness must have as its object not consciousness (*qua* consciousness of an object), but the consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness of consciousness can be an object, however, only if consciousness has *another* consciousness of consciousness for its object. If that other consciousness of consciousness has the first consciousness as *its* object, then that first consciousness encounters its own awareness of consciousness in being conscious of the other's awareness of consciousness. By being conscious of another who is conscious of it, consciousness has consciousness of consciousness as its object, an object that has it for an object. Then, each consciousness has the same structure and is aware of that convergence. Each apprehends itself to be the object of the other's awareness as well as to be an awareness of that other awareness. Consciousness is aware of another consciousness that is aware of the former's awareness of it. Through this reciprocal recognition, consciousness is self-conscious in being aware of another self-consciousness that is self-aware in the same fashion.

The interrelation may be conceivable, but *how* can this reciprocal recognition take place? If the cognitive consciousness of perception and understanding cannot provide an objective manifestation of consciousness, then merely perceiving and comprehending an other

embodied subject will fail to give consciousness an objectification of its own awareness. Can desire provide the lacking objectification?

If the desire in question is a desire for the other, reducing the other consciousness to an object of satisfaction, then consciousness is left with the same purely negative and self-eliminating self-consciousness that results from desiring any object. One consciousness may perceive its nullifying of the independence of the other, but the achievement of satisfaction leaves no positive remain in which consciousness can apprehend itself. This is true even if contending subjects risk their lives in seeking to reduce their counterpart to an object of their desire. Although they may evince their own irreducibility to their body, jeopardizing their lives does not give them a positive objectification.²²

Hegel points to another option: an interaction wherein one consciousness achieves an abiding subordination of another consciousness to its desire.²³ Instead of annihilating the other, the dominating consciousness has that other serve its desire in some ongoing way. Here the subordination has a positive objectivity, consisting in the subordinate consciousness attending to the desire of the other by observably providing means of satisfaction. Although these means thereby yield their externality and become assimilated like any object of desire, the **subservient consciousness remains external to the consciousness of its superordinate. In so doing, it effects an enduring satisfaction of desire, which objectively reflects the consciousness of the dominant figure. By observing another satisfy its desire through provision of means of gratification, the superordinate is conscious of its own desire as served by its subordinate's ongoing performance.**

There is, of course, a lack of reciprocity, residing in how the superordinate's desire for the subordination of the other is not equal to the subordinate's own desire, which serves the superordinate's desire instead of desiring the superordinate's subordination to it. Consciousness therefore is not aware of itself in the awareness of its counterpart: the subservient consciousness submits to the other's desire, whereas the dominant consciousness does not share the desire of its subordinate. Owing to this discrepancy, consciousness and self-consciousness remain distinct. What the superordinate is conscious of in confronting the subordination of the other is a reflection of its desire, not a consciousness of self.

That discrepancy is removed when what one party desires in relation to the other is what that other desires in relation to it. Or, a reciprocated recognition is achieved when, to paraphrase Sartre, each party desires the desire of the other for it.²⁴ Then, one is conscious of another self

that objectively manifests its consciousness of one's own consciousness by observably desiring to satisfy one's own desire, while one is doing the same with respect to that other. Each party desires that its counterpart desire it in turn, that it conform to the desire of the other just as the other conforms to its desire. The desire of each is thereby the desire of the other. Because the consciousness of each now involves the same consciousness of the other, each party has an individuated, yet universal self-consciousness.²⁵ In their mutual accommodation of desire, each party is conscious of another consciousness, whose awareness both reflects and is identical in form to its own, without relinquishing the individuality that keeps the relation from collapsing into an undifferentiated unity.

One of the big obstacles to comprehending this relationship is the temptation to ascribe too much to it, a temptation applying equally to the subordination where one individual serves the desire of another without reciprocation. That "master-servant" relation can become clothed with various institutional forms of bondage, from indentured servitude to slavery. As just a relation of desire, all it comprises is the subordination of one self to the desire of another, a subordination that need not involve any other conventional practice. By the same token, the relation of mutual desire satisfaction may be associated with love (for example, Sartre) or institutions of rights (for example, property, moral, household, civil, or political). As such, however, it only contains subjects becoming self-conscious by desiring to become an object of, that is, to serve one another's desire. By so coordinating desires, each party relates to itself as a subject of desire in so relating to its counterpart. To relate to oneself as a subject of love or rights, the relation to other must involve more than desire and its gratification.

Keeping within these limits is important. Because the different engagements of desire presuppose rather than constitute consciousness, they do not entail what implausibly results if any were necessary for mind to be aware of its own mental contents. Then, the various shapes of desire (desiring some non-self, desiring the subordination of another self, and desiring the desire of another) could never be suspended without annulling consciousness. In that case, nothing could be perceived without already being desired.

Similarly, because consciousness and self-consciousness are prerequisites for linguistic intelligence, recognitive desire, be it unequal or mutual, need not involve thought and language. If it did, the origin and acquisition of language would be inexplicable, since prior to discourse, individuals would be unable to distinguish themselves from others

or other objects, precluding the triangulation by which meanings are fixed through shared recognition of common responses to commonly observed objects. This impasse might seem insurmountable, for how can individuals recognize one another as self-consciousness without conceiving how each is one of a kind, that is, a particular individual sharing the universal nature of self-consciousness? Does this not require thinking a concept of self-consciousness, whose universality each is known to embody as a particular individuated from its counterparts? If recognitive self-consciousness requires understanding self-consciousness in its universality, that is, thinking the concept of self-consciousness, and if thought requires language which cannot be private, then self-consciousness would be impossible apart from linguistic interaction. Self-consciousness would then necessarily involve consciousness of oneself and others as interlocutors, as discursive agents.

What allows this to be circumvented is the character of desire. Since desire and its object are both individual, concepts are unnecessary to apprehend or manifest either. To the extent that the embodied psyche can give expression to its feelings and consciousness can perceive these expressions and any associated behavior, subjects can interact in regard to their desires without speaking or theorizing.²⁶ To be aware of one's own desiring consciousness in being aware of the desiring consciousness of another, an individual must apprehend its own desire **satisfaction to be desired by another, whose gratification one just as much desires. This involves** consciousness of the correspondence not of objects and concepts, but of objects and desire, on which depends **satisfaction rather than theoretical truth.** What is here special about the match of objects and desire is that the objects are subjects of desire.

If this is so, then consciousness of self need not require thinking any concept of oneself, any more than consciousness of others need require theorizing about them. Having a theory of self and of others does depend on linguistic intelligence, but before language can be engaged in, consciousness must discriminate itself from others. This may occur when individuals desire in respect to one another.

Nonetheless, the preverbal intersubjectivity in which nondiscursive self-consciousness resides can hardly involve self-knowledge or knowledge of others. Lacking concepts and speech, the self-awareness ingredient in desire does not judge or take any propositional attitude. At most, it registers the fit between its own mental determinations and the objectivity from which it distinguishes itself, a fit of which consciousness may be certain without knowing anything conceptual. Whether these

determinations are "correct" signifies little more than the satisfaction or lack thereof that attends desire.

Still, such self-consciousness provides a key mental prerequisite for the discursive intersubjectivity in which language and thought arise. Without the discriminations of self and other through desire, the resources are lacking for individuals to compare their responses to one another in reference to objects they share in common. If this is so, interlocutors cannot fail to be certain of one another as subjects of desire. Such certainty will then underlie self-knowledge and knowledge of others, insofar as only when individuals can recognize one another giving expression to a shared awareness of the same objectivity, can individuals be certain of their own rationality. With that, self-consciousness can become self-knowledge, conceptualizing its own universal character.

The seeds of discursive reason are planted with the universality attained by self-consciousness through the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, an identity achieved by the subject having as its object another subject no different from and reflecting itself.²⁷ Although recognitive desire does not conceive that universality nor the identity of subjectivity and objectivity in which it resides, it sets the stage for mind transcending its own particularity and having thoughts that are objective.

5

From Representation to Thought: Reflections on Hegel's Determination of Intelligence

Mental foundationalism and the psychological enabling conditions of thinking

Thinking about thinking is the canonical task of logic, setting logical investigation apart from all other inquiries, where thought addresses something other than itself. While nonlogical investigations always employ a thinking presupposed rather than accounted for in the inquiry at hand, logic requires method and subject matter to coincide so that **valid thinking can be validly thought**. This endeavor must not be confused with conceiving the mental reality of thinking, which properly falls within the philosophy of mind. If instead psychological explanations intrude into logic, its self-examination of thought notoriously goes astray. This is because what valid thinking is cannot be established if any independent factor, be it psychological or not, is permitted to determine what it is that makes thought true. The moment the validity of thinking is derived from anything outside valid thought, privileged authority is accorded givens that fall outside the purview of logic's thinking of thinking. Since these nonlogical factors are not thoughts, their investigation is not an investigation of the thinking that addresses them. Their examination must therefore presuppose the method it employs, rendering the logic determined by nonlogical factors relative to an unexamined procedure. This predicament exhibits the incoherence of appealing to any givens as sources of validity. However these givens be described, they operate as validity-conferring foundations that can never be validated on their own terms. They function as foundations of justification only by legitimating something derivative from which they are distinguished. Thus, they lack the legitimacy they confer unless they ground themselves. Then, however, they cease to be the separate

prior basis of what obtains validity, eliminating the distinction between ground and grounded on which foundational justification depends.

Accordingly, no account of the psychological enabling conditions of thought can dictate which of the thoughts these conditions make possible are true. Since these conditions enable all thoughts, true or false, the psychological process by which individuals think is neutral to all discrimination of valid from invalid thinking. Nevertheless the philosophy of mind can deliver something logic can never supply—an account of how real rational agents can think. Logic may determine the categories of thought, but that determination is not an account of how living individuals think these categories, even if real thinking presupposes whatever categories it thinks. Although true thinking can have no juridical foundations, it can hardly fail to have enabling conditions that permit self-thinking thought to be psychologically realized. Real thinking presupposes not only the categories of self-thinking thought that logic develops, but inorganic and organic nature, as well as whatever mental processes are prerequisites for actual thinking by existing thinkers. Moreover, if inquiry is to make itself intelligible, what needs establishing are the psychological conditions of not just any thinking, but that which distinguishes philosophical speculation. Categories may be determinate independently of rational agents, but philosophy cannot be conceived nor communicated unless embodied minds can actually think without foundations.

Why thinking is located in intelligence rather than in consciousness

Most modern accounts of the mental reality of thinking tend to locate it within consciousness. This reflects two pervasive presumptions. One is that consciousness is exhaustive of mental reality. The other is that consciousness cannot be aware of an independent objectivity unless consciousness thinks categories enabling it to confer some necessary, nonsubjective unity to its mental contents. Kant is the pioneer in construing consciousness as essentially discursive, as involving a conceptually determined knowing, in which thought plays an essential role. Wilfrid Sellars has extended this move, arguing that the objectivity of mental content for consciousness is bound up with the intersubjectivity of language, insofar as consciousness involves knowledge claims, knowledge claims entail judgment, the thinking of judgment is bound up with language, and language involves interaction among individuals who recognize their common assents to commonly perceived objects.

These presumptions pose several dilemmas. First, if consciousness cannot enjoy its constitutive intentionality without employing thought and language in referring to objects, how can language and thought be acquired in the first place? If consciousness, thought, and language are inextricably connected, there can be no consciousness prior to linguistic intelligence. But then, how can pre-linguistic individuals ever distinguish themselves from one another and from any commonly perceived objects, as necessary for the recognition process by which language can be acquired? If consciousness cannot be had without possession of thought and speech, there seems to be no way for language ever to be learned, nor for thinking to be acquired.

Secondly, if consciousness is exhaustive of mental life and thinking is confined to the intentional structure of conscious awareness, then all thought and knowledge are trapped in the impasse to which consciousness is condemned when it figures as an epistemological framework. Because consciousness constitutively relates to its mental content as the determination of something from which it is extricated, consciousness can never certify the correspondence of its mental content with the object putatively represented by that content. Whenever consciousness attempts to confirm correspondence, it must represent the object as it is in itself in order to compare it to consciousness' representation. **Consciousness thus finds that what it takes to be the standard of truth of its representation, the object in itself, is actually itself a representation—the appearance for consciousness of that object.** Hence, if all thinking relates to its subject matter as consciousness confronts its object, thought will never be able to know that it thinks truth.

Thirdly, just as consciousness can never secure correspondence, so it can never achieve the reflexivity that enables thinking to be aware of its own activity. Although consciousness can always make some mental phenomena the object of its awareness, the awareness of that phenomena is never itself an object of that same apprehension. If that awareness is reflected upon, the reflecting consciousness still does not have its own reflection as an object. This limitation led Husserl to admit that if consciousness is made the principle of knowledge, philosophy can never achieve self-transparency.¹ Every attempt to achieve the unity of subject and object of self-thinking thought will inevitably fail. No act of knowing will ever be known unless one appeals to a further act of knowing that remains itself beyond the horizon of the consciousness in question. The task of comprehending consciousness will thus always remain an unfinished imperative and knowing will never attain the full self-responsibility allowing dogmatic appeals to the given to be overcome.

Hegel is unique among theorists of mind in offering a solution to these interconnected difficulties. The solution resides in Hegel's account of intelligence, a domain of mind conceived to be irreducible to the psyche and consciousness, the two other mental domains that intelligence both presupposes and encompasses. In stark departure from other modern theorists, Hegel locates the psychological reality of thought and language in intelligence, thereby breaking the mental hegemony of consciousness that has so hobbled the philosophy of mind. This placement enables Hegel to conceive of, on the one hand, a pre-linguistic, preconceptual conscious awareness, with which language acquisition can be made intelligible, and, on the other hand, a linguistic intelligence whose thinking is not limited by the subject-object opposition definitive of consciousness. If these conceptions can be validated, they will together comprise an account of the mental reality of thinking that does not subvert the authority of the philosophy of mind that provides that account.

Intelligence as the field of thought

All mental activity involves self-relation, but how that self-relation operates is what distinguishes psyche, consciousness, and intelligence.

The psyche relates to its own mental content solely as determinations of itself. As such, the psyche registers nothing but the modifications of its own psycho-physiological existence without relating to anything distinguishable from itself. Communing immediately with itself through its mental manifold, the psyche has a content that is itself immediate, comprising feelings by which the psyche feels itself as self-feeling. Being what it feels and feeling nothing but itself, the psyche has no intentionality, no reference to something other. Although the psyche's self-awareness of feeling is distinguishable from sleep, the psyche draws no subject-object distinction. We may regard feeling as a subjective phenomenon, but the psyche does not relate to itself as a subject, opposed to something objective.

Consciousness arises by mind making this contrastive move, relating to its mental content as something other from which it has extricated itself. Whereas feeling provides no reference, feeling becomes sensation, the immediate mental content of consciousness, by counting as the determination of an object, something with a unity of its own distinct from and opposed to that of conscious awareness. Consciousness still must relate to its own mental content to be aware of anything. In this regard, consciousness presupposes and incorporates the psyche, which

provides the self-related mental content from which consciousness disengages itself. What transforms feeling into sensation is not a modification of the mental manifold. Mind becomes conscious by treating what it feels as a psyche as the registering of an independent other, opposing mind. That differentiation provides the subject-object opposition basic to the intentionality of consciousness, a differentiation within which two unities stand correlated, that of objectivity and that of the ego, the subject now confronting objects.

Admittedly, consciousness may come to relate to its mental content as presenting its own awareness as an object. Even then, however, what self-consciousness confronts is consciousness of an object, not the consciousness of self that self-consciousness comprises. To be conscious of the consciousness of consciousness, one consciousness must have another consciousness as its object, another who is conscious of some consciousness of consciousness in turn.

Although this reciprocal awareness remains a form of consciousness, it supplies a bridge to intelligence. When one consciousness has as its object another self-consciousness equivalent to itself, both the subject and its object are each rendered a universal self-consciousness. From either point of view, the object now has an identity common to the subject **opposed to it, just as the subject now has a nature overlapping its object. Insofar as each consciousness is here aware of its unity with the other, mind is now conscious of its unity with its object.**² This provides the **threshold** of intelligence, where mind apprehends its subjective determinations to be equally objective.

As such, intelligence combines the two self-relations of psyche and consciousness, thereby, presupposing and incorporating both. Although intelligence relates to its mental content as its own, unlike the psyche, intelligence simultaneously relates to this mental content as the determination of something objective. Conversely, although intelligence distinguishes its mental content from itself, involving the intentionality shared by consciousness, intelligence equally relates to that same content as its own subjective determination. Whereas the psyche relates to its own mental content without drawing any subject-object distinctions and consciousness repels its mental content as something exclusively objective, intelligence relates to its mental content as both subjective and objective. This is why Hegel can characterize intelligence as not just the unity of psyche and consciousness but also as an awareness of reason.³ Reason provides the underlying subject matter of intelligence insofar as reason operates with certainty that the contents of mind are objective. This certainty takes on a conceptual character when the contents

are themselves universal determinations that require thought and language to be grasped. Then the unity of subject and object of which reason is aware further comprises a unity of concept and objectivity. This allows mind to lay hold of more than the correctness of the match between subjective mental contents and any given phenomena. What now becomes apprehensible is the theoretical truth comprising the correspondence of an objective thinking and a reality that is conceptually determinate.

These broad differentiations provide a basic clue as to why thought and language should involve intelligence and not just consciousness and/or the psyche. Insofar as thoughts are about something and have meaning, thinking must be intentional. Yet unlike conscious sense-certainty, perception, or understanding, where mind is certain of the immediate being of the sensible manifold, of things and their properties, and of the dynamical interaction of objects, thinking thinks about thought determinations. Although these comprise universal determinations of objects, they no less are concepts and conceived as such. Thinking theorizes and in order to theorize, mind must be aware of the concepts it uses to lay hold of the universal nature of objectivity, as well as recognize that these concepts are mind's own thoughts about the matter.⁴

The objectivity addressed by thought need not be physical in order to be the subject matter of thinking. Thought can conceive concepts that are simply logical categories and still distinguish between the objective nature of these terms and subjective misconstruals of their content.

The placement of thought within intelligence is further implied by how thought ineluctably involves awareness of concepts and their realization. The concept is the universal and universality relates itself to its particulars, whose own plurality depends upon the individuality that enables particulars to be differentiated. Without relation to particulars, the universal forfeits its identity as one over many, whereas without relation to individuality, particulars lose their distinction from one another, collapsing into one, and depriving the universal of any instantiation to encompass. Accordingly, if mind is to grasp the universal, it must equally be aware of its particularization. It will not suffice for mind to be just conscious and distinguish its mental content as the determination of something other. To be aware of concepts as universals, that is, to think, mind must relate to its own mental content by relating to what is other to it as its own.

Consciousness cannot provide the double duty that thinking requires: the simultaneous awareness of concepts as such and of the conceptual

determination of their reality, objectivity. Intelligence can, at least so long as every mental content of intelligence figures for it both as an objective and as a mental determination.

This may be necessary for thinking, but, as Hegel's account of intelligence underscores, it is hardly sufficient. Although intelligence pervasively addresses the subject-object unity of reason, that unity applies to two types of mental contents that precede thought in the life of intelligence and without which intelligence can never engage in thinking. These contents are intuition and representation, and accounting for thinking depends upon understanding how they enable intelligence to acquire thought and language.

Preliminary puzzling over the three stages of intelligence

Hegel initially distinguishes the three stages of intelligence as intuition (*Anschauung*), representation (*Vorstellung*), and thought (*Denken*) in regard to the object that figures within their respective apprehensions of reason, of mental determinations that are both subjective and objective. Intuition relates to an immediate single object, starting from sensation of its immediate givenness, distinguishing this from mind's own intuiting by paying attention and apprehending the intuited object as **something in space and time**. Representation, through recollection, **imagination**, and verbal memory, relates to an inwardized material, **withdrawn from externality and thereby reflected into itself**. In so doing, **intelligence withdraws from the immediate relation in which it confronts the immediate singularity of the object and instead relates the object to a universal**. The universal in question figures first as an image, then a generalized representation, and finally, a recollected repeatable sign, in each case still referring to objects as immediately intuited. Finally, in thought, intelligence has an object that is both subjective and objective. Here intelligence conceives the concrete universal nature of the object, exercising a theorizing cognition whose subjective thought has objectivity and whose object is a factor (*Sache*) conceptually determined in its own right.⁵

These divisions raise the question of why thought involves more than representation. Unlike intuition, representation relates its object to a universal. Hegel considers this relating to be a necessary prerequisite for the development of thought, but still distinguishes it from thinking proper. How, then, does representation's relating of objects and universals fall below the threshold of thinking? What renders the universal to which representation relates its object something less than a full-fledged

concept? On the other hand, if thought does not relate a universal to an object that falls outside the universal, how does thought retain objectivity? Can thinking occupy itself exclusively with thought determinations, severed from any tie to things beyond conceptual determination? That is, can thought dispense with images, the last residue of representation?

The psychological road to thought must resolve these questions.

From intuition to representation

Intuition combines feeling and sensation insofar as intelligence intuits by having an immediate mental content that figures as the determination of both mind and something objective. Whereas feeling becomes sensation when consciousness projects it as something from which mind extricates itself, sensation becomes intuition by being recognized to be a mental as well as objective content. Kant had taken intuition to be basic to consciousness, characterizing it as the mental content in direct connection to what it is about, in contrast to concepts, which relate always indirectly to objects.⁶ What Hegel, unlike Kant, notes, is that mind is aware of its sensations as intuitions only when it relates to them both as its own mental contents and as determinations of objects.

This dual apprehension gives intuition the shape of reason, but only in the most formal manner. Because the content of intuition is immediately given, intuition can neither discriminate anything about what it intuits, nor have anything communicable to convey. Intuition's conjunction of subjective and objective determination offers at best a mute certainty that what the subject feels is no less authenticated in something given apart from the subject. With no mediation to apprehend, nor any mediating apprehension to perform, intuiting intelligence has no reasons to offer nor anything to say or think concerning its intuition.

Intuition nonetheless provides both an ingredient material and a stepping stone to thought. Hegel's account makes this comprehensible, by showing how intelligence engages in representation on the basis of intuition, giving itself the resources for generating signs and then employing signs to think.

The basic itinerary towards thinking that Hegel plots proceeds in two stages, the first in which intelligence moves from intuition to representation and the second in which representation undergoes its own development from image to sign to the threshold of thinking. Understanding to what extent these developments make thinking possible will put in focus the adequacy of their accounts.

Unlike the mental progressions by which the psyche advances from feeling to habituation to emotive expression and by which consciousness proceeds from sensation to perception to understanding, the phases of intelligence pass before mind as alterations of mental content that are mind's own product.⁷ This reflexivity is exhibited from the outset in the move from intuition to representation. Intelligence arrives at the image, the minimal form of representation, by internalizing intuition and recognizing that content as something it has internalized. The internalization consists in mind's re-presenting the intuition to itself as something thereby severed from its initial immediate relation to its object and placed within the arena of imagination. This internalization happens automatically just as the repetition of similar feelings automatically engenders the psyche's habituation to them. If intuition was not immediately internalized, some other mental factor would have to mediate that internalization. Yet that mediator would then have nothing mediating its internalizing activation, unless it was mediated by another factor either immediately given or mediated. Since intelligence as intuiting has nothing but intuitions to contend with, there cannot help but be an immediate internalization, of which intelligence is aware just by being aware of its internalized product. Although the process therefore simply happens, intelligence cannot apprehend its image as **an image without recognizing it to be a product of mind proceeding from the prior intuition of the same content. Otherwise the mental content would be no different than an intuition.**

What initially elicits the image is the intuition of something resembling a prior intuition. The image then comes to mind based on two mental circumstances—that mind has had an intuition like the one eliciting the image and that mind has internalized that prior intuition, which is now apprehended in the form of the image. These circumstances go together, of course, since mind internalizes its intuition once it is intuited. That internalization only becomes manifest in the apprehension of the image, which is therefore a recollection of intuited content.

This recollection occurs just as automatically as the internalization of intuition on which it follows. Although intelligence may come to produce images and associate them freely, no productive imagination can function without there already being recollection, that is, an externally occasioned reproductive imagination. Without preceding recollection, imagination has neither any images with which to construct images of its own nor any images to associate with. Consequently, there can be no productive imagination without antecedent recollection or reproductive imagination.

Recollection is formal in that the content of the prior image is taken up unmodified save for what it incurs in being detached from the immediacy of its original intuiting. Instead of being situated within the encompassing spatial and temporal context of its initial intuition, the re-presented content of the image is withdrawn into a space and time of mind's own.⁸ Whereas any intuited content reflects the influences of its surrounding environment, when it figures as an image, it undergoes an abstraction from these effects. Because the image re-presents the same content found in the intuition from which it arises and to which it refers, an identity is present that might seem to anticipate universality.⁹ The identical content extracted in the image, however, is still sensible and singular, unsuitable for providing thought an adequate mental configuration.

Nonetheless, the very baptism of the image puts mind in a position to relate images to one another independently of how intuitions are given in their immediate relation to their objects. Because the image extracts the intuited content from its objective circumstances and places it in a subjective arena, little is needed for mind to advance from the automatic recollection of images elicited by similar intuitions to an association of images sustained by intelligence alone. All mind must do is use a power already present in its awareness of images. The image may be originally occasioned by a similar intuition, but the image is not just in immediate relation to that intuition and the object to which it is related. If the image were, it would be indistinguishable from an intuition. Once elicited, the image is detached from that occasion and placed within the inner field where intelligence can attend to its products. Intelligence thereby figures as a reproductive imagination, *reproductive* in that it exercises a largely formal re-presenting of the contents of intuition, and *imagination* in that it produces images. In this capacity, intelligence can now engage in the same sort of rudimentary grouping that consciousness performs when it attends to some rather than other factors of the manifold of sensation, collecting these into a thing and its properties.¹⁰ Analogously, intelligence, as imagination, associates the images in its possession, setting them into a purely subjective connection.

Operating as an associating imagination, intelligence is necessarily aware of the connection of images it produces. That connection cannot go unnoticed because the associated images figure as images only by being apprehended as mediated by mind. Otherwise, they revert to intuitions. Since the image enabling mediation is their association, that association must be for intelligence. Just as consciousness perceives a thing by attending to the grouping of sensations it effects, so intelligence

imagines its images as images insofar as it notices how their connection is a product of mind. That connection is therefore present to intelligence.

In the first instance, the association is present only so long as imagination associates the images in question. Minimally speaking, the association consists in the unity of imagination at any moment or over any period of time. That is, intelligence attends to a plurality of images and the conjunction of these images in the imagining intelligence is their association. The association can become, of course, more concretely determined once intelligence imagines some image that it finds connected to some others. This can involve an image whose content is contained within further images, an image that combines other images, or both together (where an image encompassing others is imagined to be common to yet more encompassing images). In all these cases, imagination's association engenders a general representation. This representation is general insofar as it figures either as an abstract universal, as the common feature extracted from a plurality of images, or as a class, a composite whole comprising all its member images.¹¹ Either way, the general representation still consists of contents found in the images it associates. Although intelligence is spontaneously active in associating images, attending to its association, and analyzing the connected images by focusing on some **elements to the exclusion of others, the content of the images remains something found.**¹² Consequently, the general representation contains **the same singular sensible content given in intuition, modified only by detachment from its original context.**¹³ Common or inclusive, it remains an image, failing to attain the imageless content of a concept.¹⁴

Semiotic representation

If mind were restricted to general representations, neither language nor thought would be possible. Intelligence would be confined to a pictorial awareness, preventing reason from grasping universals in their own right and from comprehending the conceptual character of objectivity. Theoretical truth would be inaccessible and discourse about concepts would be beyond the power of mind.

Mind can be confined to pictorial representation, both as a phase of mental maturation and as a fixed limitation imposed by the species being of a dumb animal. Nonetheless, pictorial representation and the intuition it presupposes together provide sufficient resources for the next key stage on the road to thought. This consists in mind's production of signs.

Significantly, Hegel introduces the mental fabrication of signs as a stage not of thinking but of representation. If sign production were

introduced as a form of thought, the material of discourse could not be provided without already involving what it brings into being. That is, because sign production makes thought possible, it is not itself either thinking or language. Although signs may be necessary for speech and thought, sign production must begin operating with no more than general representations and the pictorial awareness to which these are limited. For this reason, dumb animals can signal one another, without arriving at signs that are words.

What makes intelligence a prerequisite for sign production is the twofold character of signs, exhibited in the duality of connotation and meaning. Consciousness may suffice to grasp the configuration of the sign, but unless the configuration is comprehended together with what it signifies, the sign cannot be apprehended as such. Intelligence can be semiotically aware because subject and object are always present in some unity for intelligence. This enables intelligence to apprehend how the sign is a unity of sense and meaning, just as inward as external.

Signs must have, at least to start with, some external existence confronting mind—namely, the intuitable factor that is to figure as a sign. Yet in order for this intuitable existence to count as the vehicle of semiotic representation, mind must equally grasp it as signifying a meaning that is internal to mind. The meaning is not just the mental content of the intuition of that configuration, for then mind would only have an intuition, not an awareness of a sign. Instead, the meaning is itself a representation distinguishable from the intuition of what indicates that meaning.

The representation in question is, however, not just a singular image. As Hegel observes, the representation that the sign signifies must be, more precisely, a general representation.¹⁵ If the representation were not general, but merely singular, the relation between sense and meaning would have no repeatable character. It would simply be an ephemeral private association, linking a unique image with the intuitable content that ought to provide the configuration of the sign. That link could then never be recalled nor communicated, since neither the same mind nor any other could make that same connection ever again. Only a general representation, whose content can be re-encountered in multiple similar images, can provide a retrievable, communicable meaning.

These considerations provide some preliminary indication of how the production of signs can proceed within intelligence, on the basis of the psyche and consciousness. To produce a sign, intelligence must be able to produce an intuitable factor to which a generalized representation can be linked. Intelligence can produce an intuitable factor because mind is

no less a psyche, whose embodied reality can express itself physically, be it by vocal expression, visible gesture, or perceivable inscription, engendering the intuitable configuration for the sign. Because intelligence also contains consciousness, it possesses intentionality, allowing mind to be aware of its own tangible productions and of objects and other subjects. Finally, the pre-linguistic intelligence engaged in intuition and representation can generate images, as well as relate them to intuitions and other images. Through these associations, the pre-verbal imagination of intelligence produces general representations,¹⁶ comprising the content reidentified in recollecting those images that share it.¹⁷

In this way, the conjunction of all three dimensions of mind plays a constitutive role in facilitating sign production and the rise of thought. Without mind being an embodied psyche able to tangibly manifest mental contents, the generalized representations providing meaning for signs would be solely subjective, hidden within the solitary mind that imagines them. Conversely, without intelligence supervening upon psyche and consciousness, providing apprehension of contents that are both subjective and objective, nothing worldly could be or be known to be an expression of mind.

In sum, to make and apprehend signs, mind must engage in a three-fold operation. **First, mind must produce an intuitable factor, which it can recognize as its own product.¹⁸ Second, mind must associate the intuition of that factor with a generalized representation that is both a mental determination and about something else. Finally, mind must recognize that association to be something produced by itself and then be in a position to recollect that connection of configuration and meaning.**

As we have seen, the representation must be generalized, for if it were merely singular, the intuitable content would just express an image confined to a single exercise of imagination in that single awareness. Yet just associating the intuitable expression to a generalized representation is not enough. The sign's link of sense and meaning must also be generalized if communication is to be possible. Only then can the semiotic relation be repeatable and reidentifiable, enabling a plurality of individuals to apprehend and communicate the same linkage. In so doing, each mind reenacts an equivalent connection of sense and meaning, performed by its own intelligence.

What allows mind to generalize the tie between sense and meaning is the same internalization by which the recollection of intuition gives rise to images. The link between intuited configuration and general representation becomes internalized by being detached from the immediate

time and place in which the individual mind makes that association. Instead, the link becomes something retrievable first through the automatic working of reproductive imagination, which recollects the semiotic connection on the occasion of intuiting a configuration similar to that of the sign. As recollected, the connection obtains the same abstracted generality of the recollected image, leaving behind the particularities of the intuited configuration that was first linked with the sign's meaning. Now, intelligence makes the connection between meaning and sense by associating a generalized representation with an image rather than with an intuition. This renders the semiotic connection a general property of intelligence, which mind can retrieve through its own imagination as well as express to others by producing another tangible token of the generalized sense and meaning.

The recollected sign still involves contents bound to images. Not only is the sense an image, but the meaning remains a generalized representation presenting an image contained in or encompassing a plurality of other images. Imagination remains operative, with thinking proper not yet in play.¹⁹ Nonetheless, as Hegel emphasizes, the sign associates sense and meaning in a manner that breaks with the dependence upon image. Symbolization still associates sense and meaning through an imagined content common to both (for example, lion and courage). By contrast, sign production connects sense and meaning²⁰ independently of their content and solely through mind. This is why the connection between sense and meaning is purely conventional in character. When the sign becomes a representation, repeatable and retrievable by intelligence, the indifference of the sign's meaning to its imaged configuration is evident, although the relation to image remains.

In order for thinking to take place, mind must apprehend meanings that transcend the particularities of image. Thought cannot be without a particularity of its own, for concepts cannot be universal without being both determinate and unifying their own particularizations. Nevertheless whatever particularity concepts possess is contained within their universality. That is, the specificity of each concept is a thought determination, not an image. This, of course, is manifest in how concepts are definable through words expressing conceptual determinations.

The conventionality of signs already frees the sense of meaning from bondage to any one specific intuition, but the generalized representation that is signified still retains a connection to intuition mediated by the images of imagination. The latter connection must be severed if mind is to think.

What provides the basic material for this last move on the road to thinking is the name. It comprises the connection of the sign with its meaning that intelligence has produced and that mind now is in a position to apprehend in the various ways that representation allows. To begin with, the name is itself a single transient production of mind, a relation of an intuited expression to an inner representation that only exists so long as intelligence makes that connection for itself. Because that connection involves both an intuited expression and an inner representation, it itself takes place in the world, as the psychological act of an embodied self. The external dimension of that act, which limits it to a specific time and place, is superseded once intelligence recollects the name and the connection of sign and meaning it comprises. Then the name undergoes an internalization, transforming not only the sign into a repeatable image, but its connection with its meaning into a lasting universal possession of intelligence. This occurs through verbal memory, whose successive forms provide the bridge to thought, as well as language proper.²¹

Verbal memory as preparatory to thinking

Hegel ushers in thinking by way of three successive forms of verbal memory: name retentive memory, reproductive verbal memory, and mechanical memorization.

Name retentive memory is primary insofar as the other two forms are predicated upon it. Inwardizing the intuition of the name in the same way that imagination inwardizes immediate intuitions, making them recollectible images, name retentive memory makes communication possible. By transforming the intuition of the name into a repeatable, reidentifiable representation, intelligence renders the individual connection of the sign to its meaning a universal, enduring bond. Intelligence now possesses memory of the name,²² combining in one representation the connection of the image of the sign with its meaning.²³

This memory operates at first in the same automatic manner as does the initial retrieval of images. Just as the recollection of images occurred on the occasion of encountering similar intuitions, so verbal memory brings to mind its trove of names when confronted with tokens of those it retains. What allows mind to have similar intuitions is the regularity of nature and the constancy of the psyche's own sensory apparatus. These same constancies provide part of the occasion for name recollection, since names contain the connection of meaning to intuition that then become internalized as a connection of meaning to image. In addition,

intelligence can intuit previous tangible expressions of a name that it has produced or tangible expressions that other individuals have made.

Hegel has little to say at this juncture about the role of other minds in facilitating name recollection, but it is worth considering whether interaction with other minds is constitutive for names becoming internalized. If some expression of the same name must be encountered to bring it back to mind, two options are possible. On the one hand, if one and the same intelligence is to provide the occasion for and to perform the elicited recollection, the occasion cannot already be a recollection. The occasion provided by intelligence must be a production of a token of the name, one that intelligence makes without intelligence recognizing it as a name recollection. To avoid this, intelligence would have to rely upon the expression of another, whose name production would have to be recognized as such, thereby eliciting a corresponding recollection of the name. Since the same predicament would apply to any other intelligence, if all parties are to recollect names for the first time, they would have to mutually recognize their use of names. That would require perceiving both the respective verbal expressions of the name and the commonly perceivable object to which they are linked. Only then, would any intelligence be in a position to recollect a name and thereby take possession of a communicable word.

However it be achieved, name recollection allows for reproduction of the generalized representation of the name just as the involuntary retention of images provides the material for their re-imagining. And just as reproductive imagination enables mind to associate images, so reproductive verbal memory allows intelligence to associate names, possessed by mind thanks to retentive verbal memory. This is a crucial development, for name association makes possible syntactical relations, as well as the propositional expressions in which relations of words can signify judgments. Judgment, however, does not merely connect representations, but determines the individual and particular in terms of the universal. Accordingly, before names can figure in propositions expressing judgments, meaning must acquire a universality that no image can provide.

Significantly, Hegel describes the reproduced name as the *factor* [*die Sache*] as it is present in the realm of representation.²⁴ The factor emerges thematically in the logic of objectivity, comprising the reality that is conceptually determinate and, as such, the genuine object of reason. The name can exhibit the nature of the factor to the extent that

words will be the psychological medium of thought, comprising the mental reality in which concepts are manifest to oneself and to others.

What makes this possible is a further feature names acquire through reproductive memory. Once names are recollected, intelligence apprehends without either intuition or image the factor in the name and the name with the factor.²⁵ Names do have meaning, but when internalized as a possession of verbal memory, the name signifies what it is about without mind needing either an actual intuition or an image of its referent.²⁶ Hegel gives the example of the name, "lion", explaining that we understand it just through its own simple representation. No intuition or memory of an individual beast is needed.²⁷ The name signifies all by itself. Discursive reality is now available to mind in words that directly signify the verbalizable objectivity that cannot be apprehended without them.

As such, the name comprises an image-less simple representation that exhibits the structure of reason, offering a subjective determination that is no less a determination of something objective. Yet, unlike intuitions, the subjective/objective content is no longer something immediately given. By dispensing with images, verbal memory enables intelligence to deal with a mental reality that is a product of intelligence, transcending the givenness of intuition as well as imagination.²⁸ To the degree that thinking thinks products of intelligence that are devoid of image, it should be no surprise that we think in names, broadly considered.²⁹

Hegel's account thus provides the following insight into how words and thought must go together. Thoughts cannot be objects of intelligence unless they can have an object-like form, distinguishable from the inwardness of mind. To be thoughts, however, rather than images, that object-like form must be freed of the externality that burdens intuitions and the images that recollect them. Names, and more generally, words, provide just the object-likeness that thought requires by having a shape of externality, given in the representation of the word, which is what Hegel can call an "inward externality"³⁰ insofar as it is a product of intelligence cut free from intuited givens.

Nevertheless how names serve thought remains to be seen. Neither the mere retention nor the mere association of names suffices for thinking. Names, both singly and in association, can designate a general representation, without designating any imageless concept, whereas verbal memories can be associated in purely arbitrary, meaningless ways that have no rhyme or reason. As Hegel points out, words can be used without comprehending the factor, without determining what is objectively conceptual. By contrast, true thought takes on the character of the factor,

which unites concept and objectivity, as does the word when it is used by true thinking to signify objective concepts.³¹

One might suppose that name retention and association can engender thinking and language only through two related developments: (1) when word order takes on differentiated forms, allowing syntax to invest meaning with more than a pictured reference to individuals, and (2) when names signify universal meanings liberated from the imagery of general representations, allowing for propositions connecting universals to one another, as well as to individuals and particulars. These two developments go together. When the syntactical relationships of words determine their significance, meaning becomes freed from the representational predicament of being fixed by the independent givens it mirrors. Only then can words signify a universality capable of particularizing itself without leaving its own realm, making possible a thinking that can determine content of its own.³²

Yet instead of invoking differentiated syntactical relations, Hegel insists that associations of words first become a bridge to thinking by being rote remembered. This rote connectivity is what distinguishes the "mechanical" third form of verbal memory. Unlike verbal memory that recollects signs with their unity of generalized meaning and represented sense, mechanical verbal memory associates signs without any reference to their meaning. The association is sustained solely through mind, which connects the words by rote, running through them in a temporal succession oblivious to any distinguishable significance. What makes memorization mechanical is that the terms are related in a way entirely external to them. Mind has here not only produced the signs, but fully taken over their relation to one another, suspending the role earlier played by intuition and representation. Being known by rote, names remain enclosed within intelligence.³³ Nevertheless the intelligence that rote memorizes names figures as an empty, unreflecting vessel of words, whose subjectivity relinquishes the character of the factor, insofar as names here figure without any object-like meaning.³⁴

Because meaning drops out of consideration in mechanical memory, intelligence might seem to revert to the psyche, where mind communes with its own mental contents without distinguishing subject and object. Yet mechanical memory is not recycling feelings. Rote memorization instead internalizes an association of names that mind produces independently of distinguishable meanings. That association is still a form of verbal memory, relating terms that remain words, which, as such, have had to be generated through sign production and recollection. Mechanically memorized names still have meaning, but now, through

rote memorization's indifference to it, they are set to signify wholly by themselves in and through intelligence.

So long as names are still interconnected through their meaning, their conjunction involves a synthesis, a relation to something else in which intelligence does not relate to itself.³⁵ Rotely memorizing intelligence, however, is the universal receptacle unifying its particular externalizations, namely its recollected words. Within the process of mechanical memorization, intelligence ignores their connection to general representations. Instead, the only universality to which they stand tied is the unity of the rotely memorizing intelligence, whose recollected running through of them in temporal succession is what now solely binds them together. By rotely possessing them all, intelligence suspends their reference to general representations, thereby eliminating the difference of meaning and name. Hegel calls this elimination the highest recollection or internalization achieved by representing insofar as no independent meaning is left and mind deals only with its own products, freed of any residue of intuition and its external givenness. Within mechanical memory, names have no significance other than that of triggering those that follow in the ordering that intelligence has spontaneously generated. Herein words bring forth one another independently of any external synthesis of meaning and expression and the fixed connections that entails.³⁶

Yet, as Hegel points out, rote memorization is also mind's most extreme externalization, in which intelligence gives itself an immediate being as meaningless words, contained within the universal verbal space that intelligence now comprises. The "I" of intelligence is this bare repository, which, insofar as intelligence provides the rote connection, equally comprises the brute mental power ordering and retrieving the different names.³⁷ In mechanical memory intelligence's own unity is just as externally connected as the names it rotely orders. Rote memorization itself contains no reason, no mediating principle for why intelligence orders its words as it does. Thus, as Hegel points out, rote memorization recalls its words without accentuation or any other trace of meaning.³⁸

Why, then, should Hegel call "highly wonderful" the capacity of intelligence to remember words by rote?³⁹ First of all, intelligence is here preoccupied solely with itself and its own products. Reference to anything external has been excluded. Second, intelligence here relates to particularizations of itself contained within the fleeting succession of its own mental process. These are the names that lie within mind's rote memory, yet do so in indifference to the connection that intelligence

forges among them. Due to this immediate junction of internality and indifference, intelligence relates to itself as a unity of subjectivity and objectivity, that is, as reason. Intelligence combines subjectivity, insofar as it encompasses its names within its own mental domain, with objectivity, insofar as the names exhibit the same independence vis-à-vis their subjective ordering as objectivity possesses vis-à-vis anything outside itself.⁴⁰ This puts objectivity in intelligence as a quality of mind's own verbal activity. Thereby intelligence retains something that enables thought to possess an objectivity without having to rely upon intuition.⁴¹ Generating determinations of its own that remain completely indifferent to the unity joining them together, intelligence has established an objectivity of words owing nothing to images.⁴²

How this subjectively engendered verbal objectivity provides the prerequisites for thought lies just a step away. As mechanical memory, intelligence possesses an external objectivity residing in the indifferent content of the names it connects. Intelligence has here eliminated any separate meaning for these names and relates to itself as in unity with the objectivity of its names.⁴³ That is, intelligence is aware of its own mental determinations being names that have an objectivity completely enclosed within the verbal domain of mind. Verbal memory serves as a transition to thinking by arriving at this identity, which allows reason to exist in the subject as its own activity.⁴⁴

What makes this identity crucial to thinking is that thought proper no longer has any meaning in the sense of something subjective, something different from its objectivity.⁴⁵ Instead of standing in relation to another representation, thought exhibits the same identity that sets logic apart. Logic cannot distinguish subject and object because logic is a thinking about thinking. Thinking, however, is itself a thinking about thought determinations, a thinking of concepts. This, after all, is what allows logic to achieve its own subject-object identity—the thinking of thinking can only be at one with its object if that object, thinking, is itself a thinking of thought. This identity does not remove all relation. Rather, thinking has its objective being in its own mental space, differentiating from itself the thoughts with which thinking is occupied.

This is why Hegel can claim that the factor comprises the content devoid of any opposition to subjective inwardness.⁴⁶ Thought exhibits the subject-object identity of the factor because thought has an externality whose objectivity is no less enclosed within the space of intelligence. That externality is the being of words, by which thought determinations are thinkable, rendered subjective without losing any of their own

objectivity. Thinking cannot occur without a verbal expression, but this expression remains within the verbal space of intelligence without relinquishing its own independent being as that which thought thinks about.

By being an identity of subjectivity and objectivity, verbal intelligence contains, to again paraphrase Hegel, reason as its activity. Intelligence is now set to engage in reasoning, in determining itself as a subjective process that is no less objective, generating its own objectivity without having to rely upon the external givenness on which intuition and representation depends. Intelligence is poised to give words repeatable, universal relations to one another, as well as to enable them to signify those relationships. In this manner, intelligence can proceed to articulate meaning without representation, to signify concepts, to think.⁴⁷

Universality, concept, and thinking

So far, Hegel's account has focused on the subject-object identity of verbal intelligence, without explicitly drawing out how universality plays a constitutive role. Since the universal is the concept as such, the conceptuality of thought hangs upon how universality enters into the self-enclosed objectivity supplied by mechanical verbal memory.

Could the emergence of universal self-consciousness provide a clue? **When consciousness had as its object another consciousness which had the former as its respective object, the subject-object identity of reason became exhibited in consciousness.** In recognizing one another, each consciousness had as its object a consciousness identical to itself, yet no less distinguished from it. Hence, each consciousness became aware of itself as a universal self-consciousness, having a structure it shared with another.

When intelligence becomes cognizant of its identity with the objectivity of the words of which it is aware, it knows itself to be the encompassing unity of itself and its other, the names which it thinks. Those names are the particularizations of intelligence's overarching unity and intelligence is therein aware of its own verbally expressed universality. Because the particulars no longer depend upon intuition for their content, the particularity is entirely mind's own production and intelligence is just the universal that contains them as its own differentiation.⁴⁸

Yet do those names thereby become universal or do they remain elements of a mind utterly inscrutable in its withdrawal from any reference to general images? One well might wonder, following Wittgenstein's argument against private language, whether rote memory's elimination

of representational meaning can ensure the universality of intelligence and the communicability of its words. Certainly the production of signs and their recollection by an individual cannot alone guarantee that any other intelligence apprehends these signs as such. Yet with sign production and recollection, individuals are in a position to make manifest to one another how common expressions signify commonly observed phenomena and how their recollection of those expressions provide a shared vocabulary. Instead of one self-consciousness reflecting itself in the self-consciousness of another through recognitive desire, here one intelligent individual would apprehend its own verbal intelligence reflected in the verbal expressions of another. By observing one another expressing comparable associations of words in the face of commonly observed events, and recollecting these correlations, individuals would take possession of communicable propositions, confident of the universality of their own linguistic intelligence. Although these propositions would be limited to general representations,⁴⁹ individuals could communicate meanings independent of any reference to images once they further recognize one another's connecting of words to be severed from representational meaning as a result of mechanical memory. Then individuals would be aware of how their particular words have in their interconnection a universality exhibited in the comparable verbal engagements of their peers without having to refer to shared general representations. Because that universality could not draw its content by abstraction from intuitions, it would have to generate its specific repeatable content through the self-differentiation of universals and their determination in and through one another.

Without invoking the interaction that could insure the communicability of imageless words, Hegel explains that intelligence is here aware of its own universality in a double sense: as the universal as such and as that universal as immediate. In thinking its thoughts, intelligence apprehends both its own unity as what thinks those thoughts and its immediate determinacy as the content of its reasoning. The former is the abiding universality that underlies each and every one of its possible thoughts, whereas the latter is the immediate content that that universal has given itself. Accordingly, intelligence is here for itself as the *true* universal, the universal in unity with its reality, encompassing itself and its other, the immediate being of its differentiation. This renders intelligence a cognizing that has thought as its product, a factor that is the simple identity of the subjective and objective,⁵⁰ simple in that it does not depend on some other factor, such as intuition, to unite thinking with what thought is about.⁵¹

Because intelligence is aware of the factor, of what is both subjective and objective, in having thoughts intelligence knows that what is thought is and that what is only is insofar as it is thinkable.⁵² This certainty provides the underlying basis of theoretical cognition, cognition that relies upon concepts to know about objects. The objects of theorizing must be conceptually determinable, which is to say, unite the subjectivity of concepts with the objectivity of independent being. Although thinking is here objective, thinking is still a having of thoughts, an activity of intelligence in which thoughts are the content and object. Thinking is intentional insofar as it is about its thoughts, but it is nonrepresentational insofar as its thoughts are not about something given independently of conceptual determination.⁵³

To understand what is distinctive about how thought involves the unity of subjective and objective, it is necessary to distinguish how that unity is present in thought from how it figures in intuition and representation. Hegel differentiates the three modes in terms of immediacy, opposition, and a reestablished immediacy containing opposition.⁵⁴ The unity is immediately present in intuition insofar as the given mental content provided by sensation is intuited to be just as much a mental as an objective determination. In representation, the mental and objective are opposed in that imagination recollects intuition and thereby is aware of the image as something subjective, distinct from the object from whose intuition it derives. Intelligence, in imagining, is aware of its representation doing double duty, being both a mental content and about something immediately intuitable. Nonetheless, because the representation has the distinctly subjective features of recollected intuition, the representation is no longer immediately identical to its object. As Hegel points out, the unity of subjective and objective in representation remains merely subjective.⁵⁵ On the one hand, imagination connects representations and intuitions in its own subjective mental space. On the other hand, mechanical memory removes the connection to independently determined meanings, while leaving words with an objectivity enclosed within the subjective mental field of verbal memory. By contrast, thinking, Hegel maintains, renders the unity of subjectivity and objectivity just as much objective as subjective, thereby enabling intelligence to know itself to have the nature of the factor. How can this be so?

Thinking unites subjectivity and objectivity only insofar as the subjectivity and objectivity in question are both conceptual. Thinking, subjectively speaking, is the activity of conceptual determination, of conceptualizing the object of thought. Thinking, objectively speaking,

is conceptual objectivity or the object insofar as it is conceptually determined and manifest in thought. Thinking thus unites the concepts that are thought with the conceptual objectivity that they grasp. In conceiving objectivity, thinking's thoughts are both its own subjective reality and the conceptual being of its object. On the other hand, thinking's unity of subjectivity and objectivity, namely its thinking, is itself both subjective and objective. Theoretical intelligence has an objective being consisting in the verbal expression of its thought, and intelligence equally is aware of thinking these verbal expressions, of thinking its thoughts.⁵⁶

The content of thought

Does this signify that the content of thought is generated in just the same way in which logical content arises out of the unity of subject and object from which logic starts? Insofar as indeterminacy gives rise to determinacy, the same development should be available for thought once mind becomes aware of contents that have no external origin. In that way, words, deprived of external meanings by mechanical memory, regain meanings generated by the activity of thinking. How would this occur?

No return to representation will suffice. The meanings established by semiotic imagination depend upon the generalized representations that arise when images are recollected and associated and intelligence attends to their common contents. This provides at most figurative commonalities, that is, empirical generalizations and family resemblances, none of which have the freedom from intuition that distinguishes thought.

Although Hegel does not develop the role that intersubjectivity may play in producing communicable signs signifying general representations, how thought generates its own content is not unveiled by understanding how names get produced through a triangulation where a plurality of individuals express their signs to one another in relation to commonly observed objects. Such triangulation remains bound to representation and its figurative generalities. This is true even if what individuals mutually express are propositions signifying commonly observed situations and events. Admittedly, general representations and the vocabulary that goes with them comprise enabling conditions for thinking, which, after all, need not invent the words it uses to think, but can learn representational vocabulary before engaging in thinking proper.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, something more must be involved for thought to employ verbal expressions that convey meanings for which no objects are empirically given.⁵⁸

Admittedly, Hegel develops thinking cognition as being first formal, possessing a universality and being residing in the subjectivity of intelligence, which thinks about thoughts that it finds as a given content, consisting in recollected representations whose linguistic expressions are equally at hand as an antecedently given vocabulary.⁵⁹ Because the contents of these thoughts are given rather than established through thinking, awareness of their unity of subjectivity and objectivity can only be an abstract, yet unverified certainty that given thoughts do provide the conceptual determination of objectivity.

Such formal thinking employs concept, judgment, and syllogism in the formal logical manner of the understanding.⁶⁰ Although Hegel does not dwell on the linguistic expression of such reasoning, he calls for the grammatical, syntactical resources enabling words to figure in propositions, which involves more than mere sign production and recollection or, for that matter, the rote ordering of mechanical memory. Putting these resources in play, intelligence first thinks over its recollected representations, explaining the individual from out of its universal determinations such that the material is first known in its truth through these categorizations.⁶¹ Then, making judgments, intelligence explains the individual as a universal, imposing the forms of the concept upon the given content it judges. Finally, through syllogizing, intelligence posits the identity of the different concept determinations of the individual, concluding them from one another, thereby removing the abiding immediacy of their contents by showing them to be mediated by one another.

This paves the way for the final stage of pure thinking, where meaning can be completely freed of dependence on any givenness deriving from general representations. The bondage of inference to presupposed premises must now be overcome by a thinking no longer ruled by a formal "logic", where the form of thought is external to its content, where thinking is an empty scaffold, caught in the heteronomy of having to appeal to some given to have anything about which to think. Liberation is achieved when the form and content of thought cease to be independently determined, when the universal is grasped as it is logically determined—as self-particularizing and as unifying itself out of its particularization into individuality, rendering the particular in all its independence into a moment of the concept. Then, as Hegel explains, the universal is no longer external to the content of what is thought, but produces the content of the object of thought out of its own thinking.⁶² Thinking now has no other content than its own determinations, and in cognizing the object it is

apprehending itself. For this reason, Hegel can speak of thought being in a fully free relation to the object, for now the object is completely transparent to thought, presenting nothing fundamentally other to intelligence.⁶³ Intelligence here relates to itself in relating to its object, for what it thinks is something exhaustively captured by the thought determinations through which it is conceived. Objective reason, the objective correspondence of concept and objectivity, has become the very subjectivity, the very activity of intelligence. This is how pure thinking, the thinking of thinking, enables intelligence to be the unity of subjectivity and objectivity that is both subjective and objective. That unity is subjective insofar as thinking has objective thoughts and that unity is equally objective insofar as the object is itself in identity with its conceptual determination. Consequently, intelligence can be characterized as self-knowing truth.⁶⁴ In thinking purely, intelligence is the identity of concept and objectivity, the truth that knows itself because what intelligence apprehends is the same identity of concept and objectivity that its own thinking comprises.

This completes the development of theoretical intelligence which proceeded from intuition and representation to pure thinking. In each case, mind was aware of determinations both subjective and objective, first in immediate identity in intuition, where a given content was both subjective and objective, then in opposition when representation associated image and intuition, and then in a reconciled identity when thought grasped an objectivity fully conceptual in character.⁶⁵ By arriving at this result, the philosophy of mind has accounted for the psychological conditions of its own theorizing.

6

The Psychology of Will and the Deduction of Right: Rethinking Hegel's Theory of Practical Intelligence

Hegel's *Philosophy of Subject Spirit* is perhaps the most neglected part of his system and no portion of that work has lingered in deeper oblivion than its concluding section on Practical Intelligence. That section, however, is doubly significant. First, Hegel's account of Practical Intelligence provides an important contribution to comprehending will as it falls within the philosophy of mind. Second, that account brings the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* to closure and ushers in the *Philosophy of Objective Spirit*. In so doing, the theory of practical intelligence consummates the philosophy of mind and provides the conceptual prerequisites for normative conduct, the topic of Objective Spirit. The theory of practical intelligence thereby constitutes the derivation of the concept of right, the reality of the free will. This means that practical intelligence comprises the will that is not yet truly free, yet furnishes individuals all they need to freely determine themselves.

To understand practical intelligence, the different dimensions of will-ing and the separate accounts Hegel provides for them must be distinguished. Generally, the *Philosophy of Right* addresses the reality of the free will, whereas the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* addresses the will as psychologically determined. The introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*, however, restates the development of practical intelligence as it appears in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. This account is not part of the Idea of Right, but rather recapitulates the concluding section of the philosophy of mind that provides what Hegel calls the deduction of the concept of right.¹ Further, the psychological account of will as practical intelligence must not be confused with the logical account of will provided in Hegel's *Logic* and *Science of Logic*.² Logically speaking, will is a subject that strives to make itself something which unites subjectivity and objectivity by transforming what confronts it so as to conform to the

subject's own determination. As such, will has a determinacy, its aim, which is to be made objective. Because will's aim initially lacks objectivity, the will is subjective and finite, bounded by the objectivity that lies beyond it. Thus will presupposes the self-subsisting independence of the objectivity it sets out to annul. By urging itself on to unify subjectivity and objectivity, will extinguishes its own activity, which only proceeds so long as that unification has not been attained.³

Will as mind adds to these logical determinations a natural and psychological concretization. With respect to mind, objectivity comprises a natural world containing the living subject whose own subjectivity has a living, animal embodied being in the world. That embodiment combines the individual's physiological species being with the psychological dimensions of mind, which have physiological ramifications of their own.

Will as practical intelligence

If the involvement of mind and body in volition is evident, whether will as mind is practical intelligence, is controversial. This question, which Hegel answers affirmatively, is sometimes confused with whether will necessarily involves thinking, whether will is practical reason. If will does involve thought, then it becomes problematic to attribute will to nonrational animals or children who have yet to develop linguistic intelligence. Because, however, intelligence includes intuition and representation as well as thought, the identification of will with practical intelligence bears upon a more fundamental divide distinguishing intelligence from psyche and consciousness. Then, will may be attributed to both dumb animals and pre-linguistic children, who lack reason but intuit and imagine.

Granting these possibilities, why should will be practical intelligence and not just an engagement of psyche and consciousness? Underlying this question is the more fundamental question of how will can comprise something irreducible to desire and reason. The famous absence of any word for "will" in classical Greek philosophy reflects the common dogma of Plato and Aristotle that mind can do nothing independent from our desires or our reason.⁴ How, then, can action, goal-directed behavior, proceed without subordination to desire or reason? If will is practical intelligence, volition's irreducibility to desire and reason must thereby be explicable.

To determine whether will is practical intelligence requires establishing whether will constitutively involves not just psyche and

consciousness, but intelligence. Intelligence unites the features of psyche and consciousness, such that mind relates to its own content as both subjective and objective. This occurs in various ways, involving successive degrees of immediacy and mediation. Intuition immediately relates to a manifold that it intuits to be both its own subjective modification and something immediately given in opposition to its own intuiting subjectivity. Representation internalizes the immediately given contents of intuition and modifies them through imagination without relinquishing the objective reference of what is imagined. Finally, linguistic intelligence enables reason to conceive concepts that are both subjective determinations of the mind's thinking and determinations ascribed objectivity.

Why should intelligence be necessary for volition? Certainly linguistic intelligence is necessary for any acting upon rational principle, since without language and thought, volition could not pursue an end requiring conceptualization. If volition constitutively entailed acting upon the conception of some good or principle of volition, will would be unique to thinking, speaking individuals.

Yet are there not dimensions of volition devoid of conceptualization, without which acting on principle is not even possible? Willing can **hardly pursue rational ends or principles without choosing, that is, committing to some aim.** Yet can the choosing will not opt for **following urges** that relate to purely singular objects and situations, which **can be intuited and represented without conceptualization?** To choose to **fulfill an urge**, the individual must comprehend how it can alter the given world it confronts to conform to its aim. Some understanding of the **mechanical, chemical, and biological relations of objectivity** is required, since otherwise the individual would have no way of understanding what need be done to effect the satisfaction of its urge. Yet such connections can be anticipated without concepts so long as the individual can recall similar associations, making use of images and general representations. This possibility renders linguistic intelligence unnecessary for choice, but it does not preclude intelligence insofar as intelligence can involve intuition and representation, with or without thinking. If volition cannot proceed without intuitions and representations, and these involve intelligence and not just psyche or consciousness, then volition would be practical intelligence with the possibility of both pre-linguistic and linguistic forms.

Hegel does not confine volition to an explicitly thinking activity, but details a series of forms of willing that make possible acting on principle, yet involve pre-linguistic intuitions and representations.⁵ If this option

is to hold up to scrutiny, identifying volition with practical intelligence, but allowing for pre-linguistic as well as linguistic forms, pre-linguistic volition must be impossible solely with psyche and/or consciousness. Yet given that the psyche and consciousness both involve embodied activity, why should such activity not qualify as volition?

The activity in which the psyche engages is at once mental and physiological, and neither consciousness nor intelligence can proceed without it. This activity involves the mental registering of life processes both internal to the individual's living organism and reflecting its metabolism with its environment. On both accounts, the psyche registers modifications given to its sensibility, monitoring these modifications as alterations of its subjective field of feeling. In so doing, the psyche is not merely passively receptive, but engages in the self-activity of a feeling self that, in feeling its own mental registrations, acts upon itself while interacting with its biosphere. This activity and self-activity does not yet differentiate subject and object. Rather, the psyche modifies its own sensibility by feeling its own feelings, engendering habits through repeated self-registerings of the feeling self. Habituation allows the mind to distance itself from certain of its feelings in function of its own history of self-feeling activity, setting the stage for the psyche to give expression to its feelings in bodily gestures distinct from the physiological embodiment of those feelings themselves. Without feeling, habituation, and expression, the individual would be in no position to detach itself from its given mental manifold, treat any of it as an end, and endeavor to realize that end in the world. Feeling provides the mental manifold for every further function of mind. Habit, enabling the feeling self to inure itself to repeated feelings, allows mind to distance itself from some of its mental contents and retain the imprint of feelings that are not immediately felt. Although this sets the stage for retaining mental contents that could figure as an end to be realized through action, it does not provide opposition to an objectivity in which aims are to be carried out. So long as the individual remains caught in the pre-conscious self-communion of the psyche, where all determinations are registered simply as contents of mind, there can be no passage from inner subjectivity to outer objectivity, no realization of ends by which volition can operate.⁶

Consciousness provides the needed opposition of subject and object and acts upon its embodied self while engaging with the objectivity from which it distinguishes its awareness.⁷ Nevertheless mere consciousness will not suffice for volition. If the individual is aware only of an opposing objectivity, but not of his or her embodied self, mind cannot

entertain ends of its own, nor distinguish whether any alteration in the perceived world is the result of mind's own embodied agency. To have an end, mind must be aware of its own mental contents in face of an objective world in which it comprehends that that content is to be realized through mind's own activity. Further, unless mind can be conscious of and recognize its own embodied self in its active engagement with the world, volition can hardly occur. At most, the conscious mind might experience the correlation of mental contents and objective events as well as the interaction of its body with its biosphere. Consciousness would not, however, be aware of any *practical* connection between its mental contents, such as desires, purposes, and intentions, with the objects it perceives. Consciousness would not thereby be conscious of its mental contents actualizing themselves in objectivity.

Self-consciousness might appear already to involve will insofar as desire sets the individual in a practical relation to objects, entailing action modifying them. Desire, however, figures as a minimal shape of self-consciousness by relating to its objects purely negatively. Desire enables consciousness to be aware of its own self by obliterating the independent subsistence of the object of desire. The object here succumbs to desire, whose consuming appetite relates consciousness to its **own self only by removing, albeit in a partial, particular fleeting way, its relation to some independent other. Appetite does not realize an end in the world, making subjectivity objective. Rather it cancels a part of that world, reducing it to the subject.**⁸

This empty obliteration is superseded, admittedly, when one conscious individual satisfies another's desire through observable behavior. The acquiescing individual desires the desire satisfaction of the other, but the beneficiary does not yet recognize the desire of its benefactor. The beneficiary does not engage in any volition, since the beneficiary does not itself realize any end of its own. Its benefactor, however, does act to satisfy the beneficiary's desire.⁹ Why does this serving activity not qualify as volition and allow volition to occur without intelligence?

Moreover, when parties engage in an even-handed recognitive desire, where individuals reciprocally serve the appetite of one another, all act to satisfy the desire of another, whose desire aims at their satisfaction as well. Through this recognition, each is indirectly conscious of its own desire, as reflected in the satisfaction provided by its counterpart.¹⁰ Why, then, is the behavior engaged in by each not volition?

The key reason is that the behavior in both cases remains pursuant to quenching appetite, achieved not by realizing an end in a transformed objectivity but by consuming the object of desire. Other forms of

recognition may well involve purpose and intention, where ends do attain a positive realization. In those cases, volition will be at play. Here, however, where only self-consciousness is engaged, behavior remains in the thrall of appetite.

What intelligence adds that appetitive behavior lacks are abiding mental determinations that remain both subjective and objective. Whereas appetite may be intentional, confronting an object to be consumed, appetite remains solely subjective. It does not seek to make itself objective, translating its mental content into something nonmental. Desire does not aim to make its object desirous. Rather, desire relates to its objective correlate as an inherent nullity, absorbable into subjectivity. That absorption may well involve the activity of an embodied individual, both feeling and conscious, but that behavior does not aim at making the individual's mental content something objective. For behavior to have an end that it consciously effects in the world, the individual must entertain a mental content that is both its own subjective possession as well as something it recognizes to be objectifiable through the activity of the individual. Only then can it figure as an end and only then can volition occur to the degree that end-oriented action distinguishes volition from appetitive behavior.

Whether or not the end has any conceptual character, it figures in inverse relation to the mental contents of theoretical intelligence. Theoretical intelligence modifies its own subjective mental content so that it corresponds to given objectivity, obtaining the subjective/objective unity of truth.¹¹ By contrast, action in pursuit of an end proceeds from a subjective mental content that the individual relates to as something with which it is to generate its own corresponding object by modifying the world to which it belongs.

Despite this inversion, one can expect the differentiations of theoretical intelligence to provide a structural clue to the forms of practical intelligence. Although the end of volition is not knowledge, like knowledge it is a subjective mental content to which objectivity becomes joined. Hence, the different modes by which theoretical intelligence determines its subjective unity of subject and object should bear upon the different ways in which the end of volition can be determined. Since theoretical intelligence has intuitions, representations, and thoughts as the subjective vehicles of truth, volition should have three successive dimensions, whose ends reflect, respectively, intuition, representation, and thought. The first two would comprise nondiscursive forms of volition, while the latter would involve acting in light of concepts.

The forms of will and the stages of practical intelligence

Conceiving the rational will in all its forms is the task of the Philosophy of Right. Before this task can be addressed, the Philosophy of Mind must consider the forms of willing that lack full rationality, yet provide the volitional prerequisites of rational agency. If the rational will wills the concept of itself, then there can be two broad types of nonrational wills—one that wills the concept of something other than itself and one that wills no concepts whatsoever, but instead pursues ends that are nonconceptual in content and represented by imagination. The necessity of these other forms of willing will be found in how the rational will emerges from them.

To address these options, it is worth critically examining the threefold delineation that Hegel gives them in his *Philosophy of Mind*. There Hegel outlines three stages that practical intelligence must undergo to reach the threshold of willing itself in its universality. He designates these stages as practical feeling (*praktische Gefühl*), impulses and choice (*die Triebe und die Willkür*), and happiness (*Glückseligkeit*).¹² Each involves a form of willing that does not yet determine itself as rational and free.¹³ Instead, they build successive steps in the will's liberation from bondage to external givens to which the will is necessarily afflicted at the outset.¹⁴

As stages in the conceptual determination of will, these forms have a dual relationship to one another. They stand in a genetic order, in which those conceptually antecedent to the others actually arise prior to those that follow upon them. What gives this genetic ordering any authority is a structural necessity according to which each prior form provides a prerequisite without which what follows cannot operate. Besides forming a genetic ordering, these stages in the will's development may equally concurrently occur. Each preceding stage may be incorporated in those that follow, such that impulse and choice involve practical feeling and the pursuit of happiness contains both practical feeling and impulse and choice. Second, the agent may pursue a later stage while simultaneously engaging in another form of willing.

The initial determination of will should comprise the minimal specification that can be given without any further features of will, but which is ingredient in all the rest. This minimal shape will have a temporal priority insofar as all successive aspects of will must presuppose its occurrence, both in each volition and in the development of each agent's practical intelligence. As such, the initial determination of will cannot be mediated by any volition. Instead of issuing from any act of

will, it will have a content given independently of volition. Nonetheless, it will comprise a necessary feature of every volition.

Feeling is mind's most basic aspect, comprising the given modification of mental content to which the psyche relates itself without disengaging and projecting it as something objective. Volition requires that mind have some mental content to be realized in objectivity by the agent, an intended state of affairs that may lie in a resulting product of the individual's embodied activity or simply in a performance by the individual. Before outwardly realizing some such inner content, the individual must register some subjective content *as an aim*, as a mental manifold poised to become subjective *and* objective in face of a world awaiting its realization. Doing so involves consciousness of an opposing objectivity, as well as awareness of the subjective content to be realized. Yet mind must further sense the discrepancy between inner and outer as something eliciting its practical response.

To have a mental content as an aim involves both apprehending that discrepancy and being poised to remove it. An aim is a *telos* that realizes itself, provided no external inference intercedes. It is not an antecedent cause of volition, but rather the subjective disposition within volition whose presence is a sufficient condition for undertaking the action that will realize it. Otherwise volition would be contingent upon something else, rather than self-initiating. Willing would then be reduced to a mechanistic behavior, in which ends get supplanted by prior causes that have no intrinsic connection to the agent. By contrast, the aim figures as a determining element contained in the process of volition without rendering willing contingent upon something external. Unlike mechanistic movement, which is determined from without with indifference to what kind of thing gets moved, volition only applies to agents who, as such, have living perceiving bodies and pleasures and displeasures. Consequently, volition can remain a process that moves itself, given its specific nature.¹⁵

In this respect, volition begins with intelligence finding itself to have specific aims, factors which belong to mind, but equally refer to an objectification that intelligence represents to itself and immediately leans toward achieving. Because these aims are, to begin with, immediately given, rather than a product of volition, the will is initially a natural agency, possessing drives, appetites, and inclinations through which it finds itself determined by nature.¹⁶ These given contents are the agent's own, but they equally have the externality of not yet being determined by willing. Because these aims are immediately given, they lack any mediating connections other than the purely formal bond

of belonging to one and the same individual. They otherwise stand independent of one another and the agent can be said to have one as well as another, with, as Hegel puts it, nothing but “also” being their connector.¹⁷

Practical feeling

As immediately and minimally given, the aim of volition has a mental reality that can be aptly characterized as a practical feeling. At the outset of volition, the agent is aware of having an aim in apprehending a modification of its own mental realm that, as immediate, has no relation to other aims or to any practical principles that might qualify its end. Feeling, by itself, informs mind only of its own modifications as immediately given in all their personal singularity. For this reason, feeling can engage the psyche without the intentionality of consciousness or any awareness of the subject-object identity underlying every aspect of intelligence. Nevertheless once intelligence and consciousness supervene upon the psyche, feeling gets conjoined with conscious perception and intelligent representation. Feeling becomes practical in this wider mental context when mind registers its own immediate singular response to having an aim and perceiving the degree of fulfillment of that aim in the world. Feeling rendered practical is *emotion*. Practical feeling or emotion is practical *intelligence* because it necessarily responds to mind’s awareness of the fit of the subjective content of an immediately given aim to the objective state of affairs to which that aim refers. What renders this response a practical *feeling* is the immediacy and personal singularity it possesses. Although the practical feeling is based upon a perception of the world condition that relates to the individual’s aim, that feeling directly registers pleasure or displeasure as the case may be, rather than invoking any principle or rendering any judgment.

The pleasure and displeasure of practical feeling are not equivalent to their counterparts when appetite is at stake. Appetite is a relation of self-consciousness insofar as appetite desires the annihilation of the independent otherness of the object of appetite, assimilating it into the subject, who is conscious of itself in virtue of eliminating this other. By contrast, practical feeling takes pleasure in the objective realization of an aim, which involves the individual apprehending how its aim has become something both subjective and objective. Practical feeling comprises the sentiment that occasions such objectification, without yet involving any such action upon the world. Practical feeling can

comprise a first form of volition, as well as the threshold for further development, insofar as it has a self-determination, but one restricted to feeling its own sensation of the fit between the given aim of the individual and the world it faces. This fit is not a theoretical matter of insuring that representations match reality, but a practical concern for how far reality matches subjective aim.

As such, practical feeling is formal in that the sentiment it has may possess any singular content.¹⁸ Just as one agent may have different aims from any other, so the common world they face may please some but not others, with aims and corresponding feelings liable to change at any moment. Accordingly, practical feeling, that is, emotion, can accompany every development of practical mind, from the first inchoate urges of thoughtless behavior to the pursuit of aims according with rational principle, but of itself, it comprises simply the subjective sentiment given at the outset of any volition.

Because it forms the subjective starting point of volition, and therefore cannot already be mediated by will, practical feeling will vindicate itself as such through the ensuing action of which it forms the beginning. On the other hand, because practical feeling is given, it is equally determined externally, affected by outside factors that impinge upon it. These include everything in the anthropological formation of the individual that affects its felt wants, as well as every contingent circumstance that bears upon the correspondence of aim and world. The will, as practical feeling, therefore unites its immediate determinate being as an affection originating from without with its character as something that determines its worldly existence through its own nature. Since intelligence has come to treat its own subjectivity as having objective significance, volition's character as self-determining is what *ought* to be. Hence, the foreign determinacy facing the individual *should* correspond with that character. The feeling of this correspondence is the pleasant and the feeling of the lack of correspondence is the unpleasant.¹⁹

Because the inner determinacy to which the affection is related is still immediate, belonging to my given, natural individuality, it is subjective and can be only felt, lacking any objective determinacy to be sensed or intuited. Since the basis of comparison is a subjective given, to which the externally determined affection should correspond, whether I feel something to be pleasant is in itself no reason for it to be right or good, granted that these are not merely subjective designations.²⁰

Practical feeling does not itself *make* subjectivity and objectivity coincide—it rather registers in sentiment the given correspondence between mind's own immediate singular inward content with the

existing world it confronts. What confirms the practical, rather than intuitively theoretical character of this self-discovery, is that the correspondence become something that ought to be objectively produced by mind. When practical feeling passes over into impulse, mind is ready to make what ought to be its product the result of an actual intervention in the way of the world.²¹

Impulse

The transition from practical feeling to impulse is immediate since once the agent feels the discrepancy between its aim and the world, it has the urge to remove that incongruence. That urge immediately proceeds from practical feeling because whatever aims the subject finds itself to have and finds unrealized in the world figure as ends only by driving the subject to bring about their fulfillment. Yet because impulse still precedes the actual achievement of the agent's aim in the world, it is just as subjective as the practical feeling that provides its occasion.

Nevertheless it is important to distinguish the subjectivity of impulse from that of appetite. As Hegel points out, impulse differs from appetite in two correlative respects.²² First, appetite is simply a function of self-consciousness, caught within consciousness' constitutive opposition between subjective and objective. This is exhibited in how appetite makes consciousness aware of the self in the purely negative act of obliterating some independent object of desire by consuming it, thereby assimilating it into the subject. Secondly, because appetite produces nothing subsisting, but instead eliminates some object, appetite is a merely individual, fleeting engagement that provides a momentary singular satisfaction that disappears once it is achieved. Impulse, by contrast, is a function of intelligence, which, as such, always concerns something both subjective and objective. Consequently, whatever satisfactions impulse provides have the inherent durability of an objectively embodied end. To the extent that the satisfaction of impulse involves pleasant feelings, these comprise an extended series of satisfactions corresponding to the persisting embodiment of the end to which impulse drives the agent. Nonetheless, as Hegel notes,²³ because the content of impulse derives from the subjective singularity of practical feeling, the universality each impulse has in relation to its enduring satisfactions remains particular. Although the agent, in acting upon impulse, secures a relatively enduring fulfillment lasting beyond the momentary satisfaction of appetite, this still remains something different from the fulfillment of the agent's other impulses,

not to mention those of others. Consequently, not only is there no necessary conformity between the impulses of different subjects, but the impulses of each agent have no intrinsic harmony with one another.

Moreover, each impulse is susceptible to multifarious realizations. On the one hand, the fulfillment of an impulse may vary according to changes in the situation intuited by the agent. On the other hand, one and the same situation can allow for various possible fulfillments of the same impulse. Accordingly, although each impulse is particular in character, it is universal in relation to the plurality of its possible fulfillments, which are contingent upon both what circumstances confront the agent and how the agent perceives and reacts to them.²⁴

Hence, if any aim is to be realized, the agent must commit to some impulse rather than another, as well as to some specific option for fulfilling the selected impulse. The contingent plurality of impulses confronts the agent with choosing among them and their realizations in order to carry through any volition. If the individual were unable to make this dual selection, impulse would remain no more than an instinctual drive. Nonetheless, instinct need not have the last word. Intelligence provides the individual with sufficient resources to engage in the double determination of choice whereby the agent opts for some impulse as well as for some determinate way of acting upon it. Intuition and representation enable any individual to be aware of its urges, consider them in distinction from one another and in relation to the world, and imagine a plurality of options for fulfilling one or another. The habituation of the psyche already provides a mastery of the body, whereas the subject-object opposition of consciousness and intelligence's awareness of contents that are both subjective and objective enables mind to tackle the translation of subjective aim into objective realization. On these bases, the recourse to choice is inescapable. Nothing can be willed unless the agent decides which impulse to follow and how to fulfill it.

Choice

Practical feeling thus engenders urges from which volition must choose. If that choice were contingent upon antecedent conditions, the teleological character of impulse would be defeated. Although the impulse might tend to drive the individual to commit actions for the sake of some aim, if that tendency could never realize itself unless subject to

some external necessitation, behavior finally would be decided by that contingency. What saves volition from such reduction to a mechanical process is the groundlessness of choice. Choice is self-initiated, opting from among impulses without being impelled to do so. Reproductive and productive imagination provide practical intelligence with representations of its different impulses and their possible implementations, and mind's power of attention allows for focusing upon one option to the exclusion of others, with or without the contribution of discursive reflection. On this basis, practical intelligence need only take the further step of making the chosen impulse its own and embodying it in directed action.

Choice, however, does not generate the impulses from among which it chooses. These impulses are contents given to it, leaving choice formal, exercising the same capacity no matter what it chooses. This is the case because what can be chosen cannot be derived from the form of choosing, which is open to an indeterminate range of independently given options. Although choice is dependent upon a given array of impulses in order to have anything from which to choose, its choice is otherwise independent of external necessitation. For this reason, choice can remain purposive in character, precipitating action that is done not **because of any antecedent condition, but because of what end has been chosen.**

Although purpose is intrinsic to choice, it would be a mistake to confuse the logic of choice with teleology. Purposive action follows from choice, but choice itself does not opt for an end as a realization of some antecedent end. Choice instead independently decides what end to seek in the first place. This exercise of freedom, however, is formal insofar as choice does not engender its ends, but selects them from among given alternatives. Because choice does not engender the options it chooses, it is a faculty, whose potential to choose is always actualized in whatever particular course of action gets chosen. As such, choice is a natural volition, having a character given antecedently to every exercise of will. This natural faculty is able to stand over and above all the options from which it is free to choose, including both its different aims and the different ways of implementing each. Instead of being immediately captive to any particular urge and any particular satisfaction of that urge, choice can select at will from their multitude and their multitudinous realizations. Nonetheless, because choice does not possess any intrinsic ends, but must find the content of its ends in the independently given array of urges, the freedom of choice is purely formal.

This incongruence between the particular content of given ends and the indeterminacy of the choosing self makes the determination of choice a poor semblance of self-determination. Self-determination involves reflexivity whereby determiner and determined are one. By contrast, in choice, none of the contents chosen among can correspond to the will, just as in none of them can the will be truly itself, as opposed to something external.²⁵ Substituting one option for another can never remove this discrepancy, for each choice is just as externally given as any other. Holding to the indeterminacy of undecidedness is no remedy, for the will that hesitates to choose remains an empty subjective capacity that fails to determine itself.²⁶

Significantly, the capacity of choice requires no discursive intelligence. Feeling, intuition, and imagination are sufficient for mind to present itself with the options of impulses and implementations from which to select. For this reason, both dumb animals and pre-linguistic children can choose, provided they have enough intelligence and bodily control to imagine their options and decide which to follow. Indeed, without the pre-linguistic natural choosing will, individuals would be unable to decide which commonly observed objects to designate to one another, or which intuitable factor to employ as a sign for that purpose. Once, however, the choices are made initiating linguistic communication, agents can choose with thought.

Drives and inclinations, as well as the circumstances affecting their fulfillment, are all given without any mediating principle guaranteeing their successful and harmonious satisfaction, be it by one individual or many. Insofar as the pursuit of one drive may hinder the pursuit of others, the choosing will finds itself embroiled in a morass of conflicting impulses.²⁷ Can the will somehow escape the conflicted pursuit of particular impulses, despite the abiding formality of its choosing agency? The turn to happiness provides the one remaining stratagem for practical intelligence.

The will to happiness

To will to be happy may not involve willing on principle, but it does require representing an end that transcends the singularity of a particular impulse. Choice, as such, simply directs action to some particular fulfillment of an impulse to the exclusion of others. Yet since choice is equally free of bondage to the impulse it elects, whatever choice is made is but an instance of a general capacity that can always pursue something else. To act, the agent must choose some particular aim, yet

each choice is ready to give way to some different option, ad infinitum. The natural will might seem condemned to this endless repetition, in which each choice is followed by an equally dispensable successor. Yet the agent imagines its own predicament, simply by being aware of all its own ends and choices. The practical intelligence of the choosing will can therefore aim to fulfill its impulses in their totality, to the extent that this is possible. To do so, practical intelligence must make its aim happiness.

This might seem to require full-fledged thought, insofar as happiness has universality, like a class under which its members are subsumed. Happiness, however, subsumes all the independently given impulses and their projected fulfillments under its encompassing end. The harmonious realization in which happiness seeks to unite them is posterior to these impulses, whose empirically given content provide the unity of happiness with its filling. To pursue happiness, the agent must therefore *imagine* how to accomplish this compatible, general, goal, reflecting upon both the given plurality of drives and the contingent circumstances for achieving their global satisfaction.

Nonetheless, imagining happiness is not analogous to any single pleasant feeling signifying the satisfaction of a single drive. Happiness is a **universal end**, aiming beyond any momentary satisfaction to a **totality of enjoyment**. As such, the ideal of happiness is something **universal**, standing higher than all particular impulse satisfactions. Yet because happiness comprises a universal satisfaction to which the choosing individual aspires, it lacks any necessary concrete filling of its own, but depends upon the contingent variegation of given impulses and circumstances to provide the material whose total satisfaction it aims to accomplish.²⁸ Thereby conditioned upon the subjectivity and feeling of a particular individual, the end of happiness is itself particular and contingent.²⁹ What is happiness for one individual need not be the happiness that individual seeks at a later time, let alone match the happiness sought by anyone else.

Because impulses have a given particularity, as well as a contingent transience, their fulfillments stand in potential opposition to one another. The pursuit of happiness cannot involve affirmative commitment to every impulse fulfillment. Instead, opting for happiness requires mediating the conflict of impulse realizations. This entails fulfilling those impulses that can be implemented in harmony with one another, but, where this is impossible, sacrificing some impulse satisfactions in favor of others. Deciding how to do this involves grappling with the qualitative and quantitative differences of impulses and their

satisfactions. Because these are variable and contingent, no objective universal prescriptions can be given. Instead, each agent must ultimately rely upon subjective feeling and preference to decide wherein happiness is to be sought.³⁰ Whatever the subject resolves, the pursuit of happiness remains a problematic undertaking, where no choices can secure an objective fulfillment of impulse in general.³¹ However happiness be sought, some impulses remain unfulfilled and frustrated by the fulfillment of others, while new impulses arise calling for further action.³²

Because happiness promises a general fulfillment of impulse, it cannot be aimed at unless one is able to entertain a universal end, which must be thought to be pursued. Consequently, only agents with linguistic intelligence can represent happiness as an end and seek to be happy. Nonetheless, acting for the sake of happiness is not equivalent to an exercise of free will, or what might be called practical reason. Practical intelligence, whether choosing to fulfill particular impulses or to attain happiness, lacks three correlative features constitutive of actual self-determination: a unity of form and content, objectivity, and freedom as an end.

The pursuit of happiness, like the pursuit of particular impulses, lacks a unity of form and content because the willing of each of these ends is different in form from the ends themselves. In each case, the achievement of satisfaction is a result of action, making general happiness as well as particular pleasures consequences of a willing that extinguishes itself in fulfilling these ends.³³

Further, the ends of impulse and happiness are subjective, being relative to the given inclinations of the individual and still lacking objectification in actual fulfillments. These inclinations, taken individually or integrated into the goal of happiness, have no necessary relation to those of any other agent, nor any necessary satisfaction. The happiness of each individual may just as well impede the happiness of others as have its fulfillment blocked by the pursuits of other agents or other externalities.

This predicament reflects how the pursuit of happiness and acting on particular impulses fails to have freedom as an end. So long as action aims at impulse satisfactions that are distinct from the activity that brings them about, willing lacks the reflexivity that enables a free will to will its own freedom, that is, to be self-determined.

Although practical intelligence retains these three deficiencies throughout its development from practical feeling to choice and the pursuit of happiness, mind has hereby attained all it needs to bring

closure to "Subjective Spirit" by ushering in the reality of freedom comprising "Objective Spirit's" domain of normative conduct.

From happiness to objective freedom

In §480 of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel suggests that for freedom to be actual, practical intelligence must relinquish its particular determinacy as well as the abstract individuality of choice. Although happiness to some extent removes the particularity of impulse by comprising a general satisfaction of all impulses, that general satisfaction still rests upon the given content of impulses, to which happiness still relates. Similarly, although happiness comprises a totality of desire satisfactions, all remain contingent givens external to the faculty of choice employed to select how to be happy. In this sense, choice just as much gives itself these aims in pursuing happiness while leaving these particular aims without any necessary connection to its pursuit of happiness. What overcomes the particular givenness of the ends of happiness and the abstract individuality of the agency of practical intelligence is the will's aiming at its own universal determination, its concept. By willing itself as its end, the will determines itself by itself **and in terms of itself**. As end of itself, the self or unity of the will **concretely contains its whole content, which is itself as self-determined**. **In this way, the form and content, the concept and object of the will become identical.**³⁴

In so determining itself, the will is the *actual* free will in two interconnected respects. First, the self-determining will is not a capacity, like the faculty of choice which is merely potentially determining. Insofar as the will that wills itself as free does so only in the activity of realizing its own concept, it is inherently actual. Second, because the free will is what it determines itself to be, it does not exist apart from its characteristic activity. The free will is therefore an actuality, not a faculty, capacity, or potentiality.

When the will wills itself as free, it corresponds to its object by determining that object and being determined in function of that object. Just as theoretical intelligence determines itself to conform to its object, so the free will determines itself to accord with its object—*itself as self-determining*. Similarly, just as practical intelligence determines its object to conform to intelligence, so the free will determines its object—*itself as free*—to accord with the agency that aims at this its end. Both types of accordance simultaneously apply since what gets determined and what does the determining coincide in self-determination.³⁵

This coincidence of determiner and determined in free willing eliminates the abiding subjectivity that afflicted practical intelligence so long as it did not aim at self-determination by willing its own concept. By pursuing particular impulses or their integration in happiness, practical intelligence aimed at something different from itself, insuring that no necessary connection can hold between its volition and its ends. With the form of willing differing from its content, the object of willing is extraneous to what is inherent in volition, to its concept. The ends of willing therefore remain particular and contingent, rather than genuinely universal and rational. The will is left other-determined rather than self-determined and lacks any necessary objectivity.

Self-determination, universality of end, unity of form and content, and objectivity thus all go together. When practical intelligence succeeds in making these features its own, mind achieves an objectivity of its own, a reality of freedom.

These connections underlie Hegel's claim that the will is the true free will only as thinking intelligence.³⁶ In every case of self-determined conduct, the will wills itself in its universal determination. In willing this its concept, the will makes its end what is intrinsic to itself, rather than how it is contingently determined. Only then does the will will nothing but itself and achieve an objectivity that is its own. For this reason, the thinking will is not only self-determined but just as much true and objective. The free will is true insofar as what it wills is identical with itself, in accord with its concept.³⁷ The free will is equally objective insofar as it has realized itself without retaining a subjectivity alien to its content in the way in which the choosing will remains an abstract capacity whose selected ends derive from something external.³⁸ The objective will contains truth because the will has won an objectivity in accord with its concept when it achieves self-determination.³⁹

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is the comprehensive development of how the thinking will, willing itself as true and objective, involves willing oneself as a bearer of rights, exercising a prerogative of choice that is universal. Rights can only be engaged in through recognition of and facilitation of the same prerogative on the part of other agents. Every exercise of rights is a lawful willing, exhibiting a type of agency common to all bearers of rights within the correlation of right and duty where every entitled volition proceeds in respect of the equal opportunity of others to engage in the same type of willing. Within the practice of rights, each participant wills its own artificial agency as a right holder, making the type of choices (for example, dispositions of property, moral conduct, family activity, social involvements, and political engagement)

whose ends are specific to the lawful practices to which they belong. Although all participants will in relation to other agents, this relation to other is not a restriction upon their willing of themselves, but rather the enabling condition that allows them all to realize the self-determination in which they are correlatively engaged. In relating to other bearers of rights in respect of their entitlements, each participant exercises its own entitlement and determines itself as the autonomous agent it can permissibly be in that context. Self-related in its relation to other, the free will is truly infinite and fully actual.⁴⁰ The other volitions to which it must relate in exercising its rights only refer the self-determined will back to itself, because what others do in exercising their rights is respect the rights of their peers. Hence, each self-determined will confronts an objectivity ratifying, rather than bounding, its own freedom. This objectivity contains its own self-determination in lawful relation to that of all other participants in the exercise of rights. Because these relations exist in acts of will, the free will is only in the activity of its self-determination. The moment it withdraws from that activity, it reverts to the finite, subjective capacity of practical intelligence, which all agents possess independently of their participation in conventions of right. Practical intelligence's faculty of choice can, however, always reenter the lawful practice of self-determination when interactions of right are re-engaged by a plurality of agents. That move cannot be undertaken unilaterally. It is instead an intersubjective undertaking whose coordinated exercise of choice comprises the practical transition from practical intelligence to objective spirit. In both theory and practice, it brings the philosophy of mind, that is, the philosophy of subjective spirit, to closure.

7

Beyond the Sociality of Reason: From Davidson to Hegel

The problematic of modern epistemology

Modern epistemology has taken its cue from what appears so natural that friend and foe alike tend to identify its prospects with those of epistemology per se. What could be more evident than regarding knowing to relate through its knowledge claims to an independently given object that serves as their standard of truth? The rationale for this view is simple. To grant epistemology its own topic, knowing needs to be given apart from its object, so that cognition can be investigated by itself without equally investigating particular objects. To command objectivity, cognition has to be distinguished from what it claims to know. If that distinction were absent, knowing could neither be examined apart from its object nor have any independent standard against which to certify the nonsubjective validity of its claims. Accordingly, knowing, as a possible topic of epistemology, is representational by nature, treating its own contents as intermediaries, directly accessible to its own scrutiny, but indirectly accessing the independently given object with which they must accord to have truth. Knowing cannot fail to have immediate access to its own representations, since otherwise it would need some other intermediary, which, if not itself directly accessible, would generate an infinite regress of mediating terms barring knowing from ever addressing any content. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and its object leaves cognition's relation to the object mediated by terms that represent, rather than comprise, what they claim to know. Consequently, knowing must compare its knowledge claims with the object in order to establish their validity. Although cognition may have direct access to its own representations, in order to compare them with their object, cognition must somehow

bridge the gap and bring the object under its purview. The moment knowing compares the object with its representations to certify their accuracy, the object is no longer given as something independent of knowing, but enters into the comparison only as it is once more represented by knowing. Hence, on its own terms, representational knowing cannot achieve what it must do to establish the truth of its knowledge claims.¹ So long as knowing represents what it knows, it can never successfully certify the match of its representations with their own standard of truth.

The representational model of knowing, the opposition of consciousness, and the problem of foundationalism

This predicament of the representational model of knowing can well seem natural to the extent that it models the defining subject/object opposition of consciousness, that shape of mind that distinguishes its own mental content from itself as determinations of an objectivity to which it stands opposed as a disengaged subjective standpoint. Not surprisingly, the pioneers of modern epistemology tend to identify mind with consciousness, facilitating the conflation of cognition in **general with representational knowing**. In so doing, they neglect the **spheres of mind that ill fit the mold of consciousness**: first of all, the **psyche, which feels its own psycho-physical modifications without distinguishing subject and object**, and then discursive intelligence, which engages in the intersubjective process of language, whereby thinking can conceive and express thoughts that just might not figure as representations of independently given objects. If consciousness were the all-encompassing framework of cognition, it might make sense to identify the intentionality of cognition with representation and to identify the correspondence of truth with the confrontation between representations and the independent given to which they putatively refer. If, however, the psyche and discursive intelligence are irreducible to consciousness, it may be just as natural to grant that thought can be about what it thinks without involving any accurate fit of representations, as well as to allow for a correspondence of concept and objectivity whose truth involves no confrontation between representations inhabiting an inner arena of awareness and a world beyond consciousness.

Although modern epistemology may baptize its representational model of knowing by conflating mind and consciousness, its defining distinction between knowing and object of knowledge does not limit

the comparison between belief and standard of truth to an opposition between something mental and something physical. The represented object may be putatively "objective", "subjective", or "intersubjective" without removing the constitutive difference that makes the validity of knowledge depend upon securing correspondence between what knowing is certain of, its own representation, and what is given apart from knowing. Accordingly, what is to be validated against the standard of truth need not be ontologically incommensurate. The normative activities seeking justification may be just as worldly as the standard against which they measure themselves.² The problem of representation still applies so long as what lays claim to validity has validity conferred upon it by some independently given factor. With that the case, the certification of validity will involve confrontation between some legitimating standard and a belief or practice in need of legitimation.

For this reason, the problem of modern epistemology can be more generally formulated as the problem of foundationalism, a problem applying not just to knowledge claims but also to any practice involving normativity. Just as representation seems natural to knowing, so foundationalism seems natural to justification. So long as validity is thought to depend upon providing reasons to justify what is held to be valid, validity is construed in foundational terms, where what enjoys validity does so by being determined by some distinct independently given factor that exercises the privilege of conferring validity. Identifying justification with foundational validation, however, presents as daunting a dilemma as identifying cognition with representation. If what allows something to be justified is another factor comprising the foundation of its validity, the privileged foundation can never satisfy its own validity requirement without canceling its own foundational role. This is because, to be valid, the foundation that confers validity must have its validity conferred in the same way that justified terms enjoy their validity—that is, the foundation must be grounded upon itself. If, however, the foundation can be valid only by deriving validity from itself, the distinction between what possesses validity and what confers validity is eliminated. For if the foundation of validity must found its own normativity, validity can no longer derive from an independently given privileged term, as foundationalism requires.

These dilemmas haunt all attempts by modern epistemology to retain representation, yet redeem knowledge against skeptical challenge.

The futility of modern epistemology's defense of representation against skepticism

Appeal to any causal relation between object and representation cannot suffice to bridge their gap and guarantee correspondence. Every ploy from Locke onward to treat representations as impressions, caused by an independently given object, presumes that cognition can immediately access the cause of its contents, at least to the degree of certifying that cause's existence and its character as cause. Even if these certifications could count as more than representations that determine the object only as it appears to knowing, they still do not guarantee that the causal relationship itself insures that what causes representations can only cause ones that accurately correspond.

No remedy is provided by the converse strategy of bringing objectivity into representation by identifying the awareness of representations with the being of what they represent. Descartes may escape the problem of bridging any gap between subject and object by construing self-consciousness as the representation of something whose existence consists in being represented. Yet even if the representation of my self as self-conscious comprises the very existence of self-consciousness, solipsism cannot be overcome if all other representations represent something transcending their own representation. Berkeleyian idealism tries to evade this limitation by conflating all existence with being represented. Yet if representation is immediately the being of what is represented, consciousness can hardly escape reduction to self-consciousness, leaving solipsism unimpeached. When Berkeley appeals to the Divine to rescue objectivity and intersubjectivity, he is only confirming how representation forfeits objective truth if it cannot retain the difference between itself and that with which it seeks to correspond. This remains the stumbling block of any coherence theory that seeks truth in the relation of beliefs to one another, without securing any correspondence between belief and object of belief.

These difficulties drive the transcendental turn, pioneered by Kant, which seeks to escape the incoherence of causal explanation of representation without reducing objectivity to subjectivity. The representational model still provides the point of departure, in that all direct appeal to the given is foresworn upon the assumption that knowing is determined in its own right apart from what any object may be in itself. Since the truth of representation cannot be secured by bridging the gap between subject and object, the only avenue left seems to be to refrain from making any direct claims about objectivity and instead turn to

investigate knowing, whose own representations are at least directly accessible. Yet if the truth of representations cannot be confirmed by direct comparison with their objects, no preliminary investigation of cognition would seem any more capable of establishing the possibility and limits of objective knowledge, for how can examination of the instrument of knowing bear upon its truth if the turn to investigate representation leaves out of account the very object providing its only standard of correctness?

The proposed answer, of course, is that knowledge of knowing can establish cognition's objectivity provided the object of knowing is determined by the structure of knowing. In that case, examining cognition can reveal what knowing puts into its object and thereby secure knowledge of objectivity so far as it is constructed by the structure of cognition. Moreover, this knowledge is not just available to the transcendental investigator. Insofar as knowing has immediate access to its own representations, cognition cannot fail to know what it has constructed as its object. On this basis, epistemology can be foundational, supplanting ontology as first philosophy, not by serving as a preliminary to a further metaphysical account of being, but by including within itself a doctrine of knowable objectivity as it is constituted by knowing.

Constructed rather than contemplated, objectivity automatically obtains a very distinctive character, duly acknowledged by Kant and his epigones. If objectivity is knowable only insofar as it is determined by the structure of knowing, objectivity will be conditioned and governed by an external necessity imparted by the determining shape of cognition. Further, since the same structure of cognition would determine all objects of knowledge, no matter what they are, objectivity will not consist of a realm of embodied forms, where things are defined by necessary natures, distinguishing them from one another and allowing for hierarchical organization into genera and species. Instead, all objects will be determined alike, that is, they will be governed by law, law that lays hold of objects irrespective of their specific form, which is to say, with respect to their matter. Consequently, the material law of constructed objectivity will leave no place for the spontaneity of agency or for the teleological determination of life and beauty.

Given these prospects for a constructed objectivity, what can cognition find in its representations that can convey more than the subjectivity of being perceived? Since knowing has immediate access to its representations, but no access to their putative object, their content cannot provide any mark that can signify something other than itself. If representations are to succeed in referring to objects, their objective

reference must instead lie in their relations to one another. Since, however, the relations among representations might merely be arbitrary, the only way any connection can signify something nonsubjective is if it can be shown to be necessary in character. Since the content of individual representations has nothing immediately nonsubjective in character, the relations cannot owe their necessity to that which each representation putatively represents. Instead, the necessity in the connection of representations must be given independently of what they are, laying hold of features, such as spatiotemporal ordering, that are indifferent to their form. Moreover, the necessity in such connection of representations cannot be derived from any connections in things themselves, which cannot be directly accessed. The necessity of certain relations of representations must be rooted in subjectivity itself. The very immediate access to representations must itself entail the connections among them that can count as nonsubjective relations of an objective world. If representation be construed in terms of consciousness, then self-consciousness must itself be possible only thanks to the necessary connecting of representations allowing for consciousness of objectivity. Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories provides an account of just such an interconnection between self-consciousness and objective constitution, showing how the unity of consciousness on which all awareness of representations depends is bound up with the necessary synthesis of representations by which objects of knowledge are given.

Although this strategy seeks to bring objectivity into subjectivity without collapsing their difference, the transcendental turn remains hobbled by the same objectivity problem and foundationalism that plagues modern epistemology in all its forms.

On the one hand, so long as objectivity is knowable because it is a construct of subjectivity, the correctness of representation remains relative to the structure of knowing. That structure may mandate necessary connections among representations by means of which a distinction can be drawn between subjective and nonsubjective associations, but the necessity that supposedly transcends subjectivity is still conditioned by cognition. Acknowledging this dependence, be it under the rubric of "transcendental idealism" or "internal realism", retains reference to something in itself transcending constructed objectivity, something to which knowing can have no legitimate access, yet to which it must refer to be merely cognition of what is for it.

On the other hand, because knowledge is secured only for what is a construct of the structure of knowing, that structure is itself beyond the

field of valid cognition. Even if representations may be immediately accessible, the connecting process by which they convey something objective is not itself an object for that cognition. The conditioning structure of cognition just as much transcends the horizon of knowledge it makes possible as does the independently given object in itself, whose residual presence allows accessible objectivity to be merely a construct. Indeed, because constituted objectivity cannot include anything not subject to external necessity, the constituting activity of the structure of knowing is simply incommensurate with the material lawfulness to which objects of knowledge are confined.

These parallel difficulties encourage transcendental investigation to bring the conditions of knowing into the objectivity they constitute, so that knowledge of these conditions is no more problematic than that of the objects they make possible. This imperative underlies the linguistic turn and all similar developments in transcendental argument that substitute worldly processes for the noumenal subjectivity with which Kant first construed the transcendental conditions of knowing. Giving cognition an object-like character may remove the problem of accessing a noumenal subjectivity, beyond the reach of knowledge, but it brings into focus a difficulty that plagues any transcendental argument. If the constituting structures of cognition are characterized in objective terms, as real practices belonging to the same objectivity they putatively determine, they cannot retain the Archimedean role on which transcendental constitution depends. By belonging to the world and having their own worldly character, the conditions of knowing are marked by a givenness of their own that cannot be the result of their constituting function, but which must precede it and be accessible only through the illegitimate direct reference to the given that the transcendental turn is seeking to avoid. This problem comes to the fore when the knowing that knows what it constructs is characterized in the same fashion as its own constructions. Yet the problem is equally at hand when the conditions of knowing are kept outside the objectivity they construct. Even then, these conditions must be ascribed two sets of features that precede their constitution of objects of knowledge. On the one hand, the conditions have a characterization comprising some particular construal of cognitive process. On the other hand, however these conditions be described, they are ascribed the transcendental privilege of constituting the objectivity to which they refer. Both moves involve disputable claims that the transcendental investigator makes in order to establish what can be known legitimately. In other words, transcendental argument makes foundational claims about the structure

of knowing that it privileges, claims that cannot be grounded in the way the knowledge it allegedly makes possible is grounded. Instead of evading the appeals to the given that illicitly bridge the gap between representation and object in itself, the transcendental investigator makes direct reference to knowing and then privileges what is allegedly found by making it the foundation for all further knowledge. This is the basic blunder of foundational epistemology, the blunder ultimately undermining any redemption of modern epistemology.

The critical convergence of Davidson and Hegel

Among past and present philosophers, Hegel and Davidson stand out for their thoroughgoing critique of the salient dilemmas of modern epistemology. Both recognize the basic absurdity of the representational model of knowing, which, by construing cognition as an instrument for accessing independently given objects, creates a gap that can never be coherently bridged. Both recognize that no causal relation between representations and their object can surmount that separation and serve as valid evidence for the truth of knowledge. Both equally realize that no coherence theory of truth can achieve objectivity so long as beliefs relate only to one another within a domain severed from anything other than itself. Both further dismiss the rescue strategy of transcendental argument. Just as Hegel shows how Kant's reference to a thing-in-itself and noumenal subjectivity reinstates the incoherent appeal to the given that haunts any construction of objectivity from subjectivity, so Davidson pillories internal realism and the idea of conceptual schemes for relativizing knowable objectivity and thereby retaining the self-defeating representational separation of knowing from the given.³ Moreover, both acknowledge the futility of seeking foundations for knowledge and reject all search for any intermediaries between belief and object that could secure correspondence.

Yet whereas both Hegel and Davidson repudiate the whole project of modern epistemology, neither regards its failure as signaling the triumph of skepticism. Although both unmask the untenability of construing truth as an accurate fit between representation and its object, they do not abandon correspondence. Hegel no more identifies the correspondence of truth with the "correctness" of representation than Davidson identifies correspondence with confrontation.⁴ Both instead uphold notions of correspondence allowing for knowledge of objectivity that is neither secured by appeal to the given nor limited by prior structures of cognition. Moreover, both acknowledge an intrinsic connection between thought and language as well as the intersubjectivity of discursive intelligence.

Nonetheless, what Davidson offers as an alternative to representational epistemology is starkly different from what Hegel understands to result from overcoming the opposition of consciousness and thereby eliminating foundational justification.

Has Davidson overcome transcendental argument?

At first glance, Davidson appears to offer but another replay of the linguistic version of foundational epistemology, turning to the interpretive process by which meaning is determined in language so as to establish how belief can be veridical. Thereby Davidson seemingly commits the cardinal sins of transcendental argument: first directly reading off the given character of the foundations of meaning determination and then privileging them as what constitutes the objectivity of belief. Just as the turn to investigate knowing describes the conditions of knowing in a direct fashion at odds with its own indirect construction of objectivity, so Davidson here immediately appeals to the given reality of interpretation while seeming to derive the objectivity of belief from the workings of communication. Moreover, in purporting to have direct access to the process of meaning determination, Davidson allows the truth of belief to hinge upon a causal relation between commonly observed states of affairs and the assent to belief they are observed to prompt. In so doing, Davidson makes the key connection that appears to turn foundations of meaning into epistemological foundations: he joins the determination of meaning to the determination of the truth conditions of what is meant. Therefore, even if interpretation may sometimes be in error, by and large understanding the meaning of assertions will involve knowledge of their truth.⁵

The familiar dilemmas of transcendental argument appear inescapably at hand. Although the conditions of meaning interpretation are alleged to constitute the objectivity of belief, the foundational truth of these conditions is advanced without being shown to issue from the process it itself describes. On the other hand, if knowledge of these conditions were a product of their own prior operation, whatever objectivity that knowledge could claim would seem to be contingent upon its own antecedent assertion, leaving it as arbitrary as any other self-assumed foundation. Moreover, if Davidson's discourse about interpretation were itself to be veridical in the way in which it mandates the connection between belief and objectivity, his theory would be just another belief that might be erroneous even if belief is predominantly true. Yet if Davidson's account is to be taken seriously, his belief about interpretation must be one belief that cannot be mistaken.

By contrast, Hegel strictly refrains from granting the conditions of meaning, or, for that matter, the conditions of any other facet of rational agency, any bearing upon the truth of what they allow to be asserted. Hegel recognizes that there is no need to deny that thinking is impossible without the intersubjective process of language, the psychological preconditions of sign production and recognition, or any of the biological, chemical, physical, and astronomical conditions of intelligent life. Yet precisely because any such conditions enable thought to think whatever is thinkable, these enabling conditions cannot coherently provide a basis for distinguishing between the true and false thoughts they equally make possible. The key mistake of transcendental argument is to treat enabling conditions of rational agency as juridical conditions of knowledge, conduct, or beauty. The moment that step gets taken, normativity in reason, action, and art is made dependent upon a privileged foundation, which can never live up to its own validity requirement. To escape this problem, Hegel overcomes the opposition of consciousness by refraining from giving juridical status to any enabling conditions of knowledge. Instead of first investigating how interpretation might make belief veridical, Hegel turns to address what is at hand when no distinction is drawn between subject and object, when no conceptual scheme is contrasted with something given, when no assumptions are made concerning knowing or being, and when philosophical investigation makes no assumptions concerning method or subject matter. That language, consciousness, life, chemical bonding, solar activity, and countless other processes may accompany philosophy from its outset is, and must be held to be, completely irrelevant to the truth of whatever emerges. Otherwise, Hegel recognizes, the foundationalism of representational cognition will reappear with all its attendant absurdities. The very same considerations that Davidson directs against the relativity of conceptual schemes lead Hegel to the corollary conclusions that thought cannot have any conditions and that language must be such as to allow thought to think freely, without any external limitation. Consequently, when Hegel offers his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an introduction to philosophy proper, he is not engaging in some preliminary investigation of the conditions of meaning or knowledge, from which objectivity can be constituted. Rather, Hegel there observes how the foundational knowing of consciousness fails to justify its own knowledge claims, making manifest how the representational framework of cognition cannot legitimate its guiding claim that knowing must always have a presupposition, some given that counts as its standard of truth. When Hegel does conceive

mind and language, he does so as topics of the philosophy of reality (*Realphilosophie*), topics which have no epistemological or foundational significance.

Davidson's attempt to escape transcendental argument and overcome foundations

Although Davidson does not follow Hegel's route, Davidson clearly does not intend to retread the path of transcendental philosophers, be they psychologically or linguistically minded. He expressly maintains that the foundations of interpretation are not the foundations of knowledge.⁶ Similarly he emphatically affirms that whatever causal relation may hold between commonly observed states of affairs and assents to propositions that they are commonly observed to prompt does not confer truth upon the beliefs these propositions express. Instead of providing evidence, the causal relation serves only to fix the content that these beliefs have.⁷

What allows Davidson to offer these qualifications is the distinguishing equiprimordiality of meaning determination, belief, and objective knowledge in his account of interpretation. To the degree that the determination of meaning does not precede belief and objective knowledge, but itself involves belief formation and the satisfaction of the truth conditions of belief, none of these different factors either founds any of its counterparts or is grounded by them in turn. This coeval character underlies Davidson's corollary claim that self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and knowledge of objectivity are neither reducible to nor derivable from one another, but rather indissolubly bound up with one another. That interconnection, of course, stands in stark contrast to representational cognition, whose immediate access to its own representations and mediated confrontation with the given privileges first person knowledge while inviting skepticism of both knowledge of an objective world and of other minds. If, as Davidson suggests, self-knowledge cannot be had apart from veridical knowledge of an objective world in general and of other minds in particular, then the modern sources of skepticism would seem to be decisively overcome.

Yet how can the process of interpretation provide this triumph over the dilemmas of foundationalism? Davidson takes communication as his starting point and then attempts to show how what makes communication possible equally secures the veridical character of belief. As Davidson acknowledges, the possibilities of communication can be

understood in respect to three processes that successively condition one another.⁸ The first is the original emergence of language, which, if meaning, belief, and truth go hand in hand, equally comprises the original emergence of thought and the whole array of propositional attitudes constitutive of belief. The second process, which presupposes the rise of language, is that by which one acquires one's first language as a member of a preexisting linguistic community, thereby entering the realm of thought.⁹ The third, which presupposes language and personal language acquisition, is the process whereby one speaker interprets the meaning of another.

Although Davidson largely focuses on the last, as the typical situation within which beliefs are held and expressed, he duly recognizes that the emergence of language and the learning of one's first language must be accounted for if the veridicality of belief is to be built into communication.

The problem facing any account of the origin of language is the need to make intelligible the pre-linguistic situation and find within it sufficient resources to explain the rise of language. If reason is discursive intelligence, then the problem extends to characterizing prospective participants in the founding of language who must lack **speech and thought**, but possess the potential for both. Moreover, if **belief is, as Davidson upholds, a propositional attitude that makes an assertion with the understanding that an assertion can be either true or false**, belief is inherently conceptual and discursive, such that those who found language must not yet speak, think, or believe. What compounds the difficulty is the interdependence of beliefs, where the identifiability of any one co-implies the contrasting identification of others.

If one were to accept the assurances of representational cognition and allow for self-knowledge and thinking prior to speech and the interaction it implies, the problem might be less daunting. Given the absurdity of representational knowing, however, we must bite the bullet and allow for a plurality of individuals who can, but do not yet discourse, conceive, and affirm or deny.

Davidson points to a set of minimal capabilities that prospective rational agents must have and the minimal situation in which these capabilities can bring language and thought into being.¹⁰ The basic requirement is that there be a plurality of individuals who are sufficiently alike to be able to observe the same regularities in the world they share and be able to observe one another responding in some recognizably similar and regular way to these similar events.¹¹ This presupposes

that the commonly observable world present regularities in the first place, that individuals be able to observe and recognize these regularities, and that they make recognizably similar regular responses to them without having to conceive, talk, or make claims about either.

Although Davidson does not explain at any length how individuals can do all this in a pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual, pre-propositional-attitude condition, he does note how a creature can discriminate among perceived sensory properties, learn by altering its behavior in light of experience, and react in a patterned way to similar stimuli without bringing these "generalizations" to conceptualization and drawing the distinction between opinion and truth that belief involves.¹² In elaborating these insights, Davidson could well draw from the account of psyche and consciousness in Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*. Hegel there develops consciousness as a mental activity presupposing the embodied self-feeling of the psyche, situated in a natural world, but not necessarily involving discursive intelligence proper. Consciousness, Hegel maintains, can relate to its own mental content as determinations of an objectivity from which its standpoint has extricated itself only once the psyche has accustomed itself to its own repeated feelings, gaining sufficient distance to express itself in its body, and thereby face the content in which it is psychosomatically immersed as something other.¹³ On Hegel's account, consciousness may then sense **what is**, perceive **things and their properties**, understand the lawful succession of appearance, self-consciously desire, and recognize other desiring individuals, all without producing and employing signs in linguistic interaction.¹⁴

If all this can occur pre-linguistically, then individuals will be in a position to take the leap of conferring meaning to and interpreting the meaning of their responses, which, Davidson will argue, involves imputing beliefs to one another that by and large must exhibit knowledge of the common world to which they respond.¹⁵ Here is where Hegel and Davidson diverge. Hegel would certainly grant that conscious individuals can engage in linguistic interaction only by recognizing how commonly employed signs get associated with others to form propositions with commonly observed objective applications. He would also grant that language and the thought it makes possible cannot condition knowledge of objectivity, since any such conditioning would incoherently presuppose things-in-themselves, beyond the veil of relativizing conditions of interpretation, while laying claim to unconditioned knowledge of language and thought itself. Yet none of these considerations, Hegel would maintain, can guarantee that the beliefs speakers communicate must by and large be true.

At this juncture, where the preconditions of communication are mobilized in the emergence of language, the acquisition of a first language, and ongoing communication between competent speakers, the argument comes into play by which Davidson seeks to show how the interpretative process embedded in communication and thought guarantees that belief is largely veridical.

Given objective regularities commonly observable by individuals who respond with similar regularities in behavior observable by one another, the stage is set for these responses to communicate meaning. The meaning in question is not a picture mirroring the facts, as representational cognition might assume, but fundamentally propositional in character, giving expression to beliefs that are themselves propositional attitudes. As Davidson points out, to have a belief is to have the concept of a proposition that can be true as well as false.¹⁶ Since thought requires language for its determination and expression, and belief involves thought and not just images, belief and language are bound together.¹⁷ Individuals still do have access to their own beliefs without having to make inferences from observable behavior, as must be done to know the beliefs of others. Nevertheless because beliefs are themselves determinate only in having a definite linguistic expression, individuals can have no access to the content of beliefs, be it their own or that of others, apart from whatever process of interpretation enables sentences to have their meaning understood. Hence, although the content of representations may well be immediately available to the inner arena of consciousness, allowing for pre-linguistic awareness, the propositional attitudes of beliefs can only have their content through the mediation of language. To the extent that knowledge involves assent to propositions and not just consciousness of representations, first person knowledge, knowledge of the contents of one's own mind, will be interconnected with whatever other varieties of knowledge must be operative in communication.

In order for the representation of a linguistic expression to have meaning, that is, for an observed or thought proposition to have a communicable significance, its common understandability must be recognizable. This cannot be provided by an individual in isolation, since nothing within a putative linguistic expression taken in isolation can manifest its communicability any more than anything the individual may privately do with it.¹⁸ Only an inherently public connection of the expression with something else can give it determinate meaning. Public connection with other expressions whose meaning is already commonly established may provide a Rosetta stone for interpretation,

but that situation, of course, presupposes what must be explained. Instead, a more basic situation must be invoked, one that will involve shared observation of prompted assent, where a publicly expressed proposition is recognizably affirmed in relation to a commonly observed state of affairs. That situation can determine the content of a proposition and the belief it expresses to the extent that those who understand that content recognize the truth of the belief it expresses, that is, recognize the objective state of affairs that could make the belief valid. Unless they can presume that the commonly observed facts that seem to prompt assent are what render the assented proposition true, they will have nothing to anchor the communicability of the putative belief expressed by that proposition. In this way, the commonly observed connection between prompted assent (the utterance of the proposition) and the state of affairs eliciting that response can be said to cause the proposition to have the meaning it commands for those who are party to the interpretative situation.

Of course, as Davidson acknowledges, there is an element of indeterminacy in the connection between statements and what elicits their assent. What communicating individuals observe to be the source of prompted assent may not wholly correspond, just as linguistic expressions can be used, at least on occasion, in ways that indicate mistaken application. Nonetheless, divergences are counteracted and limited by further communication relating the propositions in question to other intelligible statements, as well as to other commonly observed facts.

Most importantly, the encompassing web of these connections cannot be understood to allow for massive confusion, given the restraints under which any interpreter must operate. As Davidson observes, every interpreter of a publicly expressed proposition must consider its meaning to reflect the belief of its speaker, the fact of the matter it addresses as understood by its speaker, and the intention of the speaker in stating the proposition. Instead of being random inscriptions of automatons or of monkeys sitting at a typewriter, meaningful propositions must be regarded as imbued by the rationality of their speaker. Accordingly, the asserted proposition's meaning will be understood to express a belief about a state of affairs that the interpreter can recognize as what would prompt that interpreter to hold that same belief and assent to its expression, given the same intention that the interpreter imputes to the speaker. Successful communication requires this conjunction and it applies equally to how thinkers must comprehend their own unexpressed beliefs. In order for any such belief to have a determinate content, their holder must regard them as signifying what others interpret

them to mean as expressed in connection with the observable factors that prompt their statement.

Insofar as the meanings of propositions are not indifferent to the meanings of other statements, but largely fit together into a coherent whole,¹⁹ any speaker will be compelled to interpret the statements of others as being by and large expressive of beliefs they would share if they share similar intentions to communicate and observe the same states of affairs that prompt those statements.

Separating meaning from truth

Although this may preclude speakers from regarding one another as massively wrong in their beliefs, does it guarantee that belief is by and large veridical? Does the impossibility of radical incoherence in belief²⁰ insure belief's general objectivity? The conditions of interpretation may make it incoherent for individuals to claim true knowledge of their own beliefs while denying knowledge of an external world and other minds, but do these conditions insure that all three varieties of knowledge are by and large valid?

Davidson, of course, maintains that the requirements of communication do guarantee the truth of most beliefs, as well as the general validity of first person, second person, and third person knowledge. But has he really shown any more than that communication rests upon a general conformity in prompted assent, belief, and observations of how the world appears and how speakers appear to one another? Davidson recognizes that consensus in meaning and belief cannot be evidence for their truth, but maintains that consensus can be a cause of the veridical character of belief. Yet, does the intersubjective process of interpretation laid out by Davidson entail any more than general conformity between how expressions of belief and the facts commonly observed to prompt them appear to communicating individuals? Davidson, like Hegel before him, may have given crushing arguments to preclude language, consciousness, or any other enabling condition from veiling objectivity from knowledge. This, however, does not signify that such conditions defeat skepticism by making belief veridical.²¹ These enabling conditions of thought may instead have no bearing, pro, or con, on the truth of the thoughts they make possible.

To affirm that the process of interpretation determining meaning establishes the truth of belief is just as problematic as treating communication as a conditioning blinder, leaving belief relative to language. In either case, the truth of belief is conditioned by something other than

the belief itself. Even if the triangulation of communication, where individuals determine meaning by taking cognizance of each other's linguistic reactions to the world they observe in common, does not allow any of the three varieties of empirical knowledge to have any primacy over one another, the triangulation itself figures as the foundation determining what counts as true belief.

Although that determination might appear to ward off skepticism, the truth in question is utterly formal in character. That is, knowledge of the triangulation of interpretation in no way indicates what content true belief will have. The disquotational notion of truth that Davidson invokes leaves knowledge devoid of any of the necessary character that Kantian transcendental construction provides by giving objectivity specific laws. As a consequence, Davidson's retrieval of objective knowledge leaves philosophy with little to deliver beyond the conception of interpretation that he stipulates. True knowledge of that conception, however, can hardly be derived in the manner in which it specifies the determination of true belief. Not only does that determination always leave uncertain whether any particular belief is valid, but it also depends on the prior certification by which that conception of interpretation confers global validity upon the web of belief.

This is a familiar dilemma of transcendental argument, which is always at a loss to legitimate its own knowledge of the conditions of knowing, a knowing of knowing that inveterately puts itself forward before true knowing is established. That problem can here disappear if the tie between meaning determination and the truth of belief is severed. Davidson's account can easily be revised to accept this severance, without falling back into the epistemological foundationalism that he erroneously associates with any separation of meaning and truth.²² All that needs to be done is to treat the connection between intersubjectivity and objectivity as one insuring that self-certainty be joined to certainty of others and of a common world. The unity of these beliefs does not, however, signify their truth, even if no coherent argument can be made to treat the practice of interpretation as something to which true knowledge is relative. So long as knowledge can be liberated of conditions, the interconnection of subjective, intersubjective, and objective belief need not be accorded any juridical role. If accepted in this non-transcendental form, Davidson's triangulation argument would still defeat solipsism, for it would show how first-person belief can be no more certain than belief about objects and other minds. Moreover, his arguments against scheme/content distinctions and relativizing

conceptual schemes would still unmask the futility of internal realist attempts to evade confrontation with the given.

These accomplishments would bring Davidson's repudiation of representational knowing to the threshold where Hegel takes us beyond scheme/content divides and preliminary investigations of the conditions of knowing and meaning determination. Once it is recognized that enabling conditions of discourse can have no hold upon the determination of truth, philosophy without foundations can be taken seriously.

Freedom from foundations versus the sociality of reason

Hegel recognizes that overcoming the representational opposition of consciousness and foundational justification is a logical matter, unfolding without any need of denying the connection between subjective, intersubjective, and objective belief or denying any other possible enabling conditions of thought. Because logic properly comprises the valid thinking of valid thinking, it involves an identity of method and topic, of form and content, of subject and object, which requires the elimination of the opposition of consciousness and **all scheme/content distinctions that set thought over and against something given**. Moreover, logic cannot begin with any preconception of **its own method** or of its own subject matter without **begging the question**. Since what valid thinking is cannot be dogmatically assumed but **must be established** as the outcome of logical investigation, logic's self-thinking thought must begin without any determination of method or topic. This means that logic must amount to what philosophy must be to operate without any foundations—a discourse that makes no assumptions about knowing or the given, a discourse that cannot proceed from any privileged standpoint or other form of epistemological condition, or from any description of anything that is.

This enables the logical thought of philosophy to comprise a theory of determinacy. All foundational theory begins with some presupposed privileged determinacy, precluding any non-circular account of determinacy. By contrast, philosophy without foundations must commence without any given, with indeterminacy, which alone can provide a starting point from which determinacy can be established without question begging.

Whatever emerges from the exclusion of all appeal to the given and all appeal to conditions of knowing must arise from indeterminacy without being determined by any external procedure or extraneous

introduction of presupposed contents. Any development that results from the elimination of the opposition of consciousness must be a self-development, where what emerges determines itself to be what it is. Since no given substrate underlies any such development, it will comprise not the self-determination of some given, but self-determination *per se*. The truth of the resulting determinations that may arise will not reside in any correct correspondence with independently given objects nor reside in coherence with any preexisting web of belief. The truth of what presuppositionlessly develops will lie precisely in the autonomy of its emergence. This autonomy signifies that a term has its determinacy independent of any foundations, an independence from arbitrary assumption having the positive significance of comprising an element in the self-determination underway constituting itself.

In following out this self-development, which, as such, is alone concordant with the overcoming of foundations, Hegel does not preclude any role for correspondence. Concept and objectivity arise as logical determinations which, through their own contents, follow one another in succession to emerge as inherently connected components of what Hegel calls the Idea. The Idea comprises the nonrepresentational, noncoherence notion of truth in which concept and objectivity are both intrinsically distinguished and identified. Because the Idea unites concept and objectivity in virtue of nothing but their own respective determination, their correspondence need not be guaranteed by appeal to any third term or *deus ex machina*, such as Plato's Good, the connection of sensibility and understanding within the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant, or the triangulation of interpretation in Davidson.

The concept, which, as such, is equivalent to the universal, comprises the basic form of self-determination insofar as the universal entails particularity and individuality, relating to its own differentiation as a self-differentiation, something intelligible only in terms of the logic of freedom in which what determines and what gets determined are one and the same.²³ Hegel presents the concept as the immediate result of an equalization of determiner and determined that arises from the reciprocity into which the determination of determined determinacy must resolve itself. All such relations as essence and appearance, ground and grounded, and cause and effect drive themselves to this result insofar as what grounds the grounded is determined as ground by what it grounds. This leaves what is grounded just as much the foundation of what founds it and what grounds just as much founded by what it grounds. Consequently, the concept arises not from itself, but from the

self-elimination of the two-tiered determination developed by Hegel under the rubric of the Logic of Essence. Hence, the concept is burdened by a "mere" subjectivity consisting in not being self-mediated to the extent demanded by its own self-determined character. Through judgment and syllogism, the concept gets determined by its own elements, the universal, the particular, and the individual, first through the immediate connection of the copula in judgment (e.g. the individual *is* the universal) and then through a middle term in syllogism (e.g. the universal determines the individual *by means of the particular*). In each case, however, the relationship of conceptual terms posited by judgment and syllogism remains distinct from what secures their connection. That discrepancy gets finally overcome in the disjunctive syllogism, where what mediates the distinguished concept terms becomes equivalent to them.²⁴ Through this inference (where, for example, that the universal is A is concluded from the premises that the universal is the particulars A or B or C and that the universal is not B or C), the universal ends up with the same particularization in each term (the universal that is A or B or C is A, the universal that is not B or C is A, and the universal that is A is no different from what went into forging that conclusion). Because the resulting determinations are no longer determined by anything extrinsic to themselves, all subjective connections fall away.

This provides for the determination of objectivity, which Hegel identifies as a self-mediated totality, determined in and through itself. Such objectivity is to be distinguished from a reality owing its determination to its contrast with other coeval factors, as well as from an object of consciousness or a meaning determined by conditions of interpretation, whose character is relative to the cognitive process within which it figures. If objectivity were just reality, owing its determination to its contrast with something other, it could not be known without appeal to what is not objective. If, alternately, objectivity were merely an object of some structure of cognition, it could not be known apart from the veil of that conditioning. In both cases, "objectivity" would lack the free-standing independence that alone allows it to qualify as a worthy object of true knowledge, rather than the correlate of a belief that is relative and conditioned, comprising at most a "correct" apprehension of what is mere "phenomena" or "appearance". Objectivity, by comprising instead that which is a totality determined in and through itself, provides what alone can be a nonarbitrary subject matter in its own right. This is what Hegel distinguishes from "*Gegenstand*", the given to which consciousness stands in opposition, as the "*Sache*", providing that of which knowledge would in no way be relative. Since the concept

is self-determined, it can lay hold of what is itself autonomously determined. For this reason, conceptual determination can correspond to what is just as autonomously determinate and thereby escape the gap that confronts any conditioned knowing when addressing what is putatively objective.

What logically realizes this possibility is the emergence of the Idea from objectivity. Instead of effecting the correspondence of concept and objectivity by illicitly enlisting some external agency, Hegel purports to show how objectivity's self-standing totality comes to progressively distinguish within itself a congruent conceptual determination. Detailed through the successive transformations of the objective processes of mechanism, chemism, and teleology, this development gives rise to the Idea, the structure of truth in which the correspondence of concept and objectivity has allegedly arisen through nothing but what is inherent in concept and objectivity themselves. To the degree that this development is wholly immanent to concept and objectivity, it will refute any assumptions of the inconceivability of objectivity or of the ultimate subjectivity of conceptual determination.

Objectivity in knowledge will accordingly be a matter of following out the self-constitution of the "*Sache*" itself, something that can only be accomplished by the autonomous reason of conceptual thought.²⁵ This conceptualizing does not make explicit inferential connections given in the web of communicative interaction. Such connections always involve appeal to premises, leaving all conclusions conditioned and all claims relative to an endless dissemination of judgments, whose inferential dependency leaves them inveterately incapable of finally accounting for the claims they make.²⁶ That may be the predicament of empirical belief, whose "correctness" always takes for granted the phenomenal given, as well as the phenomenally given social framework of language use. It cannot, however, juridically confine philosophical reason. Philosophy need not occupy any view from nowhere, nor extricate itself from the social reality of discourse precisely because nothing about discursive practice can possibly prevent reason from providing an autonomous conceptual development capable of thinking the equally unconditioned independence of what is truly objective.

Admittedly, the above sketch of the final reaches of Hegel's *Science of Logic* at best indicates a strategy for securing correspondence without confrontation or coherence, a strategy predicated upon the overcoming of the representational opposition of consciousness. Pursuing that strategy requires leaving Davidson behind and addressing the logical determination of concept, objectivity, and Idea, for which discursive practice

is irrelevant. On Hegel's own terms, this logical investigation will make possible and lead to *Realphilosophie*, the further systematic treatment of nature and mind. In that investigation of nonlogical reality, the thinking and speech of real selves may be accounted for in their due sociality without succumbing to the temptation of treating enabling conditions of discursive rationality as transcendental conditions of knowledge.

Notes

1 Hegel's Challenge to the Philosophy of Mind

1. See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and The Philosophy of Mind*, with a study guide by Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
2. See Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 361.
3. This provides for the "primitiveness" of what Strawson calls the person, with the caveat that Strawson's non-dualist conception relates to the problem of individual consciousness, without addressing that of the individual psyche. See P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1979), pp. 101ff.
4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, being *Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. by William Wallace together with the *Zusätze in Boumann's Text* (1845) trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), addition to §440, p. 180; addition to §441, p. 181; §445, p. 188.
5. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §387, p. 25; addition to §387, p. 26.
6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 59–60.
7. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §437, p. 178.
8. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §437, p. 178.
9. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §438, p. 178.
10. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §439, p. 178.
11. The contrast between intelligence and consciousness is manifest in how representation starts not from objects, but from intuitions to which it stands in relation. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §451, p. 201.
12. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §455, p. 206.
13. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §456, p. 209.
14. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, being *Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. by William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), remark to §20, pp. 29–30.
15. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §456, p. 209.
16. Just as habit confers a universal character upon feeling, and perception renders the object a universal nexus of properties, so remembrance gives intelligence a universal mental content by referring an image to a recollected intuition, rendering that image a representation whose content subsumes that intuition. In this respect, representation proper is already imbued with universality, albeit still conditioned by the image. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §454, p. 205.
17. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §451, p. 202.
18. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §451, p. 202.
19. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §461, p. 219.
20. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §457, p. 212.

21. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §461, p. 219.
22. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §464, p. 223.
23. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §458, p. 212.
24. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §459, p. 214.
25. See, for example, Karl Popper, who distinguishes the communication of animals from bona fide linguistic competence: Karl Popper, *The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism*, from the *Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), p. 122; Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 58–9.

2 Hegel's Solution to the Mind–Body Problem

1. Hegel provides a systematic account of these two types of categories in the successive sections of his *Science of Logic* entitled “the Logic of Being” and “the Logic of Essence”. The categories of the Logic of Being are generally determined through contrast with one another, where each term is equiprimordial and has its own character by virtue of what it is not. By contrast, the categories of the Logic of Essence involve two-tiered relations where one term has priority over the other, in some respect determining it. Such categories of essence include essence and appearance, a thing and its properties, a whole and its parts, ground and grounded, substance and accident, and cause and effect. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. by A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 79–385, 389–571.
2. Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B274–9, pp. 326–9.
3. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, p. 82.
4. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 58–66.
5. Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.
6. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Propositions 1, 2, and 7, in Spinoza, *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), pp. 245, 247.
7. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Proposition 28, p. 233, Part II, Proof to Lemma 3, p. 252, Proposition 48, p. 272.
8. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Propositions 6 and 7, p. 283, and Proposition 28, p. 293.
9. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Appendix to Part I, pp. 239–41.
10. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Proposition 2, pp. 279–80.
11. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Proposition 13, Lemmas 1–7, pp. 252–5.
12. “Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion-and-rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Proposition 13, Lemma 1, p. 252).
13. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §402, p. 88–92.
14. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §412–13, additions to §412–13, pp. 151–5.
15. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §440, addition to §440, pp. 179–81.
16. Even if one invoked the blind necessity of evolution to account for the genesis of “reflexivity”, such as in the emergence of animal life from plant life, that emergence does not account for the reflexive *actuality* of mental processes, whose self-activity remains irreducible to mechanism.
17. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 711–74.

18. So Aristotle writes in Chapter 8, Book II, of his *Physics*, "If the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature." *Physics* 199b 28–9, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Volume One, p. 341.
19. Aristotle continues, "If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself; nature is like that." *Physics* 199b 29–30, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, p. 341.
20. Similarly, Aristotle distinguishes between the active and the passive intellect, where the active intellect acts upon something else, its passive counterpart, which is thereby not self-active, but determined from without. Once more, categories of craft enter in, with the passive intellect receiving form imposed upon it by the artisanship of the active intellect. See Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book III, Chapter 5, 430a 10–26, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, p. 684.
21. Plato, *Republic*, Book II, 369b–372d, in Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), pp. 1008–11.
22. As Michael B. Foster points out in his critical evaluation of the *Republic* in *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel*, Plato still makes use of categories of craft to comprehend rule, even though these are incompatible with the reflexivity of rule. Thus Plato is compelled to divide the polis and the soul into ruling and ruled components, although ruling parts of the polis and the soul still rule over themselves. See Michael B. Foster, *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1–71. Plato, like Aristotle, lacks the conceptual resources to conceive self-rule, which is shown when Socrates argues that the soul must be divided into separate ruling and ruled parts because self-control is inconceivable, given that it requires that patient and agent be one and the same. See Plato, *Republic*, Book IV, 430e–431a, *Complete Works*, p. 1062.
23. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §389, p. 33. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel further characterizes the relation of soul and body in terms of the Idea, where the body figures as objectivity and the soul figures as the concept, with the embodied soul exhibiting the truth of the Idea, whereas a dead body is "untrue". As we shall see, this further characterization underlies the self-determining cultivation endemic to mind. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), addition to §21, p. 53.
24. This centrality is what distinguishes the sentience and irritability of animals from the sensitivity and tropism of plants, which always operate locally, involving just a particular part of the organism, without achieving the unification constitutive of subjectivity.
25. John R. Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. ix.
26. See John R. Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), pp. 50–2.
27. This is why Hume insists that one cannot derive any causal (efficient) relation from the concepts of objects. To do so would require formal causality, and more specifically, the derivation of necessary differentia from the genus, which ancient metaphysics privileges.

28. This is evident in Searle's acceptance of the "causal efficacy of consciousness" in repudiating the epiphenomenalist reduction of mind. See Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, p. 58. See also Searle, *Intentionality*, p. 265.
29. Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, p. 53.
30. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), addition to §21, p. 53.
31. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §387, p. 25; *Zusatz* to §387, p. 27; §391, pp. 35–6.
32. Hegel provides an account of this development in Chapter 1, "The Notion", of "Subjectivity" in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 600–22.
33. Hegel details the stages of this development in Chapter 2, "The Judgment", of "Subjectivity", in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 622–63.
34. Hegel details the stages of this development in Chapter 3, "The Syllogism", of "Subjectivity", in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 664–704.
35. Hegel details this development in his account of the emergence of the immediate form of Objectivity, Mechanism. See Chapter 1, "Mechanism", of "Objectivity", in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 711–26.
36. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §401, pp. 75–7.
37. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §412, p. 151, *Zusatz* to § 412, pp. 151–2.
38. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §430–5, pp. 170–6.
39. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §436–7, pp. 176–8.
40. The above discussion has benefited from the helpful comments of Stephen Houlgate.

3 Hegel, Mind, and Mechanism: Why Machines Have No Psyche, Consciousness, or Intelligence

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B274–9, pp. 326–9.
2. Roger Penrose, for example, appeals to the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics to absorb into physical reality the apparent spontaneity of mind. See Roger Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3. Hegel, *Logic*, §153 and §154, pp. 215–18; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, "B. The Relation of Causality", pp. 558–69.
4. Leibniz realizes this in his theory of monads, which stand in the completely external relationship of mechanism while being completely determined in and through themselves, irrespective of their relation to other.
5. Hegel, *Logic*, §200–3, pp. 265–7; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 727–31.
6. Hegel, *Logic*, §195, pp. 262, 263; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 711.
7. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 727.
8. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §404, p. 94.
9. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §413, p. 153.
10. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §440, p. 179.
11. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §469–80, pp. 228–38.
12. Daniel C. Dennett, *Kinds of Minds* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 50–4. Dennett here presumes that living organisms can be thought of as artifacts, a view that fails to come to grips with the fundamental difference between the external teleology of artifacts and the internal teleology of life.

13. This is why Aristotle distinguishes artifacts from substances proper, whose constitutive primacy cannot be realized by an artifact's composite of a passive form and matter, but only as an active and self-realizing form and actuality. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Zeta, Chapters 3 and 4, and Book Theta, Chapter 8.
14. Charles Taylor, *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 193–4.
15. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 193.
16. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, pp. 196–7.
17. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 165.
18. This is why reckoning can be described as being devoid of thought, of genuine conceptual determination. Hegel depicts this thoughtlessness of a mechanistic approach to logic in the Introduction of his *Science of Logic* as follows: "Its determinations are accepted in their unmoved fixity and are brought only into an external relation with each other. In judgements and syllogisms the operations are in the main reduced to and founded on the quantitative aspect of the determinations; consequently everything rests on an external difference, on mere comparison and becomes a completely analytical procedure and mechanical [*begriffloses*] calculation. ... Consequently, this thinking has been equated, not incorrectly, with reckoning, and reckoning again with this thinking. In arithmetic, numbers are regarded as devoid of any concrete conceptual content, so that apart from their wholly external relationship they have no meaning, and neither in themselves nor in their interrelationships are thoughts" (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 52–3).
19. For further analysis of how the relation between universality, particularity, and individuality comprises self-determination, see Richard Dien Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), Chapter 4, pp. 51–65.
20. Dreyfus, Hubert L., *What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. xlii.
21. Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. xxxviii.
22. Dreyfus follows Heidegger in presuming that pragmatic considerations underlie all knowledge. This claim, however, undermines itself because any evaluation of whether putative knowledge serves some interest must be determinable apart from pragmatic concerns if vicious circularity is to be avoided. This pitfall is evident when Dreyfus offers as an abiding fact that "there are in the last analysis no fixed facts ... since human beings produce facts, the facts themselves are changed by conceptual revolutions". See Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 282.
23. This is why Hegel sees it fit to characterize the atomism of Leibniz's *Monadology* as paradigmatic of mechanism. See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 712.
24. This difficulty becomes evident in pattern recognition, which depends on recognition of generic differences by means of a paradigm case. If all inputs are atomistically given, however, there can be no way of deciding which counts as the paradigm, unless one can appeal to considerations of relevance, which, as Dreyfus maintains, involves interpretation transcending information processing. See Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 294.
25. Plato, *Republic*, Book VI, 510b–c, *Complete Works*, pp. 1131–2. Dreyfus cites this discussion, despite identifying the "Platonic project" as committed to

- reducing reasoning to calculation. See Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 68.
26. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A133/B172, p. 268.
 27. So Wittgenstein muses in his *Philosophical Investigations*, "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it? ... And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones ... is there only *one* way of interpreting them?" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Third Edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 39. Dreyfus cites Wittgenstein's argument to expose how computer theorists, in their quest to render all intelligence a rule-governed mechanism, must assume an immediate, self-evident interpretation which enables them to input "context-free, completely determinate data which require no further interpretation in order to be understood". See Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 204.
 28. As Kant puts it, "The power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A133/B172, p. 268).
 29. Although Kant recognizes that "metaphysics", or knowledge obtained by pure reason, must take the form of synthetic a priori judgments, he retains the view that concepts are lifeless, fixed terms, governed by the principle of contradiction. Accordingly, he must look beyond reason for something to provide non-analytic content and this he finds in the necessary relations between sensibility and understanding in experience, **which allow different concepts to be necessarily connected in respect to knowledge of empirical objects. What Kant notoriously fails to recognize is that his own account of the conditions of experience involves a cognition that is synthetic, necessary, and not restricted to objects of experience.**
 30. See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 685, where Hegel critiques the "Leibnizian application of the calculus of combinations and permutations to the syllogism and to the combination of other notions" for operating "as though in rational combinations ... a content still retained the same determinations *that it possesses when fixed in isolation.*"
 31. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, "Introduction: General Notion of Logic", pp. 43–59, "With What Must the Science begin?", pp. 67–78.
 32. For this reason, when Dreyfus asks, "Is an exhaustive analysis of human reason into rule-governed operations on discrete, determinate, context-free elements possible?", (*What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 303) a resounding "No!" must follow from the very existence of philosophy.
 33. Even if one were to accept Dennett's claim that natural selection gives rise to functional artifacts, this does not eliminate the fact that programmers and hardware designers engage in an activity transcending the limits of machine "intelligence".
 34. Although, as Dreyfus points out, (see Dreyfus, *What Computers Still Can't Do*, p. 166) proponents of artificial intelligence aim to program computers to do this translating job themselves, it is doubtful that it could ever be done without a "human", or more generally, a "natural" mind. After all, any program that allows a computer to perform the "translation" in question

- would itself have to be supplemented with the same transition from meaningful information to meaningless bits of input.
35. This reflexivity applies to mind more globally than that particular form highlighted in Charles Taylor's characterization of humans as self-interpreting animals, who are partly constituted by their self-understanding (Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 189). As we shall see, although minds with linguistic intelligence are, in important respects, determined by what they know themselves to be, this discursive reflexivity is both phylogenetically and developmentally preceded by other forms of mental reflexivity that make self-understanding possible. For this reason, computers lack mental self-activity not just because they lack self-understanding, but because they cannot feel, perceive, desire, and so on.
 36. Searle uses this example to show, contra Fodor, that "nonintentional causal relations will always be insufficient to account for intentionality." See Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, p. 91.
 37. Errol E. Harris points this out in *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 383. As he observes, the same problem applies to those who would relate internal schemata in the brain to external things they are supposed to replicate. A model "cannot qua model apprehend that of which it is a model, much less that it is a model of something other than itself. Such apprehension ... implies a separate subject (the ghost once more) who cognizes directly both the archetype and the model and can relate them as such" (Harris, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, p. 377).
 38. Searle makes these points in arguing that "all derived intentionality is derived from the intrinsic." See Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, p. 94.
 39. Harris points this out in *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, p. 347.
 40. As Harris notes, the thermostat involves a transfer of energy, but not of information, strictly speaking, since nothing gets apprehended. The thermostat is set into action by differences in temperature, but it does not perceive these differences. See Harris, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, pp. 381–2.
 41. This refers to remarks made by Kenneth Westphal in the discussion following the delivery of an earlier version of this essay at the Hegel Society of Great Britain conference at Oxford, September 2, 2008.
 42. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 189.
 43. This is different from the "feed-back" operating when a person writes with a pencil. As Errol Harris observes, when I pick up a pencil, my arm movement is regulated by constant feedback to the muscles concerned of its change of position, which can be registered in proprioceptive sensation without being consciously perceived. Yet the pencil must be seen, which involves more than feedback, or, for that matter, the mere occurrence of retinal images. See Harris, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, p. 381.
 44. Mind is treated this way, Taylor notes, by the dualist "old metaphysical view" of awareness as an inner medium of representation which monitors what goes on in our bodies, rendering consciousness as representation, separable from the processes which it monitors (Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 200). Searle analogously points out the mistake of treating our conscious states as something known by a separate special faculty of "introspection", which retains the problematic mechanistic external distinction between

object perceived and the act of perceiving. See Searle, *Mind, Language and Society*, p. 72. Only after mind-body dualism is left behind can mind be comprehended as self-activity, irreducible to artificial intelligence. Then, when mind monitors the body, it reflexively monitors its own embodiment. Taylor himself treats consciousness as representation, maintaining that the crucial difference between men and machines is not consciousness, but the "significance feature", whereby things have significance for us non-relatively (Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 201). Yet because consciousness has a reflexivity of its own, transcending the external relations of mechanism, it would be more correct to acknowledge that consciousness comprises an activity in which machines can never engage, but that is open to men, as well as brute animals.

45. Searle points this out in *Mind, Language and Society*, p. 72.
46. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, pp. 189–90.
47. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 191.
48. See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part V, Corollary to Proposition 3: "So the more an emotion is known to us, the more it is within our control, and the mind is the less passive in respect of it." Spinoza, *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), p. 366.
49. Because the inputs enter as independently determined, the "significance" factor drops out of their processing. Essential to the utility of computing machines is that we can operate them, as Taylor notes, "without reference to the significance feature" (Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 200). Yet that equally makes them incongruent with the reflexive self-activity constitutive of mind.
50. **The role of the implicit/explicit distinction is not restricted to emotions.** Taylor, noting how moving from an implicit to an explicit understanding about something alters its significance, presumes that this applies to what is an object for a practical agent, whose objects, be they emotions or projects, owe their character to how that agent understands him or herself (see Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, p. 198). Yet the implicit/explicit distinction also applies to the various shapes of consciousness, insofar as when consciousness takes cognizance of how its own activity determines what it takes its object to be, its object gets altered. Hegel formulates the general path of this alteration in the Introduction to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 54–6.
51. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §409–10, pp. 139–43.
52. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §418–19.
53. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §420–1, pp. 161–2.
54. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §422–3, pp. 162–5.
55. This connection is fundamental to Husserl's phenomenological analysis of consciousness, which accounts for mental contents via the mental acts constitutive of them. Unlike Hegel, Husserl ascribes to phenomenological analysis a global epistemological significance, equating the standpoint of consciousness with knowing per se. Instead of properly treating the phenomenology of consciousness as a part of philosophical psychology, Husserl makes the fatal move of transcendental philosophy, treating a privileged description of the structure of knowing as an epistemological foundation. What always remains beyond examination and critique is the knowing of

knowing performed by the transcendental philosopher. Husserl gives his classic statement of this errant move in Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960).

4 Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity

1. See Descartes, René, *Meditations On First Philosophy*, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), Meditation One.
2. Significantly, Kant construes this self-relation as involving *not* awareness of consciousness as an object of experience, but only the *thought* of the “I”, a thought which must always be thinkable, rather than actually thought, in conjunction with awareness of any object. This thought, moreover, is a completely empty representation of a self devoid of any individuating content. Why this is so will become clear in the following. See also Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 82.
3. Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B274–9.
4. See Strawson, *Individuals*, Chapter 2, pp. 64–86.
5. See Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book III, Chapter 12, 434b1–22. The irreducibility of spatial perception, as a precondition of the unity of consciousness, may support Aristotle’s claim. Visual perception, for example, may not be able to provide spatial perception without being coordinated with touch, which first allows differences of light and dark and color to convey spatial relations.
6. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A189–218, B232–65.
7. Of course, Kant’s psychological determinism leaves this possibility inexplicable, at least as far as observable behavior is concerned.
8. Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 98, 101.
9. See M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Colin Smith (Routledge: London, 1998) and Strawson, *Individuals*.
10. In section 16 of the B edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant points out that because the representation, “I think”, must accompany all other representations, it cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. Hence, nothing manifold can be given in the “I think”, which must be a purely simple representation, devoid of individuating content. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B132 and B135.
11. Strawson makes this point. See *Individuals*, p. 82.
12. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 99.
13. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §426–9, p. 167–70.
14. In the additions to §418 (p. 159) and §423 (pp. 164–5) of his *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel suggests that self-consciousness becomes kindled when consciousness observes a living organism, whose self-sustaining process confronts consciousness with something subjective. Consciousness cannot thereby become objective to itself, even if life has a self-ordering character akin to the self of consciousness. The awareness of life still remains distinct from the life it observes. The same can be said of consciousness of law. Hegel suggests, in the addition to §422 (p. 163) of the *Philosophy of Mind*, that observing law in nature confronts consciousness with the same inner unity of distinct determinations characterizing its own ego. But does consciousness thereby become objective to itself and turn into self-consciousness,

as Hegel intimates (albeit with the qualification that the transformation of consciousness is only *implicit*) in §423 (p. 164)? Law may be internally differentiated like the ego, but law does not oppose itself to its determinations in the way in which consciousness disengages itself from its own mental content while relating to it as something other, objective. Hence, law is not consciousness of an object, nor is consciousness of law consciousness of consciousness.

15. The latter is what Kant referred to as the "maxim" of action.
16. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §425, p. 165.
17. For this reason, Hegel describes consciousness of desire as abstract self-consciousness. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §425, p. 165.
18. As Hegel observes, self-consciousness as desire is thereby the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. As much as desire relates to the object as null, it still confronts it as an other. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §425, p. 165.
19. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §428, p. 169.
20. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §428, p. 169.
21. As Hegel puts it, immediate self-consciousness has only the "I" for its object, not yet the "I=I". See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §424, p. 165.
22. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §432, p. 172; and addition to §432, p. 172.
23. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §430–5, pp. 170–6.
24. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), p. 490.
25. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §436–7, pp. 176–8.
26. Conscious subjects may, however, have difficulty recognizing the desire of others, as is perhaps exhibited in certain cases of autism, where individuals seem unable to distinguish minds from things and therefore fail to develop linguistic intelligence.
27. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §437, p. 177.

5 From Representation to Thought: Reflections on Hegel's Determination of Intelligence

1. Although Husserl claims that "there exist no endless regresses that are infected with difficulties of any kind ... despite the evident possibility of reiterable transcendental reflections and criticisms", he admits that the radical self-investigation of such philosophy is "in the form of an endless program". See Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 152.
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag), §438, pp. 228–9; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §438, p. 178.
3. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §440, p. 230; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §440, p. 180.
4. As Hegel observes, consciousness may know *that* an object is, engaging in *Wissen*, but intelligence aims to know *what* the object is, to know its substantial nature, that is, to engage in cognition proper, *Erkennen*. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §445, p. 244; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §445, p. 191.
5. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §445, p. 245; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §445, p. 192.

6. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 155, A19/B33.
7. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §441, p. 234; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §441, p. 182.
8. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §452, pp. 258–9; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §452, p. 203.
9. Empiricism tends to take the content shared by intuition and image as if it were equivalent to universality. What results is a reduction of universality to a common mark, a shared sensible quality, effectively restricting reason to qualitative judgments and qualitative inferences in which abstract universality reigns to the exclusion of either the universality of genus and species or the concrete universal. For an analysis of these different types of universality and of the judgments and syllogisms in which they figure, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 89–130.
10. Sensation gives way to perception when consciousness relates to its mental content as a mediated given, attending to certain elements of the manifold of sensation in distinction from others. Through this grouping, consciousness distinguishes from itself a particular collection of singular aspects of sensation. As such, the collection is differentiated from other similarly effected collections, each of which consists of just the sensible features it contains. Since these features are immediately given, however, their grouping is external to them and depends upon the unification that consciousness effects by attending to them in distinction from other parts of the sensible manifold. What consciousness thereby confronts is a thing with properties, where the thing consists in a collection of sensible factors for which it lacks any further principle of unity.
11. Hegel speaks of the general representation also taking the form of a genus (*Werke 10*, Zusatz to §456, p. 266; *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §456, p. 209). Strictly speaking that would require a universal that determines its particularization, at least to the degree to which the genus entails its own species, while leaving individual members of its lowest species unindividuated by their membership. The workings of the imagination, however, would only be able to come up with family resemblances, which represent class groupings, whose particulars are simply given, rather than determined by the unity of the universal, as in genus and species.
12. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §456, p. 266; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §456, p. 209.
13. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §456, p. 266; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §456, p. 209.
14. Hegel does, however, describe intelligence as having united universal and particular, inward and outward, representation and intuition, insofar as the universal representation becomes the substantial power over the image, rendering it an accident. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §456, p. 267; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §456, p. 209.
15. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §457, p. 269; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §457, p. 211.
16. Just as habit confers a universal character upon feeling and perception renders the object a universal nexus of properties, so remembrance gives intelligence a universal mental content by referring an image to a recollected intuition, rendering that image a representation whose content subsumes that intuition. In this respect, representation proper is already imbued with universality, albeit still conditioned by the image. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, §454, p. 261; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §454, p. 205.

17. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §451, p. 257; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §451, p. 202.
18. As Hegel points out, in making signs, intelligence gives its own original representations (namely the general representations produced by its associating imagination) a definite existence in an intuition, which it thereby renders the property of mind. Instead of connoting the object to which it otherwise refers, the intuitable bearer of the sign connotes the meaning conferred upon it by mind. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, §458, p. 270; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §458, p. 212.
19. One might object that without some conceptual description, no representation can be identified. Of course, if this were true, no representation could be recognized without already involving thinking. But no description can retain generality while possessing solely a unique exemplification that would allow it to identify just one representation.
20. Sense and meaning do not yet take the form of distinct verbal expressions, as they do with the canonical example of the evening and morning stars. The basic semiotic relation involves sense simply as the intuition that connotes a separate meaning, consisting of a general representation. When the sign gets recollected, the semiotic relation connects an image to the generalized representation it connotes, but it still does not comprise a relation between signs. Thus it does not involve the syntactical relations that come into play when a plurality of signs get associated. This is indicative of why sign production and sign recollection do not yet involve language proper, but only provide its prerequisite materials. As McCumber observes, what sign production and recollection provides "lacks syntax and grammar: it is a vocabulary, rather than a true language." See John McCumber, *The Company of Words: Hegel, Language, and Systematic Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 228.
21. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §460, p. 277; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §460, p. 218.
22. That the connection of the image of the sign to its meaning is remembered does not prevent individuals from recognizing the meaning of a word they hear without being able to produce its written expression. In that case, they do remember the aural image of the word together with its significance. Moreover, as Hegel observes, because the reproduction of words presupposes their retention, we can learn to speak and write a language after understanding it. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §461, p. 219.
23. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §461, p. 219.
24. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §461, p. 219.
25. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, §460, p. 277; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §460, p. 219. The factor in the name is discursive reality, the objectivity that is conceptualizable and expressible in words.
26. In Book X of the *Confessions*, Augustine similarly points out that with verbal memory mind stores the facts themselves and not their images. The facts in question comprise the object of the "liberal sciences", the conceptually determinate subject matter which Hegel terms, "die Sache". See Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 217.

27. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, §460, p. 277; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §460, p. 219.
28. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §461, p. 219.
29. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §461, p. 219.
30. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §462, p. 280; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §462, p. 221.
31. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §462, p. 280; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §462, p. 220.
32. Žižek observes, pace McCumber, that “names in ‘representational language’ possess a fixed universal content determined not by their relationship to other names but by their relationship to represented reality.” See Slavoj Žižek, *Interrogating the Real* (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 195–6. That the mirroring of “representational language” provides only a vocabulary without syntax or grammar is indicative of how language proper necessarily entails thinking, whose autonomy transcends the fixed limits of representation.
33. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §461, p. 278; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §461, p. 220.
34. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §462, p. 280; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §462, p. 220.
35. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, p. 281; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
36. This rote triggering formally anticipates “what is missing” in “representational language”, “a word that would not merely represent its external content but would also constitute it, bring it forth, a word through which this signified content would become what it is—in short a ‘performative’”. See Žižek, *Interrogating the Real*, pp. 196–7. Because, however, mechanical memorization involves an ordering that is not inherent in its words, but depends solely on rote intelligence, it still lacks the unity of form and content constitutive of the autonomy of thought.
37. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, p. 281; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
38. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, p. 281; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
39. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, p. 281; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
40. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, p. 281; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
41. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §463, pp. 281–2; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §463, p. 222.
42. Žižek suggests that what mechanical memory here achieves is equivalent to what Lacan characterizes as the passage from the representational dimension where a “sign represents something ... for someone” to the performative dimension where “the signifier ... represents the subject itself for other signifiers” (Žižek, *Interrogating the Real*, pp. 197–8). The verbal expression of rote memorization, however, can only manifest the empty connection, the evacuated verbal space that the subject comprises. If, to paraphrase Lacan, the “signifier ‘falls into the signified’” (Žižek, *Interrogating the Real*, p. 199), the resulting identification has yet to generate meaningful discourse, that is, determinate thought.
43. As McCumber observes, “by sacrificing ... representational meaning”, mechanical memory “clears the ground for the development of content from within thought itself, without that development being infected by content externally derived.” See McCumber, *The Company of Words*, p. 237.
44. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §464, p. 282; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §464, p. 223.

45. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §464, p. 282; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §464, p. 223.
46. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §464, p. 282; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §464, p. 223.
47. As DeVries observes, "insofar as thought treats ... words only with respect to their necessary connections, ... words are raised to signs of concepts, not mere general representations. Mechanical memory is the transition to thought because it represents the point at which thought can begin to realize itself as the pure activity of organizing and uniting words." See Willem A. DeVries, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 163.
48. Samuel Beckett's novel, *The Unnameable* (New York: Grove Press, 1959), provides a stark exemplification of intelligence that knows itself as nothing but the interminable stream of its own words. The inability of that intelligence to ultimately identify itself or to escape a loquacious solipsism is precluded once one follows Hegel in realizing that intelligence involves both psyche and consciousness, including the embodiment and the recognitive interaction with other self-conscious agents of desire that these forms of mind already entail. As we have seen, the very production of signs requires the embodiment of intelligence, which is one more reason why Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo* is mistaken in claiming that philosophers should long for death and the separation of soul and body.
49. These propositions could be articulated prior to engaging in the thinking that judgment involves insofar as, to quote DeVries, "a mere statement of contingent fact is only a proposition: an attempt to theorize or explain is a judgment The raising of a representation to thought and the raising of a proposition to a judgment are quite similar in nature. Although informed with the grammatical structures of thinking, propositions are at the level of representation and share with that level the concern with individuality *per se*." See DeVries, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 183.
50. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §465, p. 283; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §465, p. 224.
51. Because thought thinks about what is conceptual, it needs no mediating connector, no representation to convey its object.
52. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §465, p. 284; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §465, p. 224.
53. Because thinking thinks thoughts, which as such are universal, the object of thought cannot comprise a beyond for reason, to which it must stand in a representational relation. As DeVries puts it, "In true thought we stand in a nonrepresentational relation to the object of our thought, which must always be a universal." See DeVries, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 171.
54. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §465, p. 284; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §465, p. 224.
55. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §465, p. 284; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §465, p. 224.
56. Hegel does distinguish between the condition where we only *are* thinking and the condition where we also know ourselves as thinking. The latter occurs only when we have risen to pure thinking, which knows that it, not feeling or representation, is alone able to grasp the truth of things. See Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §465, p. 284; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §465, p. 224.
57. DeVries observes in this connection that "thoughts here are in an important sense present to mind as merely given; that is we find language already there

and already cutting the world up a certain way. We do not invent the words we use, we learn them" (DeVries, *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 177). Empirically speaking, individuals may begin thinking in such circumstances, but the emergence of thinking cannot systematically take thought and its verbal expression for granted, but may presuppose general representations, representational vocabulary, and propositions restricted to them.

58. That problem, of course, arises only insofar as the naming of empirical objects does not already involve expressions and recognitions of thoughts.
59. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §466, p. 284; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §466, p. 225.
60. This is the space of reasons that Wilfrid Sellars connects to linguistic interaction (see his *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*), and whose inferential relationships his follower, Robert Brandom, aims to make explicit (see his *Making It Explicit* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)). Empirical knowing may exemplify this formal cognition, but philosophical reasoning cannot be confined to it. This is reflected in how Hegel's account of finite cognition in Chapter 2 ("The Idea of Cognition") of Section Three of the *Science of Logic's* Doctrine of the Notion only serves as a way station to the logical knowing of the Absolute Idea, in which finite cognition's subjective unity of concept and objectivity and the good's objective unity of concept and objectivity are united, surmounting their respective limitations.
61. Hegel, *Werke 10*, §467, p. 285; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §467, p. 225.
62. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §467, pp. 286–7; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §467, p. 227.
63. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §467, pp. 286–7; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §467, p. 227.
64. Hegel, *Werke 10*, Zusatz to §467, pp. 286–7; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §467, p. 227.
65. What makes this a merely theoretical, rather than practical identity is that it remains in mind. The activity of thinking may produce its own object, but that object is an object of thought, existing within the space of words. In order for that identity to become practical, intelligence must become a will, making its own thinking an object to itself by actualizing its own identification of concepts and objectivity as a product of its activity.

6 The Psychology of Will and the Deduction of Right: Rethinking Hegel's Theory of Practical Intelligence

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Werke 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), §2, p. 30.
2. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 818–23 and §233 and §234 of Hegel, *Logic*, pp. 290–1.
3. These aspects of the logical determinacy of the good indicate that will, *per se*, cannot qualify as self-determined in several respects. First, will has its subjective content prior to the activity by which will makes objectivity conform to itself. To be self-determined, will would have also to determine its own content through its activity. Then, in determining objectivity, will would be determining itself. That requires, of course, that the objectivity in question does not remain standing over against the will as something independently given.

Significantly, Hegel's entire analysis of practical intelligence addresses the will insofar as it has yet to achieve self-determination. Objective spirit, by contrast, addresses the reality of the free will, which is an objectivity determined by itself.

4. As John McCumber observes, "the classical Greek moral vocabulary famously has no word for 'will'. To Plato and Aristotle, that we could actually do something that goes against both our desires and our reason is simply unthinkable, because those are the only things in us that can lead to action at all." See John McCumber, *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy in the McCarthy Era* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 105.
5. In §8 of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel maintains that the formal opposition of subjectivity and objectivity as external immediate existences comprises the formal will as self-consciousness. Although this might suggest that will involves merely self-consciousness, Hegel points out that the relationship of consciousness comprises only the appearance of the will, which no longer comes into consideration to the degree that spirit (intelligence) is what here lies at issue. See Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §8, p. 58.
6. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §399–411, pp. 71–148.
7. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, see §413–15, pp. 153–6.
8. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §426–8, pp. 167–9.
9. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §430–3, pp. 170–4.
10. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §434–6, pp. 174–7.
11. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §445 and Zusatz to §445, pp. 188–92.
12. See the addition to §469 in Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*.
13. In §8 of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel claims that the difference between the forms of will are comprised by what particularization the will gives itself in moving beyond the abstract universality of its point of departure. This applies generally to both the stages of volition leading to the free will as well as to the different types of self-determination constituting the different spheres of right. See Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §8, p. 57.
14. Why the will need be bound to givens at the outset is reflected in the logical emergence of the concept, where self-determined determinacy emerges when the difference between determiner and determined eliminates itself in the course of the development of the categories of essence. Because self-determined determinacy arises once what is determined and what determines becomes indistinguishable, self-determination necessarily arises not from itself, but from an antecedent development. As a result, self-determined determinacy must further develop so that it can be what it has determined itself to be, and thereby be consistent with itself. This progressively occurs when the concept gets determined by its own constitutive factors in judgment (for example, where the universal becomes determined by the particular and the individual), and further when this determination becomes mediated by its own factors (for example, when judgment gives way to syllogism, where factors of the concept are mediated by another factor—the individual is universal through its particularity). See Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, for a detailed investigation of these stages in conceptual development.
15. Charles Taylor gives an important analysis of these differences between mechanistically determined behavior and volition (action) in Chapter Two

- of his *Explanation of Behaviour* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 26–53.
16. As Hegel puts it, the will is first only free in itself, only the immediate or natural will. See Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §11, p. 62.
 17. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §11, p. 63.
 18. Hegel, *Werke* 10, §471.
 19. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §472.
 20. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §472.
 21. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §469.
 22. See the addition to §473 of Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*.
 23. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §473.
 24. So Hegel describes each impulse as something universal and indeterminate with various objects and manners of satisfaction. See Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, 12, p. 63.
 25. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, Zusatz to §15, p. 67.
 26. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, §16, p. 68.
 27. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, §17, p. 68.
 28. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, §20, p. 71.
 29. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, Zusatz to §20, p. 71.
 30. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §479.
 31. Kant labels imperatives of happiness assertoric, rather than problematic, because he regards happiness to be one end actual in all rational agents. Kant recognizes, however, that only counsels of prudence can be provided to guide the pursuit of happiness, given the subjective contingency of what fulfillments one will judge to be part of one's happiness. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 415–16, pp. 82–4. Admittedly, any rational agent with understanding can represent happiness as an end. Nevertheless not only is the realization of happiness always unattainable with any finality, but individuals need not aim at happiness simply in virtue of acting on impulse. The pursuit of happiness requires a specific development of choice which all thinking individuals may be able to undertake, but which they may ignore by simply choosing impulses in their isolated singularity.
 32. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §480.
 33. When Aristotle identifies happiness as an activity for its own sake consisting in virtuous conduct, he is conceiving something fundamentally different from happiness as it figures within practical intelligence. Aristotle is conceiving something ethical, involving a self-sustaining association with objective ends, pursued in common by members of a community that already realizes the ends in question. Such ends are objective both by being universal to all individuals who fulfill their roles in the community by jointly pursuing them and by being such that they can only be sought by individuals who belong to a community which embodies those ends. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, Chapters 7–8, 1097b–1100a in *The Complete Works of Aristotle—Volume II*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1734–7.
 34. By uniting concept and objectivity, the will exhibits the logic of the Idea, which is why objective spirit can be characterized by Hegel as the Idea of

freedom. By contrast, practical intelligence exhibits only the concept of freedom, still subjective and formal.

35. Accordingly, the actual free will, whose emergence brings closure to the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, is characterized in §481 of the *Philosophy of Spirit* as the unity of theoretical and practical spirit.
36. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, remark to §21, p. 72.
37. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, Zusatz to §21, p. 73, §26, p. 76.
38. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, §26, p. 76.
39. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, Zusatz to §26, p. 78.
40. Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts*, §22, p. 74.

7 Beyond the Sociality of Reason: From Davidson to Hegel

1. Hegel dissects this basic problematic of representational knowing in the "Introduction" to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. William Maker succinctly develops the connections comprising this problematic in his analysis of the "Objectivity Problem" of modern epistemology in *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 218–23.
2. This is exhibited in the shapes of consciousness that Hegel observes under the heading of "Spirit" in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
3. Davidson, Donald, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 140.
4. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 137.
5. Wilfrid Sellars makes these same transcendental moves in his seminal work, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, as does his follower, Robert B. Brandom in *Making It Explicit*.
6. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 175.
7. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp. 146, 151.
8. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 127.
9. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 88.
10. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 128.
11. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp. 105, 118–20, 128–9.
12. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp. 104–5.
13. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §409–12, pp. 139–52.
14. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §413–39, pp. 153–78. The recognition of desire is significant, for, as Davidson notes, individuals cannot recognize one another to have beliefs unless they can recognize one another to have desires, inasmuch as belief is indicated by intentional behavior, which can only be recognizable as such if recognized to emanate from desire. See Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 126, and also Chapter 4, which explores how recognitive desire makes possible the pre-linguistic self-consciousness without which discourse cannot emerge.
15. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 130.
16. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 104.
17. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 104.
18. As Davidson points out, an individual may have a secret code that no one else can understand, but this code can be a "language" only for someone who already possesses a first language, which cannot itself be private. See Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 116.

19. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 96.
20. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 99.
21. William Maker provides a parallel analysis of how Davidson fails to refute the skeptic in his important essay, "The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments", in *Philosophy Without Foundations*, pp. 199–216.
22. Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p. 145.
23. For further analysis of the connection between self-determination and the concept, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic*, pp. 51–65.
24. For a detailed examination of how the concept develops into judgment, how the forms of judgment get determined, and how the forms of syllogism achieve closure, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 67–130.
25. For further examination of the logical relation between concept and objectivity, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 130–44.
26. For this reason, Brandom, like Sellars before him, can never succeed in accounting for the reasoning he employs in arguing for the "rationalist holist pragmatism" he imposes upon cognition.

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Hegel and Mind draws upon Hegel's theory of 'Subjective Spirit' to address the key problems of philosophical psychology. Winfield rethinks Hegel's account of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence to resolve the dilemmas of mind-body dualism and reveal the psychological reality of reason. *Hegel and Mind* shows why mental activity is not reducible to computation and why machines can never feel, be conscious, or think. Hegel's famous analysis of desire and recognition is shown to establish how self-consciousness can be without thought or language, making possible the emergence of linguistic intelligence. On this basis, Hegel's theory of representation is enlisted to grasp how thought can arise, enabling philosophy to account for its own psychological conditions. *Hegel and Mind* thereupon brings closure to the philosophy of mind by exploring the psychology of will, arriving at the threshold of ethics. The final chapter makes explicit the significance for knowledge of Hegel's account of mind, showing why mental processes may be enabling conditions of knowledge, but not epistemological foundations distinguishing true from false beliefs.

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